Gray Media Grp., Inc. v. Town of Matthews

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: March 4, 2026
• Docket: 25-332
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Julee Flood

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA 25-332

Filed 4 March 2026

Mecklenburg County, No. 23CV030875-590

GRAY MEDIA GROUP, INC., d/b/a WBTV, Plaintiff,

v.

TOWN OF MATTHEWS, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from order entered 13 September 2024 by Judge Donald

R. Cureton Jr. in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

14 October 2025.

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Daniel E. Peterson, for defendant- appellant.

Ballard Spahr LLP, by Lauren P. Russell, for plaintiff-appellee.

FLOOD, Judge.

Defendant, the Town of Matthews (the “Town”), appeals from an order

granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s, Gray Media Group, Inc. d/b/a/ WBTV

(“Gray Media”), Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On appeal, the Town contends

the trial court erred by: first, ordering the Town to release confidential personnel

records to a party not otherwise entitled to disclosure under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c),

and second, ordering the Town to release an e-mail with redactions lifted such to

disclose the name of the employee subject to an internal affairs investigation and the

names of three other Town employees. After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. TOWN OF MATTHEWS

Opinion of the Court

order in part, vacate the trial court’s order in part, and remand for entry of an order

consistent with this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In April of 2022, Rebecca Hawke, the Town’s manager, launched an employee

misconduct investigation to determine whether an officer (the “Officer”) of the Town’s

Police Department used excessive force during an arrest that occurred on 11 January

2021. As part of this investigation, the Town retained US ISS Agency, LLC (“ISS”),

to conduct “an independent administrative investigation” of the allegations against

the Officer. In furtherance of the investigation, the Town also filed a petition (the

“Petition”) in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 132-1.4A(g) seeking release of law

enforcement bodycam recordings (the “Bodycam Recordings”) from four law

enforcement officers who were present the night the Officer allegedly used excessive

force. On 11 October 2022, the Mecklenburg County Superior Court issued an order

granting release of the Bodycam Recordings to Hawke; two ISS employees; and the

Town’s Human Resources Director, Tonya McGovern.

After ISS finished the internal personnel investigation, ISS issued a report to

the Town summarizing its findings (the “ISS Report”). Due to several reasons listed

in the ISS Report, the Town sent a letter to the Officer on 9 December 2022, stating

that his employment was terminated. The termination letter specifically quoted

several portions of the ISS Report as reasons for terminating the Officer’s

employment.

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On 10 August 2023, Nick Ochsner, an employee of Gray Media, submitted a

public records request for, inter alia, the Bodycam Recordings, copies of certain

communication records between the Town and the Town’s counsel, copies of any

contracts between the Town and ISS, and copies of the ISS Report. The Town

produced several of the requested documents, including a partially redacted email

(the “Email”) between McGovern and the Town’s counsel. The Town explained that it

had redacted certain information—notably, the names of the four law enforcement

officers depicted in the Bodycam Recordings—“to protect the privacy of employee

personnel records pursuant to [N.C.G.S.] § 160A-168.” The Town also declined to

release the Bodycam Recordings, asserting the videos were not public records, and

the ISS Report, contending the Town was prohibited from releasing the ISS Report

because it is a personnel file under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168.

In response, counsel for Gray Media sent the Town a letter arguing the Town

could not redact the four names in the Email for two reasons: first, because the law

enforcement officer’s names were included in the Petition for the Bodycam

Recordings, which is a matter of public record, and second, because N.C.G.S. § 160A-

168(b) explicitly provides that city employee names are a matter of public record.

Gray Media also asserted that the Town was obligated to release the ISS Report

because it was not considered a confidential employee personnel record under

N.C.G.S. § 160A-168.

