Green Lago, LLC v. Any Garment Cleaners No. 3, LLC

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: November 21, 2025
• Docket: A-0360-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0360-24

GREEN LAGO, LLC,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANY GARMENT CLEANERS NO. 3, LLC, and CARLOS MARROQUIN, individually,

Defendants,

and

DRY CLEAN EXPRESS NO.1, LLC, and MATSAMY VASQUEZ, individually,

Defendants-Appellants. ____________________________

Argued October 20, 2025 – Decided November 21, 2025

Before Walcott-Henderson and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-1913-14. Ronald L. Daugherty argued the cause for appellants (Salmon, Ricchezza, Singer & Turchi, LLP, attorneys; Ronald L. Daugherty, on the briefs).

Geoffrey E. Lynott argued the cause for respondent (McCarter & English, LLP, attorneys; Frederick C. Biehl, III, Geoffrey E. Lynott, and Michael P. Lynch, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this collection action, defendants Dry Clean Express No. 1, LLC

("DCE-1") and its principal, Matsamy Vasquez,1 appeal from a September 27,

2024 amended judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Green Lago, LLC ("Green

Lago"), awarding jointly and severally $1,625,900.68, plus attorney's fees of

$21,132.50, for a total of $1,647,033.18, with post-judgment interest of 18% per

annum. DCE-1 and Vasquez dispute the validity the original judgment entered

in 2015, claiming lack of service of the complaint and further contend the court's

grant of 18% per annum interest as opposed to interest under Rule 4:42-11(a)

was in error. We affirm.

1 In the instant appeal DCE-1 and Vasquez are the sole defendants-appellants. In this opinion, however, consistent with the underlying briefs, we refer to DCE- 1, Vasquez, Marroquin, and Any Garment Cleaners No. 3 ("AGC-3") as "defendants," except where we refer to Carlos Marroquin individually. A-0360-24 2 I.

This matter has an extensive prior history dating from the 2015 filing of

plaintiff's complaint and various subsequent orders enforcing litigant's rights as

defendants failed to satisfy the court ordered levy. We, however, limit our

recitation of the facts and discussion to those pertinent to our determination of

the issues raised before us.

In November 2013, Green Lago sold two dry-cleaning businesses to Any

Garment Cleaners No. 3, LLC ("AGC-3") for approximately $465,573. AGC-3

executed a promissory note in favor of Green Lago for this purchase price, which

was personally guaranteed by AGC-3's managing member, Carlos Marroquin.

It is undisputed that neither AGC-3 nor Marroquin made any of the monthly

payments under the note. Green Lago sued for breach of the promissory note

and obtained a default judgment against both AGC-3 and Marroquin in the

amount of $542,258.61 on January 9, 2015. This 2015 judgment was never

amended until 2024.

Following the entry of default judgment, Green Lago learned that

Marroquin had transferred ownership of one of the dry-cleaning businesses to

his brother, Vasquez, and his wholly-owned company DCE-1. Green Lago also

uncovered a "Consulting Agreement" executed on January 5, 2015, days prior

A-0360-24 3 to the entry of default against AGC-3, in which Vasquez and DCE-1 agreed to

pay Marroquin $1,325,000 for the dry-cleaning business to be paid in 36

installments of $7,930.05, with an additional "balloon" payment of $1,075,650

at the end of the 36 months. Vasquez, through DCE-1, made some payments to

Marroquin but as of early 2018, over $1 million remained outstanding and

neither DCE-1 nor Vasquez made any further payments.

Green Lago subsequently moved in the Law Division for a writ of

execution against the proceeds Vasquez and DCE-1 had agreed to pay to

Marroquin directly pursuant to the Consulting Agreement. 2 In January 2019,

when Vasquez and DCE-1 did not fully comply, Green Lago moved for an order

in aid of litigant's rights and for the turnover of funds under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-63.3

