Gray v. King

227 S.W.2d 872, 1950 Tex. App. LEXIS 1926
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 15, 1950
DocketNo. 9848
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 227 S.W.2d 872 (Gray v. King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gray v. King, 227 S.W.2d 872, 1950 Tex. App. LEXIS 1926 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950).

Opinion

ARCHER, Chief Justice.

This is a suit in trespass to try title. It was filed by E. W. Gray, on November 10, 1948, against A. F. King, M. B. King, Carl King, Arthur Malone, E. C. Grindstaff, and Homer Wood, for recovery of title and possession to a tract of 220.25 acres of land in Runnels County, Texas. The defendants were owners of land adjacent to Gray’s tract. The only parties contesting the suit were the Kings, because, upon investigation, it became apparent that if Gray’s farm contained 220.25 acres, approximately 20 acres had to come from the King tract. The three King brothers who were named as defendants in the plaintiff’s original petition pleaded, not guilty, and then they, with the joinder of all parties owning an interest in the King tract, brought a cross-action against all persons owning an interest in the Gray tract, for recovery of title and possession of a 19.54-acre tract along the south .side of the King farm.

E. W. Gray and his children answered with pleas of not guilty and the' three, five, ten and twenty-five year statutes of limitation. ■ Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. arts. 5507, 5509, 5510, 5519. M. J. Florance, a cross-defendant, was dismissed from the case without prejudice.

The case is before us on four points assigned as error.

.. By their first point appellants allege error by the court in overruling their motion for a directed verdict; the second in overruling motion for judgment non obstante veredicto; by the third in overruling motion . for a new trial; and by the fourth in overruling "motion for a new trial because the verdict of the jury is against the weight and preponderance of the evidence.

The court submitted only one issue to the jury, inquiring whether the appellants (the Gray family) had ten years adverse possession of the'land. The jury answered this issue in the negative; and based on [874]*874the jury’s answer the court entered judgment for the appellees (the King family).

The only dispute between the parties hereto was over a strip of 19.54 acres lying south of a fence.

The field notes of the King 315.41 acres call for a beginning' corner as a stone mound, etc., from which a mesquite 9 in. in dia. bears south 73¾ degrees west 31 vrs.; thence south with west line of Block No. 38, 1340.92 vrs. to a stone mound for northwest corner of a 200-acre tract. The field notes for the Gray 200-acre tract begin at the southeast corner of Section 39; thence west,' etc.; thence north' parallel with the west line of said Block No. 40, 854.8 varas to a stone for the southwest corner of a 315.41-acre tract owned by J. L. King; thence east with south line of sáid King tract 1327.7 vrs. to a stone, etc.

No mention is made of a fence in either of the field notes to the two tracts of land.

■ The stone mounds called for in the deeds tyere not, found by Surveyor Simpson.

It is undisputed that the 19.54-acre tract is outside of the called field notes of the 200-acre tract and within that of the 315.41-acre tract. The fence is 94 vrs. north of the course and call distances for the 315.41-acre tract on the east side and 72.2 vrs. on the west,side.

“The rules for ascertaining boundaries are invoked only when the calls of an instrument are inconsistent or lead to different results; if there is no conflict in the calls found in the field notes, or if there is no conflict in the calls in the deed and those found upon the ground, but a perfect coincidence, there is no necessity for resorting to rules of construction and the calls speak for' themselves.” 7 Tex.Jur., 121.

“The rule is thus stated by Chief Justice Gaines in Thompson v. Langdon, supra [87 Tex. 254, 28 S.W. 931]: ‘The lines of a grant must be established by the calls in its field notes. If those calls are inconsistent, then ■ certain rules of construc- • tion and even parol, evidence may be re■sorted to'in order to resolve the doubt and to establish the' line which was actually run'- -by the- surveyor. It is 'but, a case of a latent ambiguity in a written instrument. A writing unambiguous upon its face may become doubtful when applied to the subject-matter of the description. On the other hand, if there be no conflict in the calls found in the field notes of a survey, there is no room for construction, and the calls must speak for themselves.” Gill v. Peterson, 126 Tex. 216, 86 S.W.2d 629, 632.

We believe that the evidence as a whole raised an issue of fact as to the application of the ten-year statute of limitation, and that the court, was justified in refusing to direct a verdict for the appellants.

We overrule the appellants’ second assignment of error of the court in overruling a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.

.The court submitted only one issue to the jury, inquiring whether appellants had ten years adverse possession of the 19.54-acre tract of land, and the jury answered they had not.

The testimony of the plaintiff that the land lies outside of King’s fence, and that it was inclosed by Gray’s fences, and that he had possession, cultivated, pastured and claimed it as his own for more than ten years, raises a question of fact, but it is not conclusive, because the claimant is an interested witness.

“As to the ten-year statute, it is stated in Texas Jurisprudence that: ‘In the situation which commonly is . presented, the issues in cases of this class are for the jury’s determination. The testimony of the claimant that he had been in possession of the land under an adverse claim of more than ten years raises a question of fact, but it is not conclusive, because the claimant is an interested witness.’ 2 Tex.Jur., 233, § 127.” Epps v. Finehout, Tex.Civ.App., 189 S.W.2d 631, 632.

In the case of Chittim v. Auld, 219 S.W.2d 702, 704, we have facts and circumstances not in-this case. In the Chittim case Mary Wilson conveyed a “ ‘Half interest in and to my wire fence, which fence * , * ⅜-, is.situated and runs along or near the line of Survey No. 23 * * *.’ ” [875]*875Each party was to keep the fence in repair on alternate 'years.

We, therefore, do not believe that the 19.54 acres became the property of Gray as a matter of law.

The jury having heard the witnesses and being the exclusive judge of the credibility and weight to be given their testimony, and having resolved the facts in favor of appellees, ordinarily we would not be justified in disregarding the jury verdict.

In Sturtevant v. Pagel, 134 Tex. 46, 130 S.W.2d 1017, 1018, the court said: “The Sturtevants were interested parties, and the rule is well established that jurors are not required to accept the testimony of such witnesses as true merely because it is not directly or expressly contradicted by other witnesses.”

In Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453, 456, the court held: “Doherty contends that the evidence in this case entitles him to a judgment awarding him the title and possession of this land because it shows conclusively' that Pearson did not claim adversely as- against the true or real owner, and therefore shows that Pearson.has not acquired title by the Ten Year Statute of Limitation. We overrule this contention.

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227 S.W.2d 872, 1950 Tex. App. LEXIS 1926, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gray-v-king-texapp-1950.