Grazia v. SC State Plastering

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: December 23, 2013
• Docket: 2013-UP-496
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Anthony and Barbara Grazia, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated plaintiffs, Plaintiffs,

v.

South Carolina State Plastering, LLC, Defendant.

South Carolina State Plastering, LLC, Third-Party Plaintiff,

Del Webb Communities, Inc., Pulte Homes, Inc., and Kephart Architects, Inc., Third-Party Defendants,

Of whom Anthony and Barbara Grazia, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated plaintiffs, are the Respondents,

and

South Carolina State Plastering, LLC, Del Webb Communities, Inc., and Pulte Homes, Inc., are the Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2012-212840

Appeal From Beaufort County J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-496 Heard November 6, 2013 – Filed December 23, 2013

AFFIRMED

Robert L. Widener and A. Victor Rawl, Jr., both of McNair Law Firm, PA of Columbia, for Appellants Del Webb Communities, Inc., and Pulte Homes, Inc., and Everett Augustus Kendall, II and Christy Elizabeth Mahon, both of Sweeny Wingate & Barrow, PA, of Columbia, for Appellant South Carolina State Plastering, LLC.

W. Jefferson Leath, Jr. and Michael S. Seekings, both of Leath Bouch & Seekings, LLP of Charleston, Phillip Ward Segui, Jr., of Segui Law Firm of Mt. Pleasant, and John T. Chakeris, of Chakeris Law Firm, of Charleston for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Del Webb Communities Inc., Pulte Homes, Inc., and South Carolina State Plastering, LLC appeal the circuit court's denial of their request to reinstate a previously existing injunction restricting communications between Anthony and Barbara Grazia's attorneys and other potential class members in this defective stucco litigation. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities: Peek v. Spartanburg Reg'l Healthcare Sys., 367 S.C. 450, 454, 626 S.E.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The grant or denial of an injunction by the [circuit] court will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the [circuit] court is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law."); Eldridge v. City of Greenwood, 308 S.C. 125, 128, 417 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1992) ("An order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties." (emphasis added) (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981)); id. at 127, 417 S.E.2d at 534 ("Orders which severely limit [plaintiff's] contact with potential members of the class are authorized only under the general grant of power in Rule 23(d)(2). The specific grants of power in Rule 23(d), SCRCP[,] are directed towards notifying the absent parties of the pending litigation.") (emphasis added).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.