Gratz v. McKee

258 F. 335, 23 A.L.R. 1393, 1919 U.S. App. LEXIS 1215
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedApril 28, 1919
DocketNo. 5285
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 258 F. 335 (Gratz v. McKee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gratz v. McKee, 258 F. 335, 23 A.L.R. 1393, 1919 U.S. App. LEXIS 1215 (8th Cir. 1919).

Opinion

CARLAND, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff in error (hereafter plaintiff) sued the defendants in error (hereafter defendants) to recover the value of 307)4 tons of mussel shells alleged to have been taken from the lands of plaintiff’s assignors in Pemiscot county, Mlo., and converted to 'defendants’ use. A second count of the complaint alleged that the shells were a part of the realty and were dug up therefrom. The language used in the second count was for the purpose of bringing Ihe case within the provisions of section 5448, Rev. Stat. Mo. 1909, allowing treble damages in certain cases for digging up and carrying away any substance or material, being a part of the realty. The trial court, at the close of the evidence, directed a verdict for the defend[336]*336ants, for the reason that the plaintiff had shown no title to the shells in his assignors.

Upon the question of title the evidence tended to show that in the years 1913 and 1914 the St. (Louis Union Trust Company owned approximately 1,314 acres of land in Pemiscot county, Mo., in township 20, range 12; that the Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber Company owned 125 acres in the same county, in township 20, range 11; that' Little river is a stream about 200 miles in length, flowing in a southwesterly direction through a portion 'of the above-described lands. The river empties into the St. Francois river, and thus finds its way to the Mississippi river and the Gulf of Mexico. The stream is non-navigable, except in a very restricted sense. Near Wardell, located near the center of section 25, township 20, range 11, of the lands aforesaid, prior to the years 1913 and 1914, there came or grew in the bed of Little river mussels. The shells of live mussels are valuable for use in making so-called pearl buttons. The mussel is boiled for the purpose of removing the meat from the shell. The fresh water mussel is one of the group of mollusks. It is a shellfish capable of locomotion, but disinclined to exercise this power if its supply of food is sufficient where it is. It sometimes floats upon the water, but usual-, ly lives in the beds of streams partially covered with mud. The defendants took from the bed of Little river, at a place where plaintiff’s assignors were the owners of both banks of the stream, sufficient mussels to produce the number of tons of shells sued for. The plaintiff, by assignment from the owners of the land, became the owner of the clhim for damages arising from the taking of the mussels.

[1,2] So far as the second .count of‘the complaint is concerned, .we are of' the opinion that it needs no consideration, for the reason that in no view of the case could the live animal called “mussel” be deemed real estate, any more than a ground hog. The question for decision is: Did the owners of the land through which Little river flowed own these shellfish, • and hence their shells, so that the plaintiff, as assignee, can maintain an action for their conversion? It appears that the mussels were in their natural state; that is, the owners of the land through which the stream flowed had taken no measures to reduce them to private ownership, nor were they planted where they were found by such owners. As Little river is nonnavigable, we assume that the owners of both banks thereof also owned the bed of the stream. The flowing waters of the stream, however, were public waters, and fish, whether swimming or shell, found therein, could not become, under the.laws of Missouri, the subject of private ownership. Sections 6508 and 6551, Rev. Stat. of Missouri 1909, read as follows:

Section 6508: “The ownership of and title to all birds, fish and game, whether resident, migratory or imported, in the state of Missouri, not now held by private ownership, legally acquired, is hereby declared to be in the state, and no fish, birds or game shall be caught, taken or killed in any manner or at any time, or had in possession, except the person so catching, taking, killing or having in possession , shall consent that the title of said birds, fish and game shall b'e and remain-in the state of Missouri, for the purpose of regulating and sontrolling the use and disposition, of the same after such catching, taking or [337]*337killing. The catching, taking, killing or haying in possession of birds, fish or game at any time, or in any manner, by any person, shall be deemed a consent of said person that the title of the state shall be and remain in the state,. for the purpose of regulating the use and disposition of the same, and said possession shall be consent to such title in the state.”
Section 0551: “It is hereby declared unlawful for any person to engage in what is commonly known as ‘pearl fishing’ in any of the waters of this state at any time during the months of March, April, May and June. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than one hundred dollars for each offense.”

At the time, section 6508 was enacted neither plaintifF’s assignors, nor any other private individual or corporation, had legally hcquire'd an ownership of the mussels in question. It is no doubt true that the above sections were enacted for the purpose of regulating the capture and sale of the animals therein mentioned. We also understand that “pearl fishing,” as used in section 6551, refers to the capture of freshwater mussels such as are described in this case. It therefore appears that the state of Missouri claims the right of regulating the capture of mussels in the public waters of said state. To hold that plaintiff’s assignors owned the mussels in controversy would be to decide that said assignors had the exclusive right of fishing in the waters of Nit-tie river, where these mussels were found. Such a grant would not be presumed, in the absence of express words, in a grant conveying the exclusive right of fishery. It is very doubtful, also, as to whether any such grant would be valid under the Constitution and laws of Missouri. In the case of McKenzie’s Executors v. Hulet, 4 N. C. 613, it was decided that a grant of land covered by an arm of the sea only at high water, would entitle the grantee to an action of trespass for taking oysters from the rocks within the grant. The court also said:

"The right of taking fish in the sea, or the arms thereof, belongs to every one as a common of piscary; but even this may he restrained, where an individual hath gained exclusive property. Hale, De Jure Maris, 11. And this may be acquired by grant or prescription. Ibid. 43. But it being considered as a royalty, it would not pass without special and express words.” 2 Bl. 39.

As we understand the record, the grant to plaintiff’s assignors did not mention Little river or the waters thereof; neither does it appear from the report of the case above cited what the words of the grant were in that case. The record shows that the lands of plaintiff’s assignors were first granted by the United States to the state of Missouri by the act of Congress approved September 28, 1850 (9 Stat. 519, c. 84 [Comp. St. §§ 4958-4960]), relating to swamp lands, then by the state to the county of Pemiscot, from which plaintiff’s’assignors obtained their title. We find no reason for holding that plaintiff’s assignors had by grant or otherwise an exclusive right of fishery in the waters of Little river at any point. These mussels cannot be separated from the waters of Little river, so far as their ownership is concerned.

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Bluebook (online)
258 F. 335, 23 A.L.R. 1393, 1919 U.S. App. LEXIS 1215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gratz-v-mckee-ca8-1919.