Graudins v. Hunt

Opinion

Graudins v Hunt

2026 NY Slip Op 05168

September 2, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

John Graudins, etc., respondent,

v

John Hunt, appellant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on September 2, 2026

2025-01456, 2025-05099, (Index No. 14451/15)

Francesca E. Connolly, J.P.

Cheryl E. Chambers

William G. Ford

James P. McCormack, JJ.

Quatela | Chimeri PLLC, Hauppauge, NY (Christopher J. Chimeri and John R. Eyerman of counsel), for appellant.

Schlissel Ostrow Karabatos, PLLC, Garden City, NY (Lisa R. Schoenfeld and Ashley Pulito of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In a matrimonial action in which the plaintiff's decedent and the defendant were divorced by judgment entered June 5, 2018, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (John J. Leo, J.), dated December 12, 2024, and (2) a domestic relations order of the same court dated April 24, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the defendant's cross-motion to enforce a provision of the judgment of divorce that required the plaintiff's decedent to maintain a life insurance policy and for an award of attorneys' fees. The domestic relations order directed that the estate of the plaintiff's decedent was entitled to certain retirement benefits owned by the defendant.

ORDERED that the appeal from the domestic relations order is dismissed as abandoned; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.

Christine Hunt (hereinafter the decedent) and the defendant were divorced by a judgment of divorce entered June 5, 2018. A stipulation of settlement dated November 28, 2017, (hereinafter the stipulation) between the decedent and the defendant was incorporated, but not merged, into the judgment of divorce. The stipulation provided, inter alia, that the decedent would maintain a life insurance policy with a face value of not less than $300,000, naming the defendant as the trustee for the benefit of their children and the children as the beneficiaries, until the children were emancipated.

In 2021, the decedent died. The plaintiff, the executor of the decedent's estate, moved, among other things, to enforce the judgment of divorce relating to the equitable distribution of the defendant's retirement benefits and for an award of attorneys' fees. The defendant cross-moved to enforce the stipulation, seeking to direct the decedent's estate to pay him $300,000 due to the decedent's failure to procure and/or maintain a life insurance policy in accordance with the [*2]stipulation, and for an award of attorneys' fees. In an order dated December 12, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the defendant's cross-motion. In a domestic relations order dated April 24, 2025, the court directed that the decedent's estate was entitled to receive certain retirement benefits owned by the defendant. The defendant appeals from the order and the domestic relations order.

The appeal from the domestic relations order must be dismissed as abandoned, as the defendant's brief does not seek reversal or modification of any portion of that order (see Matter of Pepe v Pepe, 124 AD3d 898).

"'A stipulation of settlement which is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce is a contract subject to principles of contract construction and interpretation'" (Turco v Turco, 230 AD3d 1182, 1183, quoting Del Vecchio v Del Vecchio, 219 AD3d 572, 575). "'A court should interpret the stipulation in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, and arrive at a construction that will give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized'" (id., quoting Sabau v Sabau, 222 AD3d 1017, 1019). "'A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the contract's apparent meaning'" (Kirk v Kirk, 207 AD3d 708, 711, quoting Cohen-Davidson v Davidson, 291 AD2d 474, 475). "'In making the determination, the court should examine the entire contract and consider the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which the contract was executed'" (Berlin v Berlin, 192 AD3d 856, 857, quoting Cohen v Cohen, 187 AD3d 707, 709).

Here, even if, as the defendant contends, the decedent breached the stipulation's life insurance provision by failing to obtain a life insurance policy for the required amount, the provision does not give the defendant standing to maintain a claim against the decedent's estate, since the defendant was not the intended beneficiary of the policy (see Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233, 238; Forman v Forman, 17 NY2d 274; Matter of Edelen, 219 AD3d 931, 932; DeAngelis v DeAngelis, 104 AD3d 901, 902). Pursuant to the provision in the stipulation, the children were the intended beneficiaries of the policy. The defendant is not seeking to enforce the stipulation on behalf of or for the benefit of his children but rather seeks to recover money from the decedent's estate in his own name. Given that the children themselves were the intended beneficiaries of the policy, they are the interested persons with standing to enforce the provision of the stipulation (see Matter of Edelen, 219 AD3d at 932; DeAngelis v DeAngelis, 104 AD3d at 902; Gallo v Gallo, 6 Misc 3d 628, 630-631 [Sur Ct, Nassau County]).

The parties' remaining contentions need not be addressed in light of our determination.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's cross-motion.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHAMBERS, FORD and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court