Gray v. Pearline

43 S.W.2d 803, 43 S.W.2d 802, 328 Mo. 1192, 1931 Mo. LEXIS 481
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedNovember 20, 1931
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 43 S.W.2d 803 (Gray v. Pearline) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gray v. Pearline, 43 S.W.2d 803, 43 S.W.2d 802, 328 Mo. 1192, 1931 Mo. LEXIS 481 (Mo. 1931).

Opinions

This is an action by a tenant to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by falling from the second floor porch of a tenement house owned by the defendants when an alleged defective "railing of said porch" broke or gave way. At the close of plaintiff's case the defendants requested and the court gave a peremptory instruction to the jury to find for the defendants, whereupon plaintiff took an involuntary nonsuit. The court overruled plaintiff's motion to set aside the involuntary nonsuit, and plaintiff appealed.

It appears that respondents owned a four-family, two-story, brick tenement building fronting on the north side of Dickson Street in the City of St. Louis. They acquired the property in November, 1925. There are two apartments on each floor rented to four tenants; each occupied a separate apartment. None of the tenants held under a written lease, all being tenants from month to month and there was no agreement as to repairs. Appellant as a tenant from month to month occupied the second floor cast apartment. At the rear of the building, being the north end thereof, is a porch for the use of the second floor tenants. The floor or platform of this porch is on a level with the second floor apartments and extends from east to west across the entire width of the building. The porch is enclosed on all sides, except the side next to the building, with a railing or banister. On a line exactly dividing the porch is a banister extending from north to south, connecting the north wall of the building at one end and the center supporting column of the porch at the other. The porch is thus partitioned into two distinct and well defined sections of equal size, each enclosed on all sides by banisters except the side formed by the wall of the building. All the banisters are three feet in height, extend to within a few inches of the porch floor, and consist of top and bottom horizontal rails with vertical pickets or slats between. The east section of the porch is connected with and appurtenant to the east second floor apartment rented and occupied by appellant, and a window and door in that apartment open upon that section of the porch. The same arrangement exists as to the west second-floor apartment and the west section of the porch appurtenant thereto. A separate stairway extends from each section of the porch to the ground, and except for the opening required for an entrance to the stairway each section of the porch is completely enclosed by a banister on all sides *Page 1196 except the side formed by the north wall of the building. The yard to the north of the building is divided by a high board fence, running north and south, which separates the yard accessible to and for the use of the tenants of the first and second floor apartments on the cast from the yard available to and for the use of the tenants in the first and second floor apartments on the west. The stairway to the east section of the porch and appellant's apartment leads to the east yard, and the stairway from the west section of the porch and the west second floor apartment leads to the west yard. The stairway to appellant's apartment is not connected with or a part of any other stairway and no other apartment or part of the building is served by it. The same situation and arrangement exists as to the west second floor apartment, porch and stairway leading thereto. The south side of the porch is attached to the north wall of the building, while the north side of the porch is supported by three wooden columns, one being at the northeast corner, one at the center of the north side of the porch and one at the northwest corner. The column at the northeast corner also supports the east stairway leading to appellant's apartment, and the column at the northwest corner supports the stairway leading to the west second floor apartment.

There is a door and window at the north end of the building in each of the two first floor apartments, and each of these doors opens upon a small individual porch of the same width as the steps, six or eight in number, leading therefrom to the ground. Between these two small first floor apartment porches and the steps leading to each is a high partition of banister construction completely separating the first floor apartments and the entrances thereto. This banister runs from the wall of the building to and connects with the south side of the center supporting column of the upstairs porch. The fence, which we have described, separating the yards, is attached to the north side of the same column and runs thence north. The two first floor apartments, the porches appurtenant thereto and the steps leading to each are independent units and in no way dependent upon each other for means of access or in the use of the separate apartments or with the upstairs porch or apartments and the two stairways leading to same.

The two second floor apartments are separate, independent and complete apartment units. The east half of the porch and the east stairway is, as we have noted, separated by a banister from the west apartment porch and stairway. The appellant had the exclusive use of the east porch and the stairway appurtenant to her apartment, and neither that part of the porch nor the stairway was used by other tenants for any purpose, nor was either a part of a common passageway, entrance, hall or areaway necessary or convenient to the use and enjoyment of other apartments in the building. The *Page 1197 evidence shows that appellant used the porch in connection with her use and occupancy of the apartment, exercising the same control thereover which she exercised over the other parts of the apartment.

Appellant was a tenant under a verbal lease, renting from month to month, at the time respondents purchased the property andthere was no agreement whatsoever as to repairs. Appellant was not personally acquainted with respondents and all her dealings with reference to the rental of the apartment and the payment of rent were had with real estate agents who managed the property for the owners and appellant testified that she had no conversation or agreement with the agents in regard to the tenancy after respondents acquired the property. The evidence was that no repairs were made by respondents prior to appellant's injury, and appellant testified that no repairs were made on the porch, that she knew of, during her tenancy.

On January 6, 1926, appellant fell from the porch appurtenant to her apartment. She testified that she was in the act of throwing a small pillow to a neighbor on the second floor porch of a tenement house on the east and across a passageway about fifteen feet in width, between the buildings; that she went to the east side of her porch, placed her left hand on the top rail of the banister along that side of the porch and threw the pillow with her right hand; that the banister broke and she fell to the ground and was injured. The testimony shows that the top rail of the banister broke or gave way and fell into the passageway. The witnesses who examined the rail state that the "ends of the rail looked like the nails had pulled through, that rusty nails had pulled through the wood, it didn't look sound" and "the ends (of the rail) were all split like they were worm-eaten or rotten, and the nails were broken, they were rusty nails." Within a few days after appellant's injury the respondents had the banister which gave way repaired by placing a new top rail thereon and also repaired other banisters both on appellant's porch and on the west porch by putting in new pickets.

The legal principles controlling this case are clear. In the absence of an agreement by the landlord to put and keep the premises in repair no duty is imposed upon him, orLandlord

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Bluebook (online)
43 S.W.2d 803, 43 S.W.2d 802, 328 Mo. 1192, 1931 Mo. LEXIS 481, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gray-v-pearline-mo-1931.