The parties could not agree as to whether the Town had to release an

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unredacted version of the Email and the ISS Report; thus, on 20 October 2023, Gray

Media initiated the present action to compel disclosure of the Bodycam Recordings,

the ISS Report, and the Email. Gray Media moved for judgment on the pleadings,

attaching a news article, a copy of the Officer’s termination letter, and a copy of the

Email to its motion. On 14 June 2024, the Town filed a motion for summary judgment

and a motion for the trial court to conduct an in camera review1 of the ISS Report and

the Email. The Town attached to its motion for summary judgment the Petition, the

11 October 2022 Order, and an affidavit of Hawke.

The parties’ cross-motions and the Town’s motion for in camera review came

on for hearing on 26 June 2024. After the hearing, the trial court granted the Town’s

motion for in camera review but reserved ruling on the parties’ cross-motions.

After reviewing the Email and the ISS Report in camera, the trial court entered

an order granting in part and denying in part the parties’ cross-motions. In its order,

the trial court noted that, since the trial court considered matters outside the

pleadings, it had converted Gray Media’s motion for judgment on the pleadings to a

motion for summary judgment. The trial court concluded there were “no genuine

issues of material fact” and ordered the parties to do the following: with respect to

the Bodycam Recordings, Gray Media must file a petition pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 132-

1 To review a document in camera means the trial court reviewed the document “in private,

without revealing the contents in open court[.]” Times News Pub. Co. v. Alamance-Burlington Bd. of Educ., 242 N.C. App. 375, 380 (2015).

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1.4A(g); with respect to the Email, the Town must “release to [Gray Media] a version

of the Email without redacting the names of the Town employees”; and, with respect

to the ISS Report, the Town must “release portions of the confidential ISS Report to

[Gray Media]. Portions of the [ISS R]eport that shall remain redacted pertain to any

interviews with, and statements made by, officers other than [the Officer].”

The Town filed a timely notice of appeal. Gray Media does not appeal.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to review an appeal from a final judgment of a

superior court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b) (2023).

III. Standard of Review

The Town appeals from the trial court’s order granting in part and denying in

part Gray Media’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of

the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. When a trial court considers matters

outside of the pleadings, a “motion for judgment on the pleadings should be treated

as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of in the manner and under the

conditions set forth in Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.” Helms

v. Holland, 124 N.C. App. 629, 633 (1996).

Here, the trial court noted that it considered matters outside of the pleadings

and converted Gray Media’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to a Motion for

Summary Judgment. As such, “the motion for judgment on the pleadings will be

treated as motion for summary judgment on appeal.” Carolina Bank v. Chatham

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Station, Inc., 186 N.C. App. 424, 427 (2007).

“The standard of review in an appeal from an order granting a motion for

summary judgment and denying a partial cross-motion for summary judgment is de

novo.” Stevens v. Heller, 268 N.C. App. 654, 658 (2019) (citing Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C.

519, 523–24 (2007)). “Under a de novo standard of review, this Court considers the

matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court.” Horne

v. Town of Blowing Rock, 223 N.C. App. 26, 32 (2012) (citation omitted). When this

Court reviews an order granting a motion for summary judgment, “the question on

appeal is whether there is a genuine issue as to a material fact and whether [the

movant is] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Helms, 124 N.C. App. at 633. “All

inferences of fact from the proofs offered at the hearing must be drawn against the

movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion.” Owen v. Haywood Cnty., 205

N.C. App. 456, 458 (2010) (citation omitted).

“The same de novo standard applies to questions of statutory interpretation.”

Schroeder v. City of Wilmington, 282 N.C. App. 558, 565 (2022). “The primary rule of

statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature controls the interpretation

of a statute. In seeking to discover this intent, the court should consider the language

of the statute, the spirit of the act, and what the act seeks to accomplish.” Stevenson

v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 303 (1972). “[W]hen the language of a statute is

clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and courts must

give the statute its plain meaning.” Gray Media Grp., Inc. v. City of Charlotte through

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City Council, 290 N.C. App. 384, 394 (2023).

