NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 230665-U
Order filed April 14, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
JANELLE GRAY, Independent ) Appeal from the Circuit Court Administrator of the Estate of Catherine ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, Gray, ) Du Page County, Illinois, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-23-0665 ) Circuit No. 21-L-533 HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC; PEOPLE ) LINK, LLC; and HOME DEPOT U.S.A, INC., ) ) Defendants ) ) (Robert A. Langendorf, P.C., ) Honorable ) Angelo J. Kappas, Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and Anderson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s award of $1,015 in attorney fees to the law office of a discharged attorney, based on the theory of quantum meruit, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶2 On August 14, 2023, plaintiff Janelle Gray, as independent administrator of the estate of
Catherine Gray, filed a motion to adjudicate the attorney lien of the law office of Robert A.
Langendorf, P.C. (Langendorf P.C.). Following an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the circuit
court of Du Page County granted plaintiff’s motion to adjudicate the lien and awarded Langendorf
P.C. $1,015 in attorney fees. Attorney Robert A. Langendorf of Langendorf P.C. appeals, and for
the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On June 28, 2019, Catherine was struck by a flower cart at a Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
(Home Depot), store located in Downers Grove, Illinois. The flower cart contained the flowers of
Hampshire Holdings, LLC (Hampshire Holdings), and was pushed by an employee of PeopleLink,
LLC (PeopleLink), a temporary employment agency. Three days following the incident, Catherine
retained Langendorf P.C. to represent her in a personal injury action against Home Depot,
Hampshire Holdings, and PeopleLink (defendants).
¶5 On August 6, 2019, Catherine discharged Langendorf P.C. and retained the law firm of
Taxman, Pollock, Murray & Beckerman, LLC (TPMB) pursuant to a contingency fee agreement.
Catherine subsequently died due to reasons unrelated to her June 28, 2019, injury. Her daughter,
plaintiff, was named as administrator of her estate and, on May 14, 2021, filed a survival action to
recover damages in relation to the June 28, 2019, incident. TPMB continued to represent the estate
throughout the proceedings. On November 29, 2022, the circuit court entered settlement in the
amount of $150,000 in favor of plaintiff and accompanying attorney fees in the amount of $50,000.
¶6 Following settlement, James Lynch, a partner at TPMB, emailed Langendorf and asked if
his firm was pursuing an attorney lien based on quantum merit and requested that, if not,
Langendorf P.C. execute a release. Langendorf refused to sign the release and asserted a lien for
2 services provided prior to his discharge. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion to adjudicate the
lien, asserting that TPMB was unable to amicably resolve the issue and requesting that the court
adjudicate the lien. Langendorf did not file a written response.
¶7 Attached to plaintiff’s reply brief in support of her motion to adjudicate the lien was an
affidavit by attorney Harvey Paulsen, who represented the settling insurance carriers, Sentry
Insurance/Florist Mutual Insurance Company (Sentry). Paulsen averred that the only verbal
communications between Langendorf P.C. and Sentry occurred on August 12, 2019, and December
2, 2019. On August 12, a representative of Langendorf P.C. called Sentry and stated that the law
firm was representing Catherine in this case, that an attorney lien would be sent, and that the law
firm was unsure of Catherine’s injuries. On December 2, a representative of Langendorf P.C. again
called Sentry and informed Sentry’s insurance adjuster that Catherine “may be representing herself
in this matter” and that Sentry was not permitted to communicate with her directly.
¶8 On October 17, 2023, an evidentiary hearing commenced on the motion to adjudicate the
lien. At the hearing, Langendorf testified that he had been a licensed attorney since 1980, that he
had practiced in the circuit courts of Du Page and Cook Counties “for a number of years,” and that
he “[had] done appellate work.” Langendorf also testified that he was an arbitrator and had “done
many arbitrations with *** the chief judge of the Du Page court,” for which he regularly charged
$500 per hour. He stated that he had “million dollar settlements” in Du Page County.
¶9 Regarding Langendorf P.C.’s representation of Catherine, Langendorf testified that he had
“signed up [the] case” and met three separate times with Catherine, who signed a contingency fee
agreement and insisted that Langendorf “handle everything personally.” Langendorf stated that he
had acquiesced and performed the work on Catherine’s case himself. He explained that, as part of
his work, he had spent “at least three hours” talking with Catherine over the phone and four hours
3 meeting with her to “[go] over everything.” He had also faxed information; preserved the videotape
of the June 28, 2019, incident; spoke to multiple insurance adjusters; and investigated related to
the fact that “she was knocked over by a floral tray in a Home Depot.” Langendorf stated that he
also spent a “significant amount of time” coordinating the dates and times of Catherine’s medical
appointments, which included calling her care providers and changing her appointments, and that
he spent “particular time” finding the proper defendants and “getting ahold” of defendants’
adjusters to discuss and try to convince them to preserve the video of the June 28, 2019, incident.
