Gray v. . Griffin

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Gray v. . Griffin

1 S.E.2d 361, 215 N.C. 182, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 223

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedMarch 1, 1939

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 1 S.E.2d 361 (Gray v. . Griffin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gray v. . Griffin, 1 S.E.2d 361, 215 N.C. 182, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 223 (N.C. 1939).

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Opinion

PeR Cueiam.

The judgment entered recites that it is admitted by the plaintiff that defendant was adjudged a voluntary bankrupt 21 March, 1938, subsequent to the matters and things alleged in the complaint, and that plaintiff announced he “did not desire to try this case except on the alleged issue of negligence of the defendant being willful and malicious within the meaning of the bankruptcy act relating to the discharge of the bankrupt from claims existing at the time of his voluntary bankruptcy.” The plaintiff testified: “He intended to pass us with two cars approaching and rather than kill all the folks approaching he took my car. I do not think he did it willfully and maliciously as he did it to save those other folks.” The other evidence offered fails to bring the conduct of the defendant within the term “willful and malicious,” as used in the bankruptcy act. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S., 473, 48 L. Ed., 754; Poznanovic v. Gilardine, 57 A. L. R., 148; Ely v. O’Dell, 57 A. L. R., 151, and annotations; Be Greene, 109 A. L. R., 1188.

Perhaps, in making his election to pursue his cause of action upon the theory that the alleged negligence of the defendant constituted a willful and malicious injury to person and property, the plaintiff was inadvertent to the decision in Re Greene, supra, and cases there cited. Having made the election, the judgment of nonsuit was proper.

Affirmed.

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PeR Cueiam.

The judgment entered recites that it is admitted by the plaintiff that defendant was adjudged a voluntary bankrupt 21 March, 1938, subsequent to the matters and things alleged in the complaint, and that plaintiff announced he “did not desire to try this case except on the alleged issue of negligence of the defendant being willful and malicious within the meaning of the bankruptcy act relating to the discharge of the bankrupt from claims existing at the time of his voluntary bankruptcy.” The plaintiff testified: “He intended to pass us with two cars approaching and rather than kill all the folks approaching he took my car. I do not think he did it willfully and maliciously as he did it to save those other folks.” The other evidence offered fails to bring the conduct of the defendant within the term “willful and malicious,” as used in the bankruptcy act. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S., 473, 48 L. Ed., 754; Poznanovic v. Gilardine, 57 A. L. R., 148; Ely v. O’Dell, 57 A. L. R., 151, and annotations; Be Greene, 109 A. L. R., 1188.

Perhaps, in making his election to pursue his cause of action upon the theory that the alleged negligence of the defendant constituted a willful and malicious injury to person and property, the plaintiff was inadvertent to the decision in Re Greene, supra, and cases there cited. Having made the election, the judgment of nonsuit was proper.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

1 S.E.2d 361, 215 N.C. 182, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 223, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gray-v-griffin-nc-1939.

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