Defendants did not admit the debt and Marroquin opposed plaintiff's motion and

cross-moved seeking to vacate the default judgment, stay enforcement

2 The writ of execution acted as a levy on "[a]ny and all rights, credits, monies [and] effects in [his] hands due or to become due to [AGC] and [] Marroquin." 3 "After a levy upon a debt due or accruing to the judgment debtor from a third person, herein called the garnishee, the court may upon notice to the garnishee and the judgment debtor, and if the garnishee admits the debt, direct the debt, to an amount not exceeding the sum sufficient to satisfy the execution, to be paid to the officer holding the execution or to the receiver appointed by the court, either in 1 payment or in installments as the court may deem just." N.J.S.A. 2A:17-63. A-0360-24 4 proceedings, and consolidate the instant matter with a pending related lawsuit

plaintiffs had filed against defendants Marroquin, AGC-3, Vaquez, and DCE-

1.4

The court granted plaintiff's motion and ordered defendants to turn over

monthly payments due under the Consulting Agreement to the Sheriff in an

August 2019 order. In that same order, the court denied defendant Marroquin's

motion to vacate the default judgment based on his assertions he was never

served with the 2015 complaint and the default judgment should therefore be

voided. The court concluded Marroquin had in fact been served with the

complaint as evidenced by service of the complaint and summons, Marroquin's

awareness of this action, and confirmation by Marroquin's attorney. Marroquin

did not appeal this May 2019 decision.

Approximately one year later, when defendants failed to remit the

payments due, plaintiff moved for the first of three orders to enforce litigant's

rights and for interest in the amount of 18% pursuant to the express terms in the

4 In this action, plaintiff alleged that Marroquin fraudulently transferred Union County dry cleaning businesses to Vasquez and companies he owned for less than fair market value and with the intent to place plaintiff's assets beyond reach, in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"), codified under N.J.S.A. 25:2-20 et seq. The UFTA provides remedies for creditors where debtors have fraudulently transferred assets to avoid collection. A-0360-24 5 Consulting Agreement. The court granted plaintiff's motion over defendants'

objection and again ordered defendants to make monthly payment to the Sheriff

in accordance with the Consulting Agreement until the debt was paid.

On September 10, 2021, Marroquin filed for bankruptcy protection under

Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and subsequently obtained an order

discharging his debts. This order discharged Marroquin of personal liability

over debts owed and explained that creditors "cannot collect discharged debts,"

but that a creditor with a lien may enforce a claim against the debtors' property

subject to that lien.

In the following January, plaintiff again sought to enforce the court's prior

orders directing defendants to turnover funds and for 18% interest, which was

granted on April 12, 2024. In that order, the court added Vasquez and DCE-1

and set the amount of the judgment at $1,625,900.68, inclusive of interest of

18% per annum.

Approximately six months later, plaintiff filed its final motion in aid of

litigant's rights, seeking a final judgment of $1,625,900.68 plus 18% interest.

The court granted plaintiff's motion in its entirety, awarding attorney's fees and

post-judgment interest at 18% pursuant to the express terms of the parties'

Consulting Agreement, and entered a final judgment on September 13, 2024.

A-0360-24 6 The court explained that although fee-shifting provisions are generally

disfavored, New Jersey law allowed the parties to contract for attorney 's fees,

provided the fees are reasonable. The court agreed the contractual interest rate

was expressly permitted based on the underlying agreement, and that the lower

statutory interest rate set forth under Rule 4:42-11(a) would not control. On

September 27, 2024, the court entered an amended judgment solely against

defendants DCE-1 and Vasquez in the amount of $1,625,900.68, plus

$21,132.50 in attorney's fees.

This appeal followed.

II.

The trial court's factual findings "are binding on appeal when supported

by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank,

SLA, 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12

(1998)). Likewise, a trial court's determination of whether to void a default

judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 "warrants substantial deference, and should

not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion." US Bank Nat'l

Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). An abuse of discretion arises

when a court's decision was "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Wear

A-0360-24 7 v. Selective Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super. 440, 459 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Flagg

v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

A motion to enforce litigant's rights is the appropriate vehicle to enforce

a court's prior order. Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 359 (2011) "[T]he scope

of relief in a motion in aid of litigants' rights is limited to remediation of the

violation of a court order." Id. at 371. The trial court’s determination regarding

enforcement of litigant’s rights pursuant to Rule 1:10-3 is reviewed on appeal

for abuse of discretion. Savage v. Tp. of Neptune, 472 N.J. Super. 291, 313

(App. Div. 2022); Wear, 455 N.J. Super. at 458-59.

