Gray v. Fisher

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 3, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-01669
StatusUnknown

This text of Gray v. Fisher (Gray v. Fisher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gray v. Fisher, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ MONTREAVOUS GRAY,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-cv-1669-pp

LT. FISHER, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Montreavous Gray, who is incarcerated at Waupun Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On January 19, 2024, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $24.43. Dkt. No. 8. The court received that fee on January 25, 2024. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee

over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that on March 31, 2023 at 2:25 p.m., defendant Lieutenant Fisher escorted him to restricted housing for possession of a cellular phone and intoxication. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶3. Fisher allegedly placed the plaintiff in a holding cell and cuffed his left hand to a six-inch chain secured to the holding cell door. Id. The plaintiff states that he immediately told Fisher

that the left cuff was too tight and was causing pain to his left wrist and hand. Id. Fisher allegedly conducted a strip search of the plaintiff while his left hand remained cuffed to the cell door. Id. at ¶4. The plaintiff states that he again complained about the cuff being too tight. Id. Fisher allegedly completed the strip search, and the plaintiff again asked Fisher to loosen the cuff. Id. The plaintiff states that Fisher responded that the plaintiff would be okay, he wouldn’t be in the holding cell for too long and Fisher left the area. Id. The plaintiff alleges that about one hour later, at 3:30 p.m., he asked

defendant Schumann to adjust the cuff because it was causing pain and numbness to his wrist and hand. Id. at ¶5. Schuman allegedly ignored the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff allegedly asked Schumann if he could process the plaintiff into a cell in restrictive housing and Schumann replied, “Relax, you haven’t been waiting that long.” Id. at ¶6. The plaintiff states that he asked to speak with the sergeant. Id. The plaintiff alleges that he then observed defendant Dr. Engstrom, who is a psychologist, talking to another incarcerated individual and he asked Dr.

Engstrom to inform the sergeant and captain that the cuff on his wrist was so tight that it was causing pain and numbness to his left wrist and hand. Id. at ¶7. The plaintiff also allegedly said that he had been left in this state for several hours and felt like he was going to have an anxiety attack. Id. Dr. Engstrom allegedly informed defendant Sergeant Demurs of the plaintiff’s situation. Id. The plaintiff states that Demurs arrived, looked into the plaintiff’s holding cell and immediately left the area even as the plaintiff begged him to loosen the cuff

or at least place him in a cell. Id. at ¶8.

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Gray v. Fisher, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gray-v-fisher-wied-2024.