Grazette v. Rockefeller

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 21, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-00965·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DAVID I. GRAZETTE, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-0965 (LLS) ROCKEFELLER; CITY OF NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT; RCPI ORDER TO AMEND LANDMARK PROPERTIES, LLC; NEW YORK PRESBYTERIAN CORNELL HOSPITAL, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated his federal civil rights. By order dated March 18, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must

determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are taken from the complaint. On September 25, 2019, while visiting a lawyer at 30 Rockefeller Plaza in Manhattan, Plaintiff David Grazette was detained and arrested by “a man who identified himself by the name of Robert Muller.” (ECF No. 2, at 5.) Mr. Muller was accompanied by two New York City Police officers who “were following his lead.” (Id.) Plaintiff was handcuffed and held in a room for four hours before being involuntarily admitted to New York Presbyterian Cornell Medical Center “under the FALSE PRETENSE that [he] was ‘running around the Rockefeller Plaza building training for a marathon and pulling fire alarms.’” (Id.) (emphasis and internal quotations in original). While at New York Presbyterian, Dr. Herd and another doctor interviewed Plaintiff. A third doctor, Emily Menand, did not interview Plaintiff but signed off on an “involuntary admission on medical certification” under Section 9.27 of New York Mental Hygiene Law. (Id. at 5-6). On September 29, 2019, Plaintiff was sent to Gracie Square Hospital “under the FALSE

PRE[]TENSE that [he] wanted to kill a cop.’” (Id. at 6) (emphasis and internal quotations in original). Plaintiff was discharged from Gracie Square on October 4, 2019. While at Gracie Square, he was forced to take medicine that “negatively affected the enertia [sic] of [his] endocrine system.” (Id.) Plaintiff names as Defendants the City of New York Police Department, the Rockefeller Group, RCPI Landmark Properties, and New York Presbyterian-Cornell Hospital, and asserts claims of “false arrest, wrongful arrest, [and] malpractice.” (Id. at 2.) He seeks money damages. DISCUSSION The Court liberally construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Plaintiff was arrested, involuntarily committed, and forcibly medicated in violation of his

federal constitutional rights. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A. Claims Against the City of New York Police Department The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Police Department because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court declines to construe the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under § 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to

allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011).

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