Green v. Cleveland

33 N.E.2d 35, 33 Ohio Law. Abs. 72, 1940 Ohio App. LEXIS 1153
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 29, 1940
DocketNo. 17581
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 33 N.E.2d 35 (Green v. Cleveland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Green v. Cleveland, 33 N.E.2d 35, 33 Ohio Law. Abs. 72, 1940 Ohio App. LEXIS 1153 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940).

Opinions

OPINION

By MORGAN, J.

The plaintiff, a classified civil service employee of the City of Cleveland, brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment holding that classified civil service employees of Cleveland are prohibited by §140 of the City Charter from campaigning at an election either for or against a bond issue, a special tax levy, amendments to the City Charter, or in favor of or against any issue submitted to the electorate of the City of Cleveland.

Section 140 of the Cleveland Charter reads as follows:

“No person about to be appointed to any position in the administrative service of the city, shall sign or execute a resignation, dated or undated, in advance of such appointment. No person in the service of the city shall discharge, suspend, lay off, reduce in grade or in any manner change the official rank or compensation of any person in such service, or promise or threaten to do so, for withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of money, or service, or any valuable thing for any political purpose. No person in the service of the city shall use his official authority to influence or coerce the political action of any person or body, or to interfere with any nomination or election to public office. No person in the classified service of the city shall act as an officer of a political organization or take part in a political campaign or serve as a member of a committee of any such organization, or circulate or seek signatures to any petition provided for by primary or [73]*73election- laws, or act as a worker in favor of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.”

The position of the City of Cleveland is that employees in the classified service are not prohibited by §140 of the charter from taking part in a campaign for or against a special tax levy, a bond issue, or a charter amendment “which does not involve a fundamental change in the governmental set-up pf the city.”

No evidence was introduced at the trial and the case was heard on the statements and admissions in the pleadings. Defendants admit that it is not unusual for classified employees of the city to campaign for special tax levies, bond issues and for charter amendments when requested so to do by the city administration.

The trial court held that a civil service employee of the city is engaged in a political campaign when he

“makes a concerted or systematic effort to influence others in their right of franchise in favor of or against either a candidate for public office or any issue to be determined by vote of the ' city,”

and that therefore such employee is prohibited by §140-of the charter from taking part in any such campaign.-

The city contends that the provision in §140 of the city charter which states that

“no person in the classified service of the city shall act as an officer of a political organization or take part in a ipolitical campaign,”

only prohibits a civil service employee from becoming an officer of a partisan or party organization and from taking part in campaigns participated in ---or conducted by party organizations- which, as is well known, interest themselves generally, if not altogether, in campaign's for the nomination and election,, of public officials.

The question to be determined in this case is whether campaigning for or against an issue which is submitted to the electorate is “political” in its nature and is prohibited by the part of §140 of the charter which states,

“No person in the classified service of the city * * * shall take part an a political campaign.”

The meaning of the word “campaign” is not ambiguous. Any organized effort to promote a cause or to secure some definite result with any group of persons is referred to as a campaign. When the result or purpose to be attained is “political” in its nature, then the organized effort can be said to be a “political campaign”. It follows that the question to be determined in this case, therefore, can be stated with accuracy to be whether a campaign to pass or defeat a special levy, bond issue or charter amendment is a campaign to attain a “political” result or is for a “political” purpose.

Whether or not the words “political campaign” shall be given the narrow construction contended for by the city, or the somewhat broader construction contended for by the plaintiff, cannot be determined or assisted greatly by dictionary definitions of the words “politics” and “political”.

It is common knowledge that these words are sometimes given by common usage the narrow definition contended for by the defendants and sometimes the broader meaning asserted by plaintiff. What is and what is not a “political campaign” must be determined pri‘marily from the evident purpose of the framers of the charter in adopting §140, and by adopting that construction of the word “political” which will accomplish the evident purpose of the makers of the charter in framing the section.

The word “political” is first used in §140 of the charier in the concluding words of the following sentence:

“No person in the classified service of the city shall discharge, suspend,' lay off; reduce in grade or in any manner change the official rank or compensation of any person in such service, or promise or threaten to do so, for withholding or neglecting to make any [74]*74contribution of money or service or any valuable thing for any political purpose.”

What is the meaning of the words “political purpose” as used in the above sentence? It is conceded that if a person in the classified service, when asked, refuses to contribute money or services to elect or defeat a candidate for public office, it. would be a violation of the above provision to punish him in any way for such refusal. Let us consider a different case. An employee in the classified service of the city is asked by a superior in authority to contribute money or services to carry a special tax levy, bond issue or charter amendment at an election. The employee refuses to comply with the request, with the result that because of such refusal he is discharged or laid off or his pay is cut, or his superior threatens him with such treatment. In a proper case brought to its attention, would and should a court hold that the employee had been punished of threatened because he withheld or neglected to make a contribution of money or services “for a political purpose”.

We can find no justification whatsoever for limiting the meaning of the words “political purpose” so as to protect an employee in the classified service when he refuses to make a contribution of money or services to elect- or defeat candidates for public office while at the same time to deny him any protection when he refuses to campaign for or against some issue submitted to a popular vote. No valid reason can be suggested for interpreting the above provision so as to give such an employee protection in one case and to deny him protection in the other.

The words “political purpose” in their natural meaning would include any purpose to be attained at an election whether the voters at such election are asked to vote on issues or for or against candidates, and such a construction carries out the evident intent and purpose of this provision of §140 of the charter.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
33 N.E.2d 35, 33 Ohio Law. Abs. 72, 1940 Ohio App. LEXIS 1153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/green-v-cleveland-ohioctapp-1940.