¶ 10 As to the exact amount of time that Langendorf spent on performing his work for Catherine,
he testified that he “did not keep [his] specifically quarter hours or point half hours of each time
*** as [he was] not required to.” He explained that he “spent a lot of time in this case and [that]
the best [he could do was] estimate it” and that he “[didn’t] want to [say that he knew] the exact
time because [that wasn’t] what [he did] in a personal injury case.” Langendorf expressed that,
although he couldn’t “give *** the exact amount of time that [he] spent on this case,” he thought
that what he had “given” was “probably on the low side of fair.” Langendorf testified that, based
on his experience, he believed that he was entitled to $500 per hour for the work he had completed
for Catherine. He noted that $500 per hour was the same rate at which he was compensated for his
work as an arbitrator, and that he believed that the rate was “fair.”
¶ 11 At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that Langendorf was
entitled to recover attorney fees for his work in representing Catherine at the hourly rate for
comparable work in Du Page County, which was $350 per hour, and that Langendorf had rendered
2.9 hours in reasonable services. The court granted plaintiff’s motion to adjudicate the lien and
awarded Langendorf P.C. $1,015 in attorney fees. Langendorf P.C. now appeals.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
4 ¶ 13 Under Illinois law, a discharged attorney engaged on a contingency fee basis is entitled to
recover a reasonable fee for the services that he or she provided prior to being discharged, based
on the theory of quantum meruit. Will v. Northwestern University, 378 Ill. App. 3d 280, 303-04
(2007). “Quantum meruit” literally means “as much as he deserves” and is an equitable remedy
that, as its name suggests, allows the circuit court to award an attorney “as much as he deserves”
for representing a client. Seiden Law Group, P.C. v. Segal, 2021 IL App (1st) 200877, ¶ 29;
Jameson Real Estate, LLC v. Ahmed, 2018 IL App (1st) 171534, ¶ 61.
¶ 14 The burden of proof is on the attorney to demonstrate the reasonable value of his or her
services. In re Estate of Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (1991). In determining the reasonable value
of an attorney’s services, the circuit court must consider all relevant factors such as “ ‘the time and
labor required, the attorney’s skill and standing, the nature of the cause, the novelty and difficulty
of the subject matter, the attorney’s degree of responsibility in managing the case, the usual and
customary charge for that type of work in the community, and the benefits resulting to the client.’ ”
Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Continental Community Bank Trust & Co., 2017 IL
App (1st) 170680, ¶ 50 (quoting Kannewurf v. Johns, 260 Ill. App. 3d 66, 74 (1994)). In
determining the reasonableness of attorney fees after a bench trial, the sole question on review is
whether the circuit court’s judgment regarding attorney fees and costs was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon v. Gaylord, 317 Ill. App. 3d 590, 598
(2000).
¶ 15 Langendorf P.C. first argues on appeal that the circuit court failed to consider all the
quantum meruit factors in determining the appropriate award of attorney fees. However, our review
of the transcript refutes that claim. Near the end of the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court
explained its reasons for awarding Langendorf P.C. $1,015 in attorney fees. Namely, the court
5 articulated that, in the context of a claim for attorney fees based on a theory of quantum meruit, a
court “[f]irst *** considers” the reasonable hourly rate in the area for similar services and, then,
“looks at the reasonable services provided.” As to the reasonable hourly rate, the court found that,
although Catherine had asked Langendorf to work on her case himself, that did not necessarily
mean that Langendorf had himself prepared all the letters and documentation during his time on
the case, rather than other attorneys or his paralegals or staff. The court also found that the “proper
and reasonable” hourly rate for Du Page County was $350 per hour for comparable work.
¶ 16 Turning next to the reasonableness of Langendorf’s services, the court found that the Dead-
Man’s Act barred Langendorf’s testimony regarding his alleged meetings with Catherine. The
court also noted that Langendorf had not offered any documentation as to the meetings and could
not remember the exact time of the meetings. The court noted that the only documents Langendorf
had offered were those in the parties’ briefs, which indicated that he had rendered 1.9 hours in
services. Additionally, the court concluded that, although the Dead-Man’s Act barred Langendorf’s
testimony regarding his meetings with Catherine, based on the time Langendorf had her “file” and
the “limited work” he had documented, he had spent a reasonable amount of one hour meeting
with Catherine. The court then adjudicated the lien in the amount of “2.9 hours at $350 per hour
for a total of $1,015 payable to [Langendorf P.C.].” Thus, the circuit court properly assessed the
quantum meruit factors, and we cannot say that the amount of the award was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶ 17 Still, seemingly based on the fact that the circuit court did not make express findings
relevant to this quantum meruit factor, Langendorf P.C. now argues that the circuit court failed to
consider Langendorf’s skill and standing in determining the award of attorney fees. Additionally,
6 Langendorf P.C. argues that the circuit court also failed to consider Langendorf’s hourly rate as an
arbitrator, which was $500 per hour.