IV. Analysis

On appeal, the Town argues the trial court erred by (A) ordering the Town to

release confidential personnel records to a party not otherwise entitled to disclosure

under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c), and (B) ordering the Town to release an unredacted

version of the Email where the redactions were required to protect the privacy of the

Town’s employees. We address each argument in turn.

A. ISS Report

The Town first argues the trial court erred by ordering the Town to release

portions of the ISS Report to Gray Media because the ISS Report was a confidential

record that could not be disclosed under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168. Specifically, the Town

argues the trial court (1) abused its discretion by ordering a general release of the

ISS Report pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4); and (2) misapplied N.C.G.S. §

160A-168(c1)(2).

1. N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4)

“Access to public records in North Carolina is governed generally by our Public

Records Act, codified as Chapter 132 of the North Carolina General Statutes.”

Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 462 (1999). Under the

Public Records Act, “[t]he public records and public information compiled by the

agencies of [the] North Carolina government or its subdivisions are the property of

the people[,]” N.C.G.S. § 132-1(b) (2023), and “the public generally has liberal access

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to public records[,]” Knight Pub. Co. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 172 N.C.

App. 486, 489 (2005). “Absent clear statutory exemption or exception, documents

falling within the definition of ‘public records’ in the Public Records Law must be

made available for public inspection.” Virmani, 350 N.C. at 462 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). The procedure to request inspection and disclosure of

“public records” is governed by N.C.G.S. § 132-6. See N.C.G.S. § 132-6(a) (2023).

One statutory exception to the Public Records Law is the inspection and

disclosure of “personnel files of employees, former employees, or applicants for

employment maintained by a city[.]” N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(a) (2023); see also Elkin

Trib., Inc. v. Yadkin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 331 N.C. 735, 736, (1992) (holding

that if a document falls under N.C.G.S. § 153A-98, which governs the inspection and

disclosure of personnel files for county employees, it is not “governed by N.C.G.S. §

132-6 of the Public Records Act because N.C.G.S. § 153A-98 provides such inspection

and disclosure may only be done as provided by that section”). As described by

N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(a), a “personnel file consists of any information in any form

gathered by the city with respect to that employee” and includes, but is not limited

to, information “relating to his application, selection or nonselection, performance,

promotions, demotions, transfers, suspension and other disciplinary actions,

evaluation forms, leave, salary, and termination of employment.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-

168(a). “All information contained in a city employee’s personnel file” is considered

confidential so long as it is not subject to one of the exceptions rendering personnel

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information public in N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(b). N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c) (2023); see also

N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(b) (2023) (identifying twelve pieces of information, including

name, age, salary, that are considered a matter of public record despite being

contained within personnel files).

If the information is not considered a matter of public record under subsection

(b), the information is, therefore, confidential and “shall be open to inspection only”

in one of seven statutory exceptions enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c), including

that, “[b]y order of a court of competent jurisdiction, any person may examine such

portion of an employee’s personnel file as may be ordered by the court.” N.C.G.S. §

160A-168(c)(4) (2023).

As previously determined by this Court, the legislative intent behind N.C.G.S.

§ 160A-168 is to keep confidential information in city employee personnel files

confidential, except under limited circumstances. In re Brooks, 143 N.C. App. 601,

606 (2001). In Brooks, we ascertained the legislative intent behind N.C.G.S. § 160A-

168 by examining the plain language of the statute. Id.; see also Correll v. Div. of Soc.

Servs., 332 N.C. 141, 144 (1992) (“Statutory interpretation properly begins with an

examination of the plain words of the statute.” (citation omitted)). Cognizant of the

fact that the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 160A-168 “does not provide for procedures

allowing or directing the court to” use its inherent power under subsection (c)(4), we

explained that the trial court “must utilize its inherent power and implement and

follow procedures which effectively and practically effectuate the [legislative] intent

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of [N.C.G.S. §] 160A-168, that an officer’s files remain confidential.” Brooks, 143 N.C.

