Great Eastern Casualty Co. v. Kelley

194 S.W. 172, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 341
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 22, 1917
DocketNo. 167.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 194 S.W. 172 (Great Eastern Casualty Co. v. Kelley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Great Eastern Casualty Co. v. Kelley, 194 S.W. 172, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1917).

Opinion

BROOKE, J.

This was a suit brought by . Mrs. Mattie Kelley, widow of Choice H. Kelley, deceased, against the Great Eastern Casualty Company upon an accident and sickness insurance policy issued by said company to Choice H. Kelley, deceased. Plaintiff, by her petition, sought recovery as under the terms of the policy for the sum of $5,000, alleged to be due as indemnity provided therein, and 12 per cent, statutory penalties as damages, and $500 alleged to be reasonable attorney’s fees. The defendant denied liability under the policy for any greater sum than $100, and pleaded prior tender, and then willingness to pay said sum in discharge of its obligation under the policy. The case was tried to a jury, and was submitted upon special issues. Upon the findings of the jury and upon motion of the plaintiff, the court, on the 14th day of March, 1916, entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff against defendant for the sum of $5,000, together with $500 as reasonable attorney’s fee and $600 statutory penalties, the aggregate sum of $6,100.

In the schedule of benefits shown by the policy were, in the first year of the policy under clause 1 of section D, and the first and all subsequent years under other clauses of section D, loss of life, $5,000. Clause 1 of section D is:

“While traveling as a passenger in a place regularly provided for passengers, within any common carrier’s public passenger conveyance (animals, aerial machines or conveyances excepted).”

And the other clauses of section D are:

“2. While a passenger within an elevator provided for passenger sendee only; or
“3. While within any burning building except •a shop or factory, by being burned by fire'or suffocated by smoke, provided the insured shall not be assisting or acting as a volunteer or paid fireman,’ or
“4. While walking on a public highway, by being injured by actual contact with a bicycle or any moving conveyance or vehicle, provided the insured is not or has not been employed or engaged on or about the conveyance or vehicle or is not stopping or attempting to stop a runaway ; or
“5. While riding within a private automobile not being used for any business purpose or any work whatsoever, and provided that the insured shall not be a.hired operator thereof (but this exception shall not apply to any physician or surgeon then employed in the practice of his profession, or any commercial traveler or buyer selling or buying goods from sample for future delivery only, collectors of accounts, or regularly licensed real estate and insurance agents in their pursuit of business), and only in case of an accident which shall materially injure the automobile; or
“6. While riding upon a bicycle (not a motorcycle) and caused solely and directly by collision with another bicycle or any moving conveyance; or
“7. While riding upon a motorcycle and caused solely and directly by reason of a collision *173 with any moving conveyance, except another motorcycle, and not being used for any business purpose or any work whatsoever (but this exception shall not apply to any physician or surgeon then employed in the practice of his profession, or any commercial traveler or buyer selling or buying goods from sample for future delivery only, collectors of accounts, or regularly licensed real estate and insurance agents in their usual pursuit of business); or
“8.' At the hands of any burglar, highwayman or robber when robbing the insured by force; or
“9. By the explosion of a stationary, locomotive, marine or portable boiler; or
“10. By a regularly licensed physician, surgeon, dentist, undertaker or nurse accidentally cutting or wounding himself while holding an autopsy or performing a surgical operation, and simultaneously therewith becoming inoculated with poison; or
“11. While riding within a conveyance drawn by horse power, provided that the insured shall not then be a hired driver thereof, nor be riding or driving in or upon any conveyance containing any merchandise or used for any business purpose or any work whatsoever (but this exception shall not apply to any physician ox-surgeon then employed in _ the practice of his profession or any commercial traveler or buyer selling or buying goods from sample for future delivery only), and only in case of an accident which shall materially injure the conveyance; or
“12. By being kicked by a horse or gored by a bull or cow; or
“13. While getting on or off or being on the step or platform of any conveyance specified in clause 1; or
“14. While actively engaged in farming by actual contact with and while operating a threshing, mowing, reaping, or binding machine, harrow, or plow.”

Plaintiff! attached the policy sued on to her petition, and made the same a part thereof, alleged its validity and existence at the time of the death of her husband, Choice H. Kelley, and that her said husband was accidentally killed while said policy was in full force and effect. She further alleged that Choice H. Kelley met his death while riding upon a motorcycle, and by reason of a collision with a moving conveyance. The other alternative allegations were not submitted by the court. Plaintiff alleged the giving of notices and furnishing of proofs of death in accordance with the terms of the policy; that the defendant, Great Eastern Casualty Company, failed and refused to pay her the sum due her thereon, after she had demanded payment thereof, through her attorneys in October, 1914; and, further, that the policy sued on was a renewal of a former policy issued to Choice ,H. Kelley, in which plaintiff was named as beneficiary, and that the policy sued on was in force for the second year. The further allegation was made of the employment of attorneys and the agreement to pay them $500, and the reasonableness of such sum, and the refusal of defendant to make payment of the amount demanded by her upon the policy for more than 60 days after furnishing proof of death.

Defendant answered by general demurrer and general and special answer, admitting the execution and delivery of the policy sued on, but denying that under the terms thereof it is liable to plaintiff for any greater amount than the amount already tendei-ed to plaintiff, to wit, $100. ' The defendant filed its motion for new trial, which was overruled, and the cause is now before this court for consideration.

Appellant’s assignments are as follows:

(a) The coui-t erred in' failing and refusing to give defendant’s special charge No. 1, reading as follows: “In this case the plaintiff has shown herself entitled to recover the sum of $100 only. Xou will therefore find a verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant for the sum of $100, and find against plaintiff as to all other sums sued for.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
194 S.W. 172, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 341, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/great-eastern-casualty-co-v-kelley-texapp-1917.