Great Olympic Tire Co., Cross-Appellant v. United States of America, Cross-Appellee

597 F.2d 449, 44 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6219, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 13828
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 20, 1979
Docket77-1469
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 597 F.2d 449 (Great Olympic Tire Co., Cross-Appellant v. United States of America, Cross-Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Great Olympic Tire Co., Cross-Appellant v. United States of America, Cross-Appellee, 597 F.2d 449, 44 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6219, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 13828 (5th Cir. 1979).

Opinion

GEE, Circuit Judge:

"This case concerns the federal excise tax on rubber used in retreading automobile tires. It appears to be one of first or near-first impression and hence, though we agree with the disposition made below, we write briefly to explain our affirmance. Since the text of the statutes concerned lends itself to several interpretations, we have sought to follow that which we think expresses congressional intent. As to the prospective application of these taxes, at least, a consideration of almost equal importance to correctly divining that intent is that we should arrive at a clear and workable interpretation of these somewhat doubtful provisions.

First, a few facts. Taxpayer produces and markets retreaded tires. The first step in the manufacturing process is to get and clean a used-tire casing, buffing off the remaining original tread to ready it for the new. Next, new tread rubber — the subject of this tax — is applied to the tire surface by an extruding machine. Finally, the old casing and new rubber are placed in a curing mold, where heat bonds them together and imprints the new tread.

Tread rubber is wasted at several stages of this process, and the major question presented by this appeal is what, if any, of this wasted rubber should be taxed. Some of it is lost through accretions to the ex-truder head, some is ruined by scorching; the United States does not claim a tax on this rubber. It does, however, seek to tax that lost by application to tires that fail final inspection and to those destroyed by testing for quality control. The taxpayer resists and seeks as well to obtain a credit for rubber remaining on tires returned under warranty. It prevailed below, except as to the warranty items.

The statutory scheme imposes on manufacturers a tax of a nickel a pound on tread rubber used in retreading tires “of the type used on highway vehicles,” exempting that used “otherwise.” 1 The phrases quoted are critical. Obviously they exclude from taxation rubber used on tires unsuited for highway service, and this the government concedes. The difficulty arises as to tread rubber applied in confecting such a retreaded tire as would be “of the type used on highway vehicles” but which does not survive the manufacturing process. This may happen, as we note above, either when the tire does not come out right and fails inspection or when it is selected as a specimen for testing quality and destroyed by examination. Are these “of the type”? If so, the tread rubber used on them is taxable; “otherwise” it is not.

Both parties make arguments, among others, focussing on the time and place at which the condition of these tires is to be determined. The United States focusses on the extruder head. Here, it contends, is where the tread rubber is “used”; and if at this stage the partly confected recap is “of the type” from which a highway model can be made, the rubber on it is taxable. This interpretation is administratively feasible and probably economically so, as well; doubtless the tax on the wasted tire rubber *451 will simply — like the cost of these wasted tires themselves — be apportioned among the acceptable products as a cost of doing business. We cannot accept it, however. In the first place, at this second stage of the manufacturing process, the casing and rubber are simply not a tire at all, let alone one “of the type,” etc. They may or may not become one; whether they will cannot be known for various reasons. One of these reasons, in the second place, is that whether the tire will be “of the type” is determined not at the second stage of the process but at the third, where the tread is imprinted. If at that stage the tire becomes a “racing slick,” for example, it is not suitable for highway use, being given an essentially treadless configuration suitable for maximum traction on dry surfaces but not for general road use. The same is true of lug-type treads, designed for rough ground and mud but producing undesirable vibration at normal highway speeds. These considerations are, indeed, recognized by the government in a Revenue Ruling with which its present contentions appear to conflict. 2

Taxpayer, on the other hand, seeks to focus on the tires in question — the defective and test specimens — as they exist after they have been found to fail inspection, or after testing in the case of the specimens. At this time their sidewalls are slashed to prevent their use. After this, they are manifestly not “of the type.” The difficulty with this particular mechanical approach is that the specimen tires, at least, were unquestionably serviceable tires “of the type” on which tread rubber was “used” before the taxpayer deliberately destroyed them. Whether the defective tires were “of the type” before being slashed is more questionable, but some at least would doubtless have served their time, or part of it, without incident, like those returned under warranty after partial attrition of their treads by highway service.

Thus, neither time-focussed argument satisfies entirely. Nor does the statute specify any particular time in the process of manufacture — and surely inspection and testing are necessary parts of that process — at which we are to view the tires as “of the type” or as “otherwise.” We are therefore driven behind the statutes’ phraseology to the concerns that prompted them. What was Congress trying to do by its riddling reference to tires of the type used on highway vehicles? We conclude from the legislative history that it sought to measure the incidence of this tax as closely as is administratively feasible (and no closer) by actual wear and tear on the highways.

Representative portions of this history point in this direction, and we have found none indicating otherwise. The tax on tread rubber was enacted as part of the Highway Revenue Act of 1956, which created the Highway Trust Fund and allocated what committee reports of both houses called “highway user taxes” such as this fund. H.R.Rep.No.2022, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1956-2 Cum.Bull. 1285, 1287); S.Rep.No.2054, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1956-2 Cum.Bull. 1308, 1309); U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1956, p. 2822. Not all taxes so allocated arise from actual highway use, but some do and all are on related uses — fuels, accessories, tires, etc. As to the tax under consideration, Congress recognized that actual use of a tire or retread on the highways was not a practical criterion, since actual use could not feasibly be

*452 monitored. Hence, it adopted “of the type” in an effort to come as close to measuring the tax by actual use as was administratively feasible:

The additional tire tax and also the new tax on tread rubber have been restricted to tires of the type used on highway vehicles (or tread rubber for recapping these tires) because Title II of both the House and your committee’s version of this bill is designed to raise revenue for a highway program. It is necessary to base the additional taxes on “tires of the type used on highway vehicles” because of the difficult administrative problems which would be involved in attempting to base the tax on the actual use to which the tires are placed.

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Related

Bridgestone/Firestone Americas Holding, Inc. v. United States
342 F. Supp. 2d 746 (M.D. Tennessee, 2004)
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Bluebook (online)
597 F.2d 449, 44 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6219, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 13828, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/great-olympic-tire-co-cross-appellant-v-united-states-of-america-ca5-1979.