App. at 611 (citation modified). We subsequently provided general guidelines for

when the trial court utilizes its authority under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4):

The [s]uperior [c]ourt should make an independent determination that the interests of justice require disclosure of the confidential employment information. It is further within the [s]uperior [c]ourt’s inherent power and discretion to implement other procedures as may be required to effectuate the legislature’s intent that the information remain somewhat confidential. The court could, for example, limit that dissemination and use of disclosed materials to certain individuals, order an in camera inspection, or redact certain information

Id.

Although Brooks set forth the general guidelines, this Court did not address

the scope of the trial court’s authority under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4) until Release

of Silk Plant Forest Citizen Rev. Comm.’s Rep. & Appendices v. Barker, 216 N.C. App.

268 (2011). The specific issue this Court addressed in Barker was “whether the

legislature intended to grant to the trial court the authority to release portions of a

city employee’s confidential personnel file to the general public[.]” Id. at 271

(emphasis added). In addressing this issue, we examined the plain language of the

statute, specifically focusing on the language the legislature chose to use “as a

limiting mechanism.” Id. at 272. We determined the legislature sought to keep the

personnel files confidential by limiting examination of the file to “any person” as

opposed to the “general public,” and by granting the trial court the authority to permit

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the person to examine, rather than copy or mass produce, the confidential

information. Id. Simply put, “the legislature chose to grant the trial court limited

authority to allow ‘any person’ to ‘examine’ a relevant ‘portion’ of the file.” Id. Relying

on this Court’s analysis of the legislative intent in Brooks, we held that the trial court

did not have the authority to release of any portion of a city employee’s confidential

personnel file to the general public because, “even when justice requires disclosure of

this information, the disclosure should be narrowly tailored in order to adhere to the

legislative intent.” Id. at 274. We then noted, in a footnote, that a trial court’s

determination under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4) would likely be reviewed for an abuse

of discretion because the trial court was given the “‘inherent power and discretion’ to

tailor the method of disclosure[.]” Id. at 274 n. 8 (quoting Brooks, 143 N.C. App. at

611).

Here, the Town argued before the trial court, and the trial court concluded,

that “the ISS Report is a confidential personnel record under” N.C.G.S. § 160A-168.

Gray Media does not appeal the trial court’s conclusion, and thus, for the purposes of

appeal, we presume that the ISS Report is a confidential personnel record. See

Barker, 216 N.C. App. at 271 (reasoning that, where the city argued the transcripts

were a part of the officers’ personnel files and did not contend otherwise on appeal,

this Court may assume that the transcripts were confidential and protected under

N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)). As a confidential personnel record, the ISS Report is

protected under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168 and may not be disclosed absent a statutory

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exception. See N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c).

When the trial court ordered the Town to release certain portions of the ISS

Report, the trial court relied on the statutory exception that, “[b]y order of a court of

competent jurisdiction, any person may examine such portion of an employee’s

personnel file as may be ordered by the court.” See N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4). The

Town, however, argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Town to

release portions of the ISS Report under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4).

We are unable to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion

because the Record on appeal does not contain a copy of the ISS Report that the trial

court reviewed in camera. We note that portions of the ISS Report are part of the

Record because, as the Town concedes, the Town heavily quoted the ISS Report in

the Officer’s termination letter. Although the information in the ISS Report is

considered confidential personnel information, certain portions of the ISS Report

became subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act when the Town quoted the

ISS Report in the Officer’s termination letter. See News & Observer Pub. Co. v. Poole,

330 N.C. 465, 474 (1992) (concluding records that were once exempt from the Public

Records Act became subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act when the

records were placed in the public domain). Without a copy of the ISS Report that the

trial court reviewed in camera, however, this Court can only speculate as to what the

unquoted portions say. For example, the parts of the ISS Report that were not quoted

in the Officer’s employment termination letter may be exactly what the trial court