¶ 18 We have repeatedly rejected the argument by litigants that the circuit court did not consider
a statutory factor solely because it did not make express findings as to that factor in its order. See,
e.g., Shen v. Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733, ¶ 136 (“[W]e reject [the] argument that the court did
not consider all the statutory factors solely because it did not make specific findings in the order.”);
In re Marriage of Berk, 215 Ill. App. 3d 459, 464 (1991) (stating that the fact that the circuit court
did not specifically list a factor did not mean that the court did not consider it in determining the
best interests of the child at issue). Furthermore, it is true that, when determining an award of
attorney fees based on a theory of quantum meruit, a court must consider the attorney’s skill and
standing and the customary charge for the work that he or she performed when these factors are
relevant. See Wegner v. Arnold, 305 Ill. App. 3d 689, 693 (1999). Here, however, it is unclear how
the circuit court erred by declining to set Langendorf’s hourly rate at $500 per hour when he
testified that he received $500 per hour as an arbitrator, but there was no indication that he was
acting in the capacity of an arbitrator while representing Catherine. Thus, we will not disturb the
circuit court’s award of attorney fees based only on the fact that it did not expressly note
Langendorf’s skill and standing or hourly rate as an arbitrator in its order below.
¶ 19 Langendorf P.C. also argues that the circuit court erred by setting an hourly rate of $350
per hour for Langendorf’s work in this case based on the customary and reasonable hourly rate for
comparable work in Du Page County. Langendorf P.C. contends that the court should have instead
based Langendorf’s hourly rate on the usual rate for comparable work in Cook County because
that is the county in which the firm was located, the attorneys in the firm typically practiced, and
Langendorf performed his work on Catherine’s case.
7 ¶ 20 In Illinois, a court is not bound by the opinion of attorneys as to what constitutes reasonable
attorney fees. In re Marriage of Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 113 (1990). Rather, when assessing
the value of legal services rendered, the court may rely on the knowledge that it has acquired in
the discharge of professional duties. Richheimer v. Richheimer, 59 Ill. App. 2d 354, 365 (1965).
Moreover, when considering the appropriate amount of attorney fees, courts should look to what
is customarily and usually charged for similar services in the court where the services were
rendered. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Malec, 205 Ill. App. 3d 273, 293 (1990) (“[A]ttorneys are
entitled to recover a fee based on what is usually and customarily charged and paid for like services
in the court where the services were rendered.”); In re Marriage of Anguili, 134 Ill. App. 3d 417,
424 (1985) (noting case law that stated that an award for attorney fees should be based on what is
usually and customarily charged and paid for like services in the court where the services were
rendered); Crane v. Roselle, 157 Ill. App. 595, 598 (1910) (“The inquiry should be what is usually
and customarily charged and paid for like services in the court where said services were rendered,
where the fee is the subject of contract or where the matter is between parties competent to
contract.”).
¶ 21 This case originated and was litigated in the circuit court of Du Page County. Accordingly,
the circuit court properly based Langendorf’s hourly rate on the usual rate for similar services
performed in Du Page County rather than in Cook County, regardless of where Langendorf P.C.
was physically located, the attorneys at the law firm typically practiced, or Langendorf performed
the tasks underlying his representation of Catherine.
¶ 22 Next, Langendorf P.C. argues that the circuit court erred by limiting the award of attorney
fees so as to compensate Langendorf only for time spent for which he had provided documentary
support in the form of letters he had written, medical records, and “the receipt of certain physician
8 liens.” Langendorf P.C. contends the court erred by ignoring the additional evidence Langendorf
offered through his testimony.
¶ 23 It is axiomatic that we review a circuit court’s factual findings made during an evidentiary
hearing under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, and that, under this standard, we will
not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight
to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn therefrom. See, e.g., In re Parentage of
W.J.B., 2016 IL App (2d) 140361, ¶ 25. Therefore, even if the circuit court gave more weight to
Langendorf’s documentary evidence than to his testimony, or ascribed little to no weight to his
testimony altogether, we will not vacate the award of attorney fees solely on either of these bases.
See Wegner v. Arnold, 305 Ill. App. 3d 689, 693 (1999) (“The trial judge has broad discretion in
matters of attorney fees due to the advantage of close observation of the attorney's work and the
trial judge's deeper understanding of the skill and time required in the case.”).
