Greathouse v. City of Fresno

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 JAMES GREATHOUSE, Case No. 1:24-cv-00715-JLT-BAM 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION 13 v. (Doc. 10) 14 CITY OF FRESNO, et al., FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendants. 16 Plaintiff James Greathouse (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 17 civil rights action under 4 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons that follow, the Court will recommend 18 that this action be dismissed for failure to obey a court order, for failure to prosecute, and for 19 failure to state a claim. 20 I. Background 21 Plaintiff initiated this action on June 20, 2024, and filed a signed complaint on July 1, 22 2024. (See Docs. 2, 3, and 4.) On October 3, 2024, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and 23 granted him leave to amend. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on November 6, 24 2024. (Doc. 9.) On November 8, 2024, the Court screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint 25 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and determined that the amended complaint failed to comply 26 with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. (Doc. 10.) 27 The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of 28 1 service of the Court’s order. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff was expressly warned that if he failed to file an 2 amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s order, then the Court would recommend 3 dismissal of this action for failure to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 7.) 4 The deadline for Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint has passed and Plaintiff has not 5 complied with the Court’s order. The Court therefore will recommend dismissal of this action. 6 II. Failure to State a Cognizable Claim 7 A. Screening Requirement and Standard 8 The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro se and in forma 9 pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to 10 dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 11 granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 12 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 13 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 14 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 15 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 16 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 17 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 18 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 19 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 20 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 21 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 22 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 23 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 24 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 25 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 26 B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations 27 Plaintiff brings this action against the City of Fresno and the Fresno Police Department. 28 Plaintiff asserts that this action arises from him being falsely arrested. (Doc. 9 at 1.) 1 In relevant part, Plaintiff alleges as follows:

2 The young officer who walk to the female officer it escalated the situation between me and the young officer. This isn’t just about me, its about every black 3 man every black woman who would experience something similar who had been mistreated misjudged or worse this isn’t about me James Greathouse it’s a symbol 4 of the injustice that to many had experienced a visual reminder of how deep- rooted prejudice and assumptions could tear the fabric of society and in the midst 5 of it all I would stand tall calm and unshaken even as the people around me seeded to spiral into anger. 6 7 (Id. at 1) (unedited text). 8 Plaintiff also alleges:

9 With the humiliation I was enduring the pain of being arrested for no other reason other than to color of my skin and being assaulted by a police officer for no 10 reason other than the color of my skin and the frustration that simmered beneath the surface this not just about me its about the countless men and women who had 11 worse outcomes. Its not just a mistake. All they could say to me, that this matter will not be without an investigation. How many investigations get swept under 12 the carpet. 13 (Doc. 9 at 1-2) (unedited text). 14 Plaintiff further alleges:

