Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs

618 F. App'x 1016
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedJuly 14, 2015
Docket2014-3159
StatusUnpublished

This text of 618 F. App'x 1016 (Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 618 F. App'x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Michael Ben Graves appeals from a July 2014 Final Order by the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”), which concluded that the Department of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”) complied with an earlier Final Order. Because the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In January 2009, Mr. Graves, a preference eligible veteran, applied for a position as a Medical Records Technician/Coder (“MRT”) at the DVA’s Long Beach, California Healthcare System. The vacancy announcement for the MRT position listed the pay grade as “GS-675-4/5/6/7/8.” Graves v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 114 M.S.P.R. 245, 247 (2010) (“2010 Board Decision”). In February 2009, the DVA hired a non-preference eligible individual at the GS-8 level. Id. at 248, 252. Mr. Graves was not hired.

In May 2009, Mr. Graves filed a Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (“VEOA”) appeal of his non-selection for the MRT position. Id. at 247. In an initial decision, the administrative judge (“AJ”) found that the DVA originally intended to fill two MRT positions, one at the GS-6/7/8 level and one at the GS-4/5 trainee level, but ultimately filled the higher level position only. Id. at 248. After the AJ found against Mr. Graves, the Board found that the DVA violated Mr. Graves’s veterans’ preference rights. Id. at 252-58. The Board identified two violations of the veterans’ preference rules. First, the Board explained that the DVA violated 5 U.S.C. § 3317(a) by considering only a single application for appointment— not at least three. Id. at 253. Second, the Board found that the DVA violated “the pass over process” by failing to file written reasons for its decision with the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) and by failing to obtain the OPM’s approval. Id. The Board instructed the AJ to order the DVA to reconstruct the selection process for the MRT vacancy in accordance with the veterans’ preference requirements. Id. The Board identified five steps that must be included in the reconstructed process, three of which are relevant in this appeal: 1) the DVA must remove the non-preference eligible individual from the MRT position; 2) the new certificate of eligibles must contain at least three names for appointment; and 3) if the DVA wanted to pass over Mr. Graves, it must comply with the required “pass over” procedures. Id.

The Board issued a March 2012 Final Order requiring the DVA to reconstruct the selection process for the MRT position. Mr. Graves then filed a petition for enforcement of this Final Order. In response, the DVA submitted several documents, including an unsworn statement from the Acting Chief of the Human Resources Service at the DVA’s Long Beach facility. It stated that the DVA had created separate lists of eligible persons at different grade levels for the MRT position, that Mr. Graves qualified only at the GS-4 level, that the non-preference eligible individual qualified at the GS-8 level, and that the selecting official chose only from the GS-8 level and thus did not consider Mr. Graves.

In August 2013, the Board found that the DVA failed to demonstrate it had removed the non-preference eligible individual from the MRT position or reconstruct *1018 ed the selection process as ordered. A. 18, 59. The Board ordered the DVA to demonstrate it had complied with the March 2012 Final Order and to submit a detailed explanation for the DVA’s determination that Mr. Graves was not qualified above the GS-4 level. A. 59. The DVA submitted documentary evidence showing it had removed the non-preference eligible individual from the MRT position and appointed her to a “temporary special needs position” while it reconstructed the selection process. A. 19. The DVA also submitted a sworn statement from the Chief of Health Information Management Service at the DVA’s Long Beach facility (“Chief of HIMS”) that she compared Mr. Graves’s application with the position requirements and determined he did not qualify above the GS-4 level. The DVA explained it decided to fill the MRT vacancy at the GS-8 level and, because Mr. Graves qualified only at the GS^l level, it was not required to list him on the GS-8 certificate of eligibles. As a result of the reconstructed selection process, the DVA reappointed the non-preference eligible individual to the MRT position.

• In the July 2014 Final Order from which Mr. Graves appeals, the Board found the DVA in compliance with the March 2012 Final Order. A. 17. The Board found that the DVA’s removal, appointment to a “temporary special needs position,” and subsequent reappointment of the non-preference eligible individual did not invalidate the reconstructed selection process. A. 19-20. The Board found that the DVA considered Mr. Graves’s relevant education, experience, and other qualifications when it found him not qualified above the GS-4 level. A. 20-23. Because the DVA decided to fill the MRT vacancy at the GS-8 level, not GS-4, the Board found that the competitive service rules under 5 U.S.C. §§ 3317 and 3318 and the OPM’s “rule of three” and “pass over” requirements did not apply. Thus, the Board found the DVA afforded Mr. Graves a lawful selection process and dismissed his petition for enforcement. Mr. Graves timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. § 7703.

Discussion

We only reverse a final decision of the Board if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without procedures required by law, rule or regulation having been followed; or unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938).

Mr. Graves argues that the Board made two errors in its July 2014 Final Order. First, Mr. Graves argues that the DVA improperly assessed his qualifications by determining he was not qualified above the GS-4 level and failed to provide a “side-by-side, requirement issue by requirement issue” comparison of his resume and application with the requirements “for MRT grades GS-4 and GS-5.” Appellant’s Br. 2. Second, Mr. Graves argues that the non-preference eligible individual was never removed from the MRT position, but rather was reappointed using a procedure that did not comply with the OPM’s “rule of three” and “pass over” requirements. Id.

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Board’s Assessment of Mr.

Graves’s Qualifications

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Bluebook (online)
618 F. App'x 1016, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/graves-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-cafc-2015.