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ordered to remain redacted. On the other hand, the parts of the ISS Report that were

not quoted in the Officer’s employment termination letter, but were ordered to be

released to Gray Media, could reveal information identifying the residence of a sworn

law enforcement officer, thereby possibly violating N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c4)(1). See

N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c4)(1) (2023). Without the ISS Report, however, we cannot

readily determine what the ISS Report says, and we are “not required to, and should

not, assume error by the trial judge when none appears on the record before the

appellate court.” Pharr v. Worley, 125 N.C. App. 136, 139 (1997) (citation omitted).

While we are unable to determine what the ISS Report says, we hold the trial

court exceeded its authority under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4) by ordering the Town

“to release” portions of the ISS Report to Gray Media. As mentioned, this Court has

stated that “the legislature chose to grant the trial court limited authority to allow

‘any person’ to ‘examine’ a relevant ‘portion’ of the file.” Barker, 216 N.C. App. at 271

(emphasis added); see N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4) (“By order of a court of competent

jurisdiction, any person may examine such portion of an employee’s personnel file as

may be ordered by the court.” (emphasis added)). We emphasize the word “examine”

because “[t]he use of the word ‘examine,’ as opposed to ‘copy’ or another word

pertaining to mass publication, indicates the legislature’s intent to limit the exposure

of these personnel files.” Id. at 273. Although there may be “circumstances when

justice requires that an individual . . . be permitted to examine a relevant portion of

a city employee’s personnel file, . . . a wholesale publication of even a portion of the

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file would be contrary to the legislative intent behind N.C.[G.S.] § 160A-168(c)(4).”

Id. at 272. Where, as here, the trial court ordered the “release” of confidential

personnel information to Gray Media—doing business as WBTV—the threat of mass

publication is greater. Thus, because the trial court does not have the authority under

N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4) to order the release of any portion of a city employee’s

personnel confidential personnel file, see N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4), the trial court

erred by ordering the Town “to release” portions of the ISS Report to Gray Media.

Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order regarding the release of certain portions

of the ISS Report and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

2. N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c1)(2)

The Town also argues the trial court erred by utilizing subsection (c1)(2) as a

“basis for the exercise of its discretion under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c)(4).” Specifically,

the Town argues the trial court erred by analyzing subsection (c1)(2) because the ISS

Report does not concern a criminal investigation and, even if it did, subsection (c1)(2)

“provides the municipality with the option to not disclose the investigatory records to

the investigated employee while the investigation is active.”

As mentioned, confidential information in a city employee’s personnel file

“shall be open to inspection only” in one of seven statutory exceptions enumerated in

N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c). N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c). Subsection (c1), however, provides

the following four exceptions to N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c):

Even if considered part of an employee’s personnel file, the

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following information need not be disclosed to an employee nor to any other person:

(1) Testing or examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment, employment, or promotion in the city’s service, when disclosure would compromise the objectivity or the fairness of the testing or examination process.

(2) Investigative reports or memoranda and other information concerning the investigation of possible criminal actions of an employee, until the investigation is completed and no criminal action taken, or until the criminal action is concluded.

(3) Information that might identify an undercover law enforcement officer or a law enforcement informer.

(4) Notes, preliminary drafts and internal communications concerning an employee. In the event such materials are used for any official personnel decision, then the employee or his duly authorized agent shall have a right to inspect such materials.

N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c1) (2023). Ordinarily, the city invokes one of the exceptions

under subsection (c1) as a means to claim an exemption from the disclosure

requirements under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c). See Wind v. City of Gastonia, 226 N.C.

App. 180, 185, aff’d, 367 N.C. 184 (2013) (“It is under this exception enumerated in

subsection (c1)(4) that [the city] asserts its authority to deny [the] plaintiff’s request

to inspect the documents at issue.” (emphasis added)).

