Green Tokai Co. v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (9-13-2007)

2007 Ohio 4688
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 13, 2007
DocketNo. 06AP-642.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2007 Ohio 4688 (Green Tokai Co. v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (9-13-2007)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Green Tokai Co. v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (9-13-2007), 2007 Ohio 4688 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Green Tokai Co., Ltd., commenced this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order awarding to respondent Rodney L. Henderson ("claimant") R.C. 4123.57(B) scheduled-loss compensation for the loss of the third or *Page 2 distal phalange of the first (index), second (long), and third (ring) fingers of his right hand, and to enter an order denying said compensation.

{¶ 2} This court referred the matter to a magistrate of this court, pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Attached as Appendix A.) Therein, the magistrate recommended that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its staff hearing officer's ("SHO") order of March 31, 2006, that awards R.C. 4123.57(B) scheduled-loss compensation for the amputation or loss of the distal phalanges of three fingers of claimant's right hand, and to enter an order denying R.C. 4123.57(B) compensation. Claimant did not file objections to the magistrate's decision. However, the commission filed objections to the magistrate's decision, and, therefore, this matter is now before this court for a full, independent review.

{¶ 3} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a determination of the commission, relator must show a clear legal right to the relief sought and that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief. State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141. A clear legal right to a writ of mandamus exists where the relator shows that the commission abused its discretion by entering an order which is not supported by any evidence in the record. State ex rel. Elliott v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 76. On the other hand, where the record contains some evidence to support the commission's findings, there has been no abuse of discretion and mandamus is not appropriate. State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond FoundryCo. (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 56. Furthermore, questions of credibility and the weight to be *Page 3 given evidence are clearly within the discretion of the commission as fact finder. State ex rel. Teece v. Indus. Comm. (1981),68 Ohio St.2d 165.

{¶ 4} By its objections to the magistrate's decision, the commission generally argues that the magistrate erred in finding no evidence upon which the commission could rely to support a finding that claimant has sustained the loss of the distal phalange of the second and third fingers of his right hand. The commission does not object to the magistrate's decision regarding the first finger of claimant's right hand, in effect conceding that it abused its discretion in its determination as to that finger.

{¶ 5} The commission specifically argues that the magistrate erred in his assessment of the amputation diagram form concerning claimant's right hand, which was completed by Dr. Trzeciak on February 10, 2006. The amputation diagram form displays the bones of the right hand. Dr. Trzeciak marked the three amputation sites by drawing lines across the distal phalanges of the first, second, and third fingers. In his decision, the magistrate determined that the form completed by Dr. Trzeciak provides no evidence that claimant has sustained an amputation of a distal phalange at or near the joint. According to the magistrate, the "lines drawn across the distal phalanges are clearly not at or near the DIP [distal interphalangeal] joints of those phalanges." (Magistrate's decision, at ¶ 37.) The commission disagrees with that statement as to claimant's second and third fingers. The commission argues that the magistrate has reweighed the evidence and failed to afford the commission discretion in its application of the appropriate legal standard to the facts.

{¶ 6} Relator argues that the magistrate's decision is supported by this court's decision in State ex rel. Bailey v. Indus. Comm. (Nov. 12, 1999), Franklin App. No. 99AP-152 *Page 4 (Memorandum Decision), wherein this court adopted the conclusion of the magistrate that "the commission properly decided that amputation of the two-thirds of the distal phalange was not an amputation near the joint to support an award pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B)." Additionally, relator argues that the magistrate's decision is supported by State ex rel.Werner v. Indus. Comm. (Apr. 18, 2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-544 (Memorandum Decision), wherein this court stated that "the magistrate correctly found that, inasmuch as [the claimant] lost half or less of the distal phalange of his right index finger, he was not entitled to an award pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B)."

{¶ 7} We find relator's reliance upon Bailey and Werner to be unconvincing in the case at bar, as those decisions are "memorandum decisions," which have no binding precedential value. See State v.Gillman, Franklin App. No. 01AP-662, 2001-Ohio-3968; State ex rel.McDonald v. Indus. Comm. (Dec. 12, 1995), Franklin App. No. 94APD12-1738; and State ex rel. Stevenson v. Orient State Institute (Sept. 30, 1992), Franklin App. No. 91AP-1152.

{¶ 8} Conversely, for the reasons that follow, we find the commission's argument to be persuasive. In State ex rel. Kabealo v.Indus. Comm. (Mar. 8, 1990), Franklin App. No. 88AP-33, this court was presented with the question of how much severance of a distal phalange is required for an award of compensation under R.C. 4123.57(C), the pertinent language of which is now contained in R.C. 4123.57(B). This court determined that, under the statute, the "[l]oss of the distal phalange does not mean partial loss. Rather, it means severance near the joint." Kabealo.

{¶ 9} According to the commission, it has discretion to determine whether an amputation is "near the joint" for purposes of R.C.4123.57(B). Relator argues that the *Page 5 commission seeks to apply "unfettered authority" in determining whether a claimant has sustained a loss under R.C. 4123.57(B).

{¶ 10} The "near the joint" standard expressed in Kabealo, which was based on this court's interpretation of the pertinent statutory language, necessarily leaves the commission with discretion, as the word "near" is an imprecise word used to describe proximity. Moreover, it would be inappropriate for this court to select a specific distance that would sufficiently constitute "near the joint," for purposes of determining whether a loss has occurred under R.C. 4123.57(B). This determination has been left to the sound discretion of the commission, which is reasonable considering "the distal phalange is small and distinctions are hard to draw." Kabealo.

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2007 Ohio 4688, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/green-tokai-co-v-indus-comm-unpublished-decision-9-13-2007-ohioctapp-2007.