15 It wouldn’t matter to the officer’s weather or not I was saying all the seen that I was a black man and assumed I was a threat. That’s al thy needed to justify that I 16 am guilty. The officer believing in their badge believing that it gives them the authority to control any situation to make snap judgement without consequence. 17 The officers need to face the reality of their actions. The damages were done and I was mistreated and misjudge or worse also this is about the system that allows 18 this to keep happening this is about accountability. 19 (Doc. 9 at 2) (unedited text). 20 Plaintiff requests judgment in the amount of five million dollars. (Id.) 21 C. Discussion 22 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 23 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 24 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed 25 factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 26 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 27 omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 28 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 1 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; 2 see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557. 3 Although Plaintiff's amended complaint is short, it is not a plain statement of his claims. 4 The amended complaint does not include basic factual allegations regarding what happened, when 5 it happened, or who was involved. Bare assertions that Plaintiff was “falsely arrested” and 6 “assaulted” are not sufficient. Plaintiff’s complaint must contain sufficient factual detail for the 7 Court to reasonably infer that the named plaintiffs are liable for the alleged misconduct. 8 Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not provide any factual allegations concerning the 9 circumstances or his arrest or the alleged assault. 10 2. Monell Liability 11 Plaintiff names the Fresno Police Department and the City of Fresno as defendants, but 12 does not identify any actions either entity took to violate his rights. Recent Ninth Circuit 13 authority makes clear that “both California municipalities and police departments are ‘persons’ 14 amenable to suit under § 1983.” Est. of Debbs v. County of Sacramento, No. 2:20-cv-01153-TLN- 15 DB, 2023 WL 4108320, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 21, 2023) (quoting Duarte v. City of Stockton, 60 16 F.4th 566, 568 (9th Cir. 2023)). “Bringing a section 1983 claim against a municipal police 17 department is essentially bringing the claim against the municipality.” Robertson v. Merced 18 County, No. 1:24-CV-00009-BAM (PC), 2024 WL 3091166, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 21, 2024) 19 (citing Annan-Yartey v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, 351 F. App’x 243, 246 (9th Cir. 2009)). 20 Municipalities “cannot be held liable [for the actions of their employees] under § 1983 on 21 a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 591 22 (1978). Instead, the constitutional injury must occur during the execution of an official “policy or 23 custom.” Id. at 694. “A plaintiff may assert Monell liability based on: (1) an official policy; (2) a 24 ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local 25 government entity’; (3) the act of an ‘official whose acts fairly represent official policy such that 26 the challenged action constituted official policy’; or (4) where “an official with final policy- 27 making authority ‘delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.’” 28 Bustamante v. County of Shasta, No. 2:23-cv-01552-TLN-DMC, 2024 WL 3673529, at *2 (E.D. 1 Cal. Aug. 6, 2024) (quoting Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008)). 2 Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not allege any official policy, practice, or custom of 3 either the police department or the city, nor does it allege delegation or ratification by an official 4 with final policy-making authority sufficient to support Monell liability. 5 3. Fourth Amendment 6 a. False Arrest 7 Plaintiff alleges that this case arises from his false arrest. A claim for unlawful arrest is 8 cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided “the arrest was 9 without probable cause or other justification.” Dubner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 10 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). To state a claim under § 1983 for false arrest and imprisonment, 11 however, a plaintiff must allege facts “to demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest 12 him.” See Cabrera v. City of Huntingdon Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing George 13 v. City of Long Beach, 973 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1992)). Probable cause “exists when under the 14 totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have 15 concluded that there was a fair probability that [the person arrested] had committed a crime.” 16 Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 17 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1986)). 18 Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was “falsely arrested” for no other reason than the color of 19 his skin. (Doc. 9 at 2.) This conclusory allegation is not sufficient to state a cognizable claim for 20 false arrest. Plaintiff's amended complaint fails to allege any facts concerning the circumstances 21 of his arrest, including when he was arrested, where he was arrested, who was involved, and what 22 happened. 23 b. Excessive Force 24 Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by a police officer. (Doc. 9 at 2.) A claim of 25 excessive force in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop implicates the Fourth Amendment 26 right to be free from “unreasonable ... seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Graham v. Connor, 27 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is 28 ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality 1 of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing 2 governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted). Whether a law 3 enforcement officer’s use of force was “objectively reasonable” depends upon the totality of the 4 facts and circumstances confronting him. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir.) (en 5 banc) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1128 (2005). 6 A court must “first assess the quantum of force used to arrest the plaintiff by considering 7 the type and amount of force inflicted.” Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th 8 Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Second, a court balances the 9 government’s countervailing interests. This involves considering “the severity of the crime at 10 issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and 11 whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. 12 at 396. Using these factors, a court must determine “whether the force employed was greater than 13 is reasonable under the circumstances.” Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1058. 14 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege the circumstances surrounding the alleged use of force, 15 including when it happened, where it happened, who was involved, and what happened. 16 Plaintiff’s amended complaint includes only a conclusory assertion that he was “assaulted,” but 17 does not contain sufficient factual detail for the Court to reasonably infer that the named plaintiffs 18 are liable for the alleged misconduct. 19 4. State Law Claims 20 Plaintiff may be attempting to assert a state law claim for assault. Under 28 U.S.C. § 21 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original jurisdiction, the “district courts 22 shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action 23 within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 24 III of the United States Constitution,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). The Supreme 25 Court has stated that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should 26 be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 27 Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must 28 first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 1 III. Failure to Obey a Court Order and Failure to Prosecute 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 4 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 5 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 6 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 7 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 8 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 9 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 10 46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. 11 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order 12 requiring amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 13 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). 14 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: (1) 15 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 16 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 17 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 18 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 19 B. Discussion 20 Here, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is overdue. The action cannot proceed 21 without Plaintiff’s cooperation and compliance with the Court’s order. Moreover, the Court 22 cannot hold this case in abeyance awaiting compliance by Plaintiff. The Court additionally 23 cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his case. Thus, the Court finds 24 that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 25 The third factor, risk of prejudice to the defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, as a 26 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. 27 Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs 28 against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 1 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose 2 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 3 progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. 4 Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 5 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the Court’s order will result in 6 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 7 1262; Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s November 8, 2024 8 screening order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to comply would result in a 9 recommendation for dismissal of this action. (Doc. 10 at 7.) Plaintiff had adequate warning that 10 dismissal could result from his noncompliance. 11 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that 12 would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further 13 unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status in this 14 action indicates that monetary sanctions are of little use, and the preclusion of evidence or 15 witnesses is likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case. 16 III. Conclusion and Recommendation 17 For the reasons stated, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for 18 failure to state a cognizable claim, for failure to obey a court order, and for failure to prosecute. 19 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 20 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 21 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may 22 file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 23 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed 24 fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page 25 number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page 26 limit may not be considered. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 27 /// 28 // 1 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 2 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 3 v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

6 Dated: December 19, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7

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