Here, in addition to utilizing its inherent authority under N.C.G.S. § 160A-

168(c)(4), the trial court also relied on N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(c1)(2) in determining

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whether the Town should release the ISS Report to Gray Media. The Town, however,

did not assert its authority under subsection (c1)(2) as a way to deny Gray Media’s

request to review the ISS Report. See id. Further, neither of the parties point to

evidence indicating the ISS Report contained “information concerning the

investigation of possible criminal actions of an employee[.]” See N.C.G.S. § 160A-

168(c1)(2). As such, because subsection (c1) provides exceptions to the disclosure

requirements under subsection (c), the trial court erred in using subsection (c1)(2) as

a means to order disclosure of the ISS Report. The trial court’s error in using

subsection (c1)(2), however, does not affect our disposition because, as discussed, the

trial court’s order regarding the release of certain portions of the ISS Report must be

vacated.

B. Email

Next, the Town argues the trial court erred by ordering the Town to release an

unredacted version of the Email. Specifically, the Town argues that it was obligated

to redact the officers’ names in the Email because “disclosing the identity of

employees whose body-worn camera footage was needed for the investigation is

confidential personnel information under [N.C.]G.S. § 160A-168.” Further, the Town

argues that “requestors are entitled to the name of every municipal employee, [but]

not every document with a municipal employee’s name on it notwithstanding any

other statutory privilege.”

Section 160A-168(b), provides:

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(b) The following information with respect to each city employee is a matter of public record:

(1) Name.

(2) Age.

(3) Date of original employment or appointment to the service.

(4) The terms of any contract by which the employee is employed whether written or oral, past and current, to the extent that the city has the written contract or a record of the oral contract in its possession.

(5) Current position.

(6) Title.

(7) Current salary.

(8) Date and amount of each increase or decrease in salary with that municipality.

(9) Date and type of each promotion, demotion, transfer, suspension, separation, or other change in position classification with that municipality.

(10) Date and general description of the reasons for each promotion with that municipality.

(11) Date and type of each dismissal, suspension, or demotion for disciplinary reasons taken by the municipality. If the disciplinary action was a dismissal, a copy of the written notice of the final decision of the municipality setting forth the specific acts or omissions that are the basis of the dismissal.

(12) The office to which the employee is currently assigned.

N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(b) (emphasis added). The statute further provides, “[a]ll

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information contained in a city employee’s personnel file, other than the information

made public by subsection (b) of this section, is confidential . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 160A-

168(c) (emphasis added). As mentioned, this Court has already recognized that,

according to the plain language of the statute, see Gray Media Grp., Inc., 290 N.C.

App. at 394, the legislative intent behind N.C.G.S. § 160A-168 is “to keep a city

employee’s personnel file confidential except under limited circumstances.” Barker,

216 N.C. App. at 274.

Nonetheless, the release of a city employee’s name located in another city

employee’s personnel file, does not necessarily reveal any confidential personnel

information that the legislature intended to keep confidential; rather it releases only

information that is already, by the plain terms of the statute, “a matter of public

record[.]” N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(b); see Gray Media Grp., Inc., 290 N.C. App. at 394.

Thus, according to the plain language of the statute, each city employee’s name that

is made public by subsection (b) is a matter of public record subject to disclosure under

the Public Records Act. N.C.G.S. § 160A-168(b)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the trial

court’s order directing the Town to release a version of the Email without redacting

the city employees’ names.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, we hold the trial court did not err by ordering the

Town to release a version of the Email without redacting the city employees’ names;

however, the trial court did err by ordering the Town to release portions of the ISS

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Report to Gray Media, where the trial court has the limited authority under N.C.G.S.

§ 160A-168(c)(4) to permit a person to examine a relevant portion of the file. We

therefore affirm the trial court’s order in part, vacate the trial court’s order regarding

the release of certain portions of the ISS Report, and remand for entry of an order

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Chief Judge DILLON and Judge GRIFFIN concur.

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