Great American Insurance Company v. Salem Group, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedSeptember 8, 2023
Docket4:22-cv-01609
StatusUnknown

This text of Great American Insurance Company v. Salem Group, Inc. (Great American Insurance Company v. Salem Group, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Great American Insurance Company v. Salem Group, Inc., (S.D. Tex. 2023).

Opinion

Southern District of Texas ENTERED September 08, 202° IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE § COMPANY, § § Plaintiff, § VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-CV-01609 § SALEM GROUP, INC. d/b/a COMPLETE § CONCRETE, SELWAN CONSTRUCTION, = § INC., NASER SALEM and MATILDA § SLEIMAN a/k/a MATILDA SULEIMAN, § Defendants. ORDER Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Great American Insurance Company’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19). Defendants Salem Group, Inc. d/b/a Complete Concrete, Selwan Construction, Inc., Naser Salem and Matilda Sleiman a/k/a Matilda Suleiman (collectively “Defendants”) did not respond. Having considered the Motion, the evidence, and the law, and hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19).

1. Background

Plaintiff issues surety bonds on commercial construction projects in Texas. (Doc. No. 19 at 4). Between 2019 and 2021, Plaintiff issued several payment and performance bonds in connection with public works projects between Defendants and Harris County, Texas (“Harris County”). (/d.) On August 15, 2019, before issuing the bonds, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into an Agreement of Indemnity (“AOI”) in favor of Plaintiff. (/d.) Plaintiff alleges that it received multiple claims under the payment bonds beginning in 2021 from various subcontractors and vendors who asserted that they were unpaid for labor and

work materials provided to Defendants. (/d. at 8). Plaintiff also alleges that it sent an initial written demand to Defendants after the claims were filed, seeking indemnification pursuant to the AOI. (id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges pursuant to its investigation that it became clear, through communications and otherwise, that Defendants would be financially unable to pay the costs of completion on the public works projects covered by the surety bonds. (/d. at 8-9). In 2022, Harris County sent a demand under the performance bond requesting that Plaintiff fulfill its obligations to the County and Plaintiff alleges that that it solicited competitive price proposals for the remaining scope of work on the projects. (/d. at 10). Plaintiff further contends that it accepted a bid from an alternative vendor and tendered the bid to Harris County, paying an amount of $3,740,781.70 to resolve the performance demand. (/d.). Plaintiff claims that it received recoveries of contract funds from Harris County in the amount of $491,081.20 and has applied and credited those amounts to Defendant’s account. (/d. at 11). As of December 13, 2022, Plaintiff alleges that it paid a total of $1,664,504.49 to various subcontractors on the payment bond. (/d.). In total, Plaintiff seeks indemnity by Defendants for a total of $4,995,364.88 plus court costs and post-judgment interest at the federal post-judgment rate. (/d. at 20-21). Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as to Count II of the Complaint (Indemnity/Reimbursement) because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendants were obligated by the indemnity agreement to indemnify and reimburse Plaintiff “‘for the net losses and expenses incurred and paid as a result of the claims under the bonds.” (Doc. No. 19 at 13). Plaintiff stated in its motion that it is moving for final summary judgment on Count II rather than on Count I (Specific Performance of the Collateral Deposit Provision) because Plaintiff has “liquidated most, if not all, of the pending claims and demands presented against it under the

Bonds” and is seeking to be reimbursed for what it has paid out on the bonds rather than seeking a deposit of collateral against future losses or expenses. (Doc. No. 19 at 4). II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (Sth Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986)). Once a movant submits a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show that the court should not grant the motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321-25. The non-movant then must provide specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute. Jd. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in deciding a summary judgment motion. Jd. at 255. The key question on summary judgment is whether there is evidence raising an issue of material fact upon which a hypothetical, reasonable factfinder could find in favor of the nonmoving party. /d. at 248. It is the responsibility of the parties to specifically point the Court to the pertinent evidence, and its location, in the record that the party thinks are relevant. Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (Sth Cir. 2003). It is not the duty of the Court to search the record for evidence that might establish an issue of material fact. Id.

WW. Analysis A. Defendants’ Lack of Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

Local Rules 7.3 and 7.4 of the Southern District of Texas state that a motion will be submitted to the judge 21 days after filing. Under Local Rule 7.4, a failure to respond will be taken as “representation of no opposition.” See Local Rule LR7.4. Rule 7.4(a) plainly states that such responses must be filed by the submission date. Jd. Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on January 18, 2023. (Doc. No. 19). Defendants have not responded to the motion, and the 21-day deadline has long passed. The Fifth Circuit, however, has held that “imposition of the ultimate sanction of automatically granting a motion” for summary judgment upon failure to comply with the local rule is “wholly inconsistent” with Rule 56. John vy. Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985). A non-movant’s failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment does not entitle the movant to summary judgment. Retzlaff v. de la Vina, 606 F.Supp.2d 654, 656 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (Sth Cir. 1988)). Instead, a court may accept the movant’s evidence as undisputed and may enter a judgment in the movant’s favor if summary judgment evidence establishes a prima facie showing of the movant’s entitlement to judgment. Jd. Therefore, a dismissal pursuant to the local rules based solely on Defendants’ failure to respond to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment would be improper. Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiff's arguments from its motion below.

B.

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Bluebook (online)
Great American Insurance Company v. Salem Group, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/great-american-insurance-company-v-salem-group-inc-txsd-2023.