¶ 24 Moreover, Langendorf P.C.’s reasons for believing that the circuit court did not at all
consider Langendorf’s testimony relevant to the time that he spent representing Catherine are
unclear. However, to the extent that its belief is based on the fact that the circuit court did not
expressly mention the relevant portions of Langendorf’s testimony in determining that he had
rendered only 2.9 hours of reasonable services, we have expressed before that just because the
circuit court did not explicitly mention a piece of evidence does not mean that it did not consider
it. See Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Zurich Insurance Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 131529, ¶ 129. Thus,
we reject Langendorf P.C.’s argument to the contrary in this case.
¶ 25 Additionally, Langendorf argues that the circuit court improperly permitted counsel for
plaintiff to testify during the evidentiary hearing without first having been sworn in as a witness.
Indeed, Illinois Rule of Evidence 603 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) requires every witness to declare, by oath
9 or affirmation, that he or she will testify truthfully before taking the stand. However, while our
review of the record shows that counsel for plaintiff was never sworn in before addressing the
court during the evidentiary hearing, our review also shows that counsel never testified but instead
only argued in support of plaintiff’s position while referencing sworn statements that were made
by others. Because counsel never testified during the proceedings, the circuit court did not err by
allowing counsel to address the court without first having been sworn in.
¶ 26 Having resolved Langendorf P.C.’s foregoing arguments, we further conclude that, even if
the reasoning and logic applied by the circuit court were erroneous for the reasons that it advances,
the award of attorney fees was nevertheless adequately supported by the evidence. See In re
Kendale H., 2013 IL App (1st) 130421, ¶ 31 (explaining that the question on appeal from a lower
court’s judgment “is the correctness of the result below, not the correctness of the reasoning on
which the result was reached,” and that “an appellate court may affirm a lower court’s judgment
on any ground supported by the record.”). To support Langendorf P.C.’s position at the evidentiary
hearing, Langendorf testified, relevant to his skills and experience, that he had been an attorney
since 1980, practiced in Du Page and Cook Counties “for a number of years,” and performed
appellate work and worked as an arbitrator. He further testified that he had participated in “million
dollar settlements” and regularly charged $500 per hour in his role as an arbitrator.
¶ 27 As to the nature of the work he performed, Langendorf testified that he had “signed up this
case” and met with Catherine three separate times in his office. Langendorf described Catherine
as “very thorough” and explained that she had insisted that he “handle everything personally,”
wanted to know “every detail” about what he had done, and “went over everything.” Langendorf
stated that he had performed every task in this case himself, in accordance with
Catherine’s request, and that these tasks included sending faxes, speaking to multiple insurance
10 adjusters, investigating related to the fact that “she was knocked over by a floral tray in a Home
Depot,” calling medical care providers, rescheduling her medical appointments, coordinating her
medical billing, working to ensure that the video footage of the June 28, 2019, incident at Home
Depot was preserved, and talking with Catherine over the phone and meeting with her in person.
¶ 28 However, undercutting Langendorf P.C.’s position, Langendorf testified that, with respect
to the total time he spent working on Catherine’s case, “the best [he could] do [was] estimate it,”
and that he “[didn’t] want” to state the exact time that he expended “because that’s not what [he
did] in a personal injury case,” but that it was a “significant amount of time.” As to the individual
tasks that he completed, Langendorf testified that he “spent at least three hours” talking to
Catherine on the phone and four hours meeting with her in person, but he did not offer
documentation to support this testimony. As to the remaining tasks, he testified only that he spent
“particular” time finding the correct defendants in this case and “a significant amount of time”
working to ensure that the video footage of the June 28, 2019, incident was preserved. The only
documentation that Langendorf provided the circuit court to support his overall claim was “the
receipt of certain physician liens,” “limited medical records,” and letters that he drafted.
¶ 29 Additionally, the circuit court noted that the “pre-suit” work that Langendorf had
completed typically “involves a multitude of attorneys and paralegals and staff,” regardless of
whether Catherine had asked Langendorf to complete the work himself. The court also found that
the reasonable hourly rate to be applied for the fee calculation was $350 per hour, which was the
usual rate for similar work in Du Page County and which countered Langendorf’s desired rate of
$500 per hour, based on the usual rate in Cook County. In light of the evidence presented during
the evidentiary hearing and Langendorf’s failure to make more specific showings to support his
11 position, it cannot be said that the circuit court’s award of $1,015 in attorney fees was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 30 As a final note, Langendorf P.C. argues that the circuit court erred by finding that
Langendorf’s testimony as to his meetings with Catherine was barred by the Dead-Man’s Act.
Because we have already concluded that the circuit court’s award of attorney fees was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence, even when considering Langendorf’s testimony regarding his
meetings with Catherine, we need not address this issue. See DeLapaz SelectBuild Construction,
Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d 969, 977 (2009) (declining to address the argument that the attorney fees at
issue were not established on a quantum meruit basis, after already concluding that the circuit court
did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorney fees).
¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 32 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.
¶ 33 Affirmed.