A.

Before us, DCE-1 and Vasquez argue the court erred in granting the 2015

default judgment against AGC-3 and Marroquin and as a result, the judgment

and subsequent writ of attachment must be vacated. They maintain "[a]ll of

[p]laintiff's requested relief against defendants in this case center around a writ

of execution issued against [them] based upon the default judgment entered

against [d]efendant Carlos Marroquin," and "service of process was defective

and the judgment was void."

A default judgment is considered void if rendered in the face of defective

personal service. Rosa v. Araujo, 260 N.J. Super. 458, 462 (App. Div. 1992).

A-0360-24 8 However, affidavits of service are presumed correct and may be rebutted only

by clear and convincing evidence. See Jameson v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co.,

363 N.J. Super. 419, 426 (App. Div. 2003). Additionally, despite conflicting

claims, defendants bear the burden to defeat the presumption of validity of

service beyond bare assertions. Id. at 427. Even if a court finds technical defects

in service, a judgment may not be considered void if the defendant had actual

notice of the action. Citibank, N.A. v. Russo, 334 N.J. Super. 346, 352 (App.

Div. 2000).

Applying the requisite deferential standard, we reject appellants'

contention the default judgment entered in 2015 was "defective" and must be

voided. Reviewing this same argument, the court properly considered

defendants' 2019 post-judgment action in response to plaintiff's complaint and

found no basis to void the default judgment. As the court stated:

Mr. Marroquin admits receiving the complaint and knew a default was going to be entered. He did not deny hiring an attorney to attempt to negotiate a settlement for himself and AGC-3. Under these circumstances the court will not vacate the judgment. The rules with regard to service are designed to [ensure] parties receive notice. He has admitted he has received notice.

We also note that plaintiff's supplemental certification made as part of this

record shows that shortly after service of the complaint, Marroquin's counsel

A-0360-24 9 communicated with plaintiff's counsel regarding a possible settlement, which is

indicative of Marroquin's knowledge of the complaint. Thus, appellants cannot

establish a lack of actual notice of the action.

Moreover, the extensive record before us makes clear the parties have

engaged in lengthy post-judgment litigation spanning approximately ten years,

including multiple motions by plaintiff seeking to compel defendants to satisfy

the judgment entered against them. Against this backdrop, we are hard-pressed

to conclude the court erred in its 2019 denial of defendants' application for

vacatur of the 2015 default judgment. Rather, we agree with the court that

defendants asserted no basis to void the default judgment.

B.

Appellants next contend they were denied due process because they were

added to the action as judgment debtors only at the post-judgment enforcement

stage, preventing them from taking discovery or presenting defenses . They

maintain that as non-parties to the initial lawsuit, they did not admit any debt

due under the Consulting Agreement as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:17-63. The

statute provides that after a levy upon a debt due to the judgment debtor from a

third party, the court may, upon notice and opportunity to contest, direct

payment to the creditor if the court finds, based on the evidence and any

A-0360-24 10 response from the garnishee, that a debt is in fact due. It does not require an

express admission of liability by the garnishee.

Applying the plain language of the statute, we are unpersuaded by

appellants' argument the turnover order was improper absent their admission of

indebtedness. This argument is without merit and constitutes a misreading of

the statute. The statute is intended to authorize enforcement after a levy and

court determination of a debt is due, following notice and opportunity to contest.

Here, the court considered Vasquez's own testimony regarding the

Consulting Agreement, payment records, and supporting documentation, and

found the debt owed to Marroquin under the Consulting Agreement was valid

and subject to levy and turnover to Green Lago. Marroquin had notice of the

post-judgment enforcement proceeding and participated in the subsequent

motion practice and neither Marroquin nor Vasquez appealed any court orders

until the entry of the September 2024 amended final judgment. The

requirements of due process in post-judgment proceedings are more limited than

at the merits stage: due process is satisfied if the nonparties, here DCE-1 and

Vasquez, receive reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to oppose

execution or contest their liability before funds are turned over or judgments are

enforced. See First Resol. Inv. Corp. v. Seker, 171 N.J. 502, 515 (2002) (citing

A-0360-24 11 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))

(explaining that post-judgment due process requires only notice and an

opportunity to be heard before property is taken or a judgment is enforced).

