Green v. Augusta Ford
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-01-220 ERIC GREEN, coon Plaintiff PONS LS rAAY ™ V. sep MY DECISION AND ORDER AUGUSTA FORD, Defendant
This matter is before the court on Defendant, Augusta Ford’s, motion for partial summary judgment. !
This case revolves around the alleged sexual harassment of Plaintiff Eric Green (“Plaintiff”) by his co-worker Dwayne Raymond (“Raymond”) at their place of employment, Defendant Augusta Ford (“Defendant”). The following facts are undisputed.
Plaintiff and Raymond worked for Defendant at the same time. Raymond was known as “crass and crude,” and “liked to harass people about just about anything... just anything to pump you up.” Raymond made numerous sexual comments to Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff’s wife, her physique, and sexual activity with her. Raymond told Plaintiff on at least two occasions that he wanted to have sexual intercourse with Plaintiff's wife. Raymond also told Plaintiff that he wanted to have sex
with Plaintiff and Plaintiff's wife as a threesome on at least four occasions.” Raymond
" The original complaint also named Dwayne Raymond, an employee of Augusta Ford and co-worker of Plaintiff's, as a defendant. The parties stipulated to a dismissal of the complaint against Raymond, per Stipulation of April 29, 2002. Augusta Ford is the only remaining defendant. The court notes that Defendant’s motion failed to include the 21-day notice required by M.R. Civ. P. 7(b){L)(A). Also, Plaintiff's opposition to the motion was filed on May 27, 2003 ~ four days after the May 23, 2003 deadline.
Defendant objects to this fact as hearsay because it is supported by a record reference to Mr. Lunt, a fellow employee of Defendant’s. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See M. R.
did not reference Plaintiff's body parts, but “barraged” Plaintiff with lascivious sexual remarks about his wife. Raymond did not harass other employees of Defendant about sexual issues involving their wives during Plaintiff’s tenure with Defendant?
Plaintiff originally brought five counts in this case. At this time, only Counts 1 and 5 remain (for violation of the Maine Human Rights Act and violation of the Maine Whistleblower’s Act, respectively). Defendant’s motion seeks judgment as to Count I, violation of the Maine Human Rights Act by sexual harassment.
Summary judgment is proper if the citations to the record found in the parties’ Rule 56(h) statements demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Dickinson v. Clark, 2001 ME 49, { 4, 767 A.2d 303, 305. “A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case under governing law.” Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, 7 4, n.3, 770 A.2d 653, 655, n.3 (citing Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, { 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575). “The invocation of the summary judgment procedure does not permit the court to decide ar issue of fact, but only‘to determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists. The Court cannot decide an issue of fact no matter how improbable seem the opposing party’s chances of prevailing at trial.” Searles v. Trustees of St. Joseph’s College, 1997 ME 128, J 6, 695 A.2d 1206, 1209 (quoting Tallwood Land & Dev. Co. v. Botka, 352 A.2d 753, 755 (Me. 1976)). To avoid a judgment as a matter of law for a defendant, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each element of her cause of action. See
Fleming v. Gardner, 658 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Me. 1995).
Evid. 801(c). This statement should be admitted because it is not offered for its truth, but only for the fact that the statement was made. Further, Lunt testifies that he heard these statements himself. See Lunt Dep. 10, 11. ° Defendant qualifies this fact with citations to the record supporting that Raymond is crass, rude, frequently steps
over the line, and likes to antagonize people. However, nothing in the supported statements of fact denies this statement.
The Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence to demonstrate that he was subjected to harassment because of his sex, a necessary element of a sexual harassment action under the Maine Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff maintains that he was subjected to sexual harassment because of his sex. There are no genuine issues of fact.
“Maine courts have relied on the federal case law surrounding Title VII for the purpose of construing and applying the provisions of the Maine Human Rights Act.” Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 436 n.3 (1* Cir. 1997); Bowen v. Dept. of Human Services, 606 A.2d 1051, 1053 (Me. 1992): Maine Human Rights Commission v. Maine Dept. of Defense & Veterans Services, 627 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Me. 1993). “To prevail on a sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment, a Plaintiff must
prove:
1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he was subjected to unwelcome
sexual harassment; 3) the harassment was based on sex; 4) the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
Plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment; 5) that
sexually objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively
offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive
arid the victim in fact did perceive it so; and’ 6) thai some basis for
employer liability has been established.” Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 395 (1* Cir. 2002)(citing O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1° Cir. 2001)). In same-sex harassment cases, as in all harassment cases, the Plaintiff “must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations” but in fact constituted discrimination “because of... sex.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). “The critical issue is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of
the other sex are not exposed.” Id. Oncale provides three situations where same-sex
harassment constitutes discrimination because of sex:
(1) when the conduct involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity, there can be an inference of discrimination if there is credible evidence the harasser is homosexual;
(2) when the employee is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by a member of the same sex as to make it clear that the harasser if
motivated by a general hostility to the presence of members of that sex in the workplace;
(3) when a same-sex Plaintiff may offer direct comparative evidence regarding how the harasser treated members of both sexes in the workplace. Id. These three examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corporation, 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7* Cir. 1999). Again, regardless of the situation, the Plaintiff must always prove the conduct at issue constituted discrimination “because of... sex.” Id.
It is undisputed that the majority of Raymond’s comments to Plaintiff were regarding Plaintiff's wife, her physique, and sexual activity with her. However, on at least four occasions, Raymond also stated that he wanted to have sex with Plaintiff and Plaintiff's wife as athreesome. The issue before the court is whether such commenis constitute sexual harassment against Plaintiff, because of Plaintiff’s gender, in violation of the MHRA. No evidence is offered to demonstrate any of the same-sex harassment scenarios discussed in Oncale, supra.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Green v. Augusta Ford (Green v. Augusta Ford) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.