Gray v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review

489 A.2d 315, 88 Pa. Commw. 284, 1985 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1236
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 20, 1985
DocketAppeal, No. 3040 C.D. 1983
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 489 A.2d 315 (Gray v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gray v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 489 A.2d 315, 88 Pa. Commw. 284, 1985 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1236 (Pa. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

Opinion by

Senior Judge Barbieri,

Nancy V. Cray, Claimant, appeals an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which affirmed a referee’s denial of benefits under Section 403-A(h) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1

The sole issue raised for our review is whether the Board erred in denying all shareable regular benefits2 to Claimant because she voluntarily left her part-time job. On October 11, 1982, while receiving unemployment compensation benefits, Claimant took a part-time job as a store clerk at Handy Markets, Inc., for twenty hours per week at a pay rate of $3.35 per hour. She quit the job later that day. On October 25, 1982, a [286]*286referee found, under Section 402(b) of the Law,3 that Claimant had left work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. Pursuant to this Court’s decision in Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Fabric, 24 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 238, 354 A. 2d 905 (1976), the referee reduced Claimant’s regular benefits by $67.00 per week.4 Claimant did not appeal the referee’s decision. Claimant subsequently applied for shareable regular benefits, commencing the week of April 9, 1983. The referee, as affirmed by the Board, denied all shareable regular benefits under Section 403-A(h) of the Law,5 on the grounds that Fabric applies only to the denial of regular benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law, but not to the denial of shareable regular benefits under Section 403-A(h) of the Law.

Claimant, citing Fabric, argues that her shareable regular benefits should have been reduced rather than terminated. In Fabric, this Court held that “when a [287]*287claimant voluntarily leaves part-time employment within the meaning of Section 402(b)(1) of the Act, he is rendered ineligible for further benefits only to the extent that his benefits were decreased by virtue of his part-time earnings.” Id. at 242-43, 354 A.2d at 908.

In Regan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Revietv, 82 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 648, 476 A.2d 483 (1984), this Court held that “an applicant for federally-funded extended benefits . . . who has voluntarily left part-time employment shall be ineligible for such benefits only to the extent that such benefits were decreased by her part-time earnings.” Id. at 650, 476 A.2d at 484. The Court reasoned:

There is no basis for distinguishing between Section 402(b) (1) and Section 403-A(h). “Both . . . are general eligibility provisions which are routinely applied in appropriate cases.” Id. at 240, 354 A.2d at 908. There is nothing inherent in Section 403-A(h) which would render the application of the procedure dictated by Fabric “illogical, unwise, or contrary to the purposes of the Act.”

Id. at 650, 476 A.2d at 484.

Based on the Court’s reasoning in Regan, we believe that Fabric applies to the denial of shareable regular benefits under Section 403-A(h) of the Law. We see no basis for distinguishing between the denial in Regan of federally-funded extended benefits under Section 403-A(h) of the Law and the denial in the present ease of shareable regular benefits under that same statutory section. Consequently, we hold that Claimant is entitled to shareable regular benefits, reduced to the extent of her part-time earnings.6

[288]*288The Board, relying on Section 202(a)(4) of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970,7 argues that our holding in Regan is invalid and that Fabric cannot apply to cases involving federally-funded extended or regular shareable benefits. Section 202(a)(4) provides:

No .provision of State law which terminates a disqualification for voluntarily leaving employment, being discharged for misconduct, or refusing suitable employment shall apply for purposes of determining eligibility for extended compensation unless such termination is based upon employment subsequent to the date of such disqualification.

We believe, however, that Section 202(a) (4) is inapplicable to the present case. Section 202(a)(4) applies only to provisions of State law which terminate a disqualification, whereas the rule set forth in Fabric does not terminate a disqualification, but merely provides that a disqualification due to a voluntary separation shall be partial- under certain circumstances.

Accordingly, the decision of the Board will be reversed.8

[289]*289Order

And Now, March. 20, 1985, the order of the Unemployment iCompensation Board of Review, No. B-222721, dated September 29, 1983, is reversed.

Judge Williams, Jr., did not participate in the decision in this case.

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Related

Commonwealth v. Commonwealth
535 A.2d 716 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
489 A.2d 315, 88 Pa. Commw. 284, 1985 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1236, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gray-v-commonwealth-unemployment-compensation-board-of-review-pacommwct-1985.