We further note the court added Vasquez and DCE-1 as direct judgment

debtors, as opposed to mere garnishees, after AGC-3 and Marroquin failed to

comply with multiple turnover orders. We observe no error on the part of the

court given the persistent withholding of funds from plaintiff.

Additionally, the record shows that following the entry of default

judgment, Green Lago served Vasquez and DCE-1 with all relevant writs,

motions, and court orders, prompting Vasquez and DCE-1 to appear, submit

written opposition, file certifications, and participate in motion hearings, thus

availing themselves of all procedural and due process safeguards.

C.

We next turn to appellants' challenge to the turnover orders, as well as the

calculation of both the amount due and post-judgment interest. They argue the

court exceeded its authority in determining the scope of the turnover orders and

the amount to be paid, and that any recovery by plaintiff was limited to sums

actually accrued under the Consulting Agreement with Marroquin. They further

maintain that because Marroquin had been discharged in bankruptcy, plaintiff

A-0360-24 12 could not collect beyond what was independently due from Vasquez or DCE -1,

and the court’s orders impermissibly extended the reach of enforcement beyond

those limits. We are unpersuaded.

Appellants' challenge to the court's grant of 18% per annum post-judgment

interest, in which they argue the court was constrained to apply the Rule 4:42-

11(a) rate, is equally unavailing. 5 The court properly applied the contractual

rate of 18% as set forth in the promissory note. Pursuant to basic breach of

contract principles, the promissory note provided for 18% interest and

defendants failed to demonstrate that 18% was unconscionable or contrary to

public policy. See Metlife Cap. Fin. Corp. v. Washington Ave. Assocs. L.P.,

159 N.J. 484, 494, 498-99, 504 (1999); State Bank v. Rinaldi, 303 N.J. Super.

239, 265 (App. Div. 1997). Accordingly, we reject appellants' assertion the

court abused its discretion by applying the express contract rate.

We further reject appellants' assertion the bankruptcy discharge order

precludes any recovery against them and that the continuing enforcement by

plaintiff violates the automatic stay provision. Their argument is without merit

as it is contrary to the express language of the discharge order. That order

5 Rule 4:42-11(a) addresses the calculation of simple interest on awards, orders, or judgments. A-0360-24 13 explicitly states "a discharge removes the debtors' personal liability for debts

owed before the debtors' bankruptcy case was filed." (emphasis added).

Here, Marroquin filed his bankruptcy petition in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas on September 10, 2021, and

the discharge order relieved him of his personal liability for debts owed prior to

the petition being filed. However, as to defendants Vasquez and DCE-1, they

are not the beneficiaries of this discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) ("[D]ischarge

of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the

property of any other entity for, such debt"). Thus, the discharge did not

eliminate the underlying obligation owed by Vasquez and DCE-1 pursuant to

the court’s prior turnover orders, nor did it affect Green Lago’s right to continue

enforcing its judgment as to the levied property and assets.

D.

Lastly, we are equally unpersuaded by appellants' remaining arguments

contending the entire controversy doctrine applies and the court erred by failing

to consolidate this post-judgment enforcement action with the previously

pending, now dismissed, lawsuit against Marroquin. The entire controversy

doctrine "generally requires parties to an action to raise all transactionally

related claims in that same action." Largoza v. FKM Real Est. Holdings, Inc.,

A-0360-24 14 474 N.J. Super. 61, 79 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC

v. Moore, 464 N.J. Super. 59, 67 (App. Div. 2020)).

Here, however, the post-judgment proceedings were confined to the

enforcement and satisfaction of a previously-adjudicated debt and did not

address the merits of plaintiff's claims because defendants failed to respond to

the complaint. Under these circumstances, we do not countenance defendants'

belated attempts to resurrect a long-settled matter based on the entire

controversy doctrine. We further note this issue was not raised below and we

decline to address its merits here. Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J.

218, 230 (1998) (citing State v. Churchdale Leasing, Inc., 115 N.J. 83, 100

(1989)).

To the extent we have not addressed any of appellants' arguments, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.

Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-0360-24 15