Green v. Frazier

176 N.W. 11, 44 N.D. 395, 1920 N.D. LEXIS 93
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 2, 1920
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 176 N.W. 11 (Green v. Frazier) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Green v. Frazier, 176 N.W. 11, 44 N.D. 395, 1920 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 1920).

Opinions

Grace, J.

This action was commenced by the plaintiffs, in the county of Cass, to procure an injunction to restrain the defendants, each of whom is a state officer of the state of North Dakota, from disbursing certain public funds in the state treasury, aggregating perhaps several hundred thousand dollars; and, further, to restrain the defendants from issuing certain state bonds, and to have declared invalid, null and void, certain amendments of the state Constitution, and certain statutes authorizing the disbursing of such money, and the execution, sale, and delivery of such bonds. The venue of the action was changed by a proper order to the county of Burleigh.

The plaintiffs are taxpayers of this state, and as such bring this action. The decisions in this case, in so far as it interprets the provisions of the Constitution and laws of this state, will be binding upon not only these taxpayers, but all others of this state.

At a general election in this state, there were ten proposed constitutional amendments to the Constitution of the state of North Dakota, legally submitted to the electors for adoption or rejection. Each of them received a majority of the votes cast at such election, and thus they were duly adopted by the electors. They were then duly presented to the legislature of the state of North Dakota, and, by resolution of the House of Representatives of the state of North Dakota,.the Senate concurring, agreed to and declared a party of the Constitution of the state, and each of said amendments was duly adopted, and thus became effective as part of the Constitution of the state of North Dakota.

The validity of two of such constitutional amendments is challenged by this action, and claimed, thereby, to be null and void.

Section 182 of the Constitution, prior to its amendment, is as fol[401]*401lows: “The state may, to meet casual deficits or failure in the revenue or in case of extraordinary emergencies contract debts, but such debts shall never in the aggregate exceed the sum of $200,000, exclusive of what may be the debt of North Dakota at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

“Every such debt shall be authorized by law for certain purposes to be definitely mentioned therein, and every such law shall provide for levying an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest semiannually, and the principal within thirty years from.the passage of such law, and shall specially appropriate the proceeds of such tax to the payment of .said principal and interest, and such appropriation shall not be repealed or the tax discontinued until such debt, both principal and interest, shall have been fully paid.

“No debt in excess of the limit named shall be incurred except for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, defending the state in time of war, or to provide for public defense in case of threatened hostilities; but the issuing of new bonds to refund existing indebtedness, shall not be construed to be any part or portion of said •$200,000.”

As amended, § 182 is as follows:

“The state may issue or guarantee the payment of bonds, providing that all bonds in excess of $2,000,000 shall be secured by first mortgages upon real estate in amounts not to exceed one half of its value; •or upon real and personal property of state-owned utilities, enterprises or industries in amounts not exceeding its value, and, provided further, that the state shall not issue or guarantee bonds upon property of state-owned utilities, enterprises or industries in excess of $10,000,000.
“No future indebtedness shall be incurred by the state, unless evidenced by bond issues, which shall be authorized by law for certain purposes, to be clearly defined.
“Every law authorizing a bond issue shall provide for levying an ■annual tax, or may make other provisions, sufficient to pay the interest semiannually, and the principal within thirty years from the passage of such law, and shall specially appropriate the proceeds of such tax, or of such other provisions, to the payment of said principal and interest, and such appropriation shall not be repealed nor the tax or other [402]*402provisions discontinued until such debt, both principal and interest, shall have been paid.
“No debt, in excess of the limit named herein shall be incurred except for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, defending the state in time of war or to provide for the public defensé in case of threatened hostilities.”

Section 185 of the Constitution, before its amendment, is as follows: “Neither the state nor any county, city, township, town, school district or any other political subdivision shall loan or give its credit or make donations to’ or in aid of any individual, association or corporation, except for necessary support of the poor, nor subscribe to or become the owner of the capital stock of any association or corporation, nor shall the state engage in any work of internal improvement, unless authorized by two-thirds vote of the people.”

As amended, the section is as follows: “The state, any county or city may make internal improvements and may engage in any industry, enterprise or business, not prohibited by article 20 of the Constitution, but neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall otherwise loan or give its credit or make donations to or in aid of any individual, association or corporation except for reasonable support of the poor, nor subscribe to or become the owner of capital stock in any association or corporation.”

The specific laws claimed by the plaintiff to be unconstitutional, void and of no effect, and which were enacted by the 16th legislative assembly, are as follows:

House Bill 17, the Industrial Commission Act; House Bill 18, Bank of North Dakota Act; House Bill 49, Bank of North Dakota Bond Act; Senate Bill 130, Bank of North Dakota, Beal Estate Act; Senate Bill 20, the Mill and Elevator Association Act; Senate Bill 75, the Mill and Elevator Association Bond Act; Senate Bill 19, the Home Building Act.

The Industrial Commission Act created and established the industrial commission, the duties of which are to conduct and manage, on behalf of the state of North Dakota, certain state utilities, industries, enterprises, and business projects, then and thereafter established by law. Numerically, the industrial commission consists of three mem[403]*403bers, and its personnel is the governor, the attorney general, and the Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor, of the state of North Dakota. Its powers and duties are defined by the act creating it.

“The Bank of North Dakota Act” is one declaring the purpose of the state of North Dakota to engage in the banking business, and establishing a system of banking, under the name of “the ¿Bank of North Dakota,” operated by the state. The act defines the scope and manner of its operation, and the powers and duties of the persons charged with its management.

The powers, duties and privileges of “the Bank of North Dakota” are fully set forth in the act creating it, and its operation, management and control are, by the act, committed to the industrial commission.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
176 N.W. 11, 44 N.D. 395, 1920 N.D. LEXIS 93, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/green-v-frazier-nd-1920.