ROBERTS, Justice.
The plaintiffs are sixty-seven school teachers employed in the Saco public school system. In November 1979, the plaintiffs, asserting a violation of 26 M.R.S.A. § 621 by the City of Saco, the Saco School Committee, and Howard Cushman, Superintendent of Schools, brought an action pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. § 626 — A for unpaid wages.
Under section 621, certain employers are required to pay their employees within eight days of the time when the work is performed.
Section 626-A allows an em
ployee to bring an action for violation of section 621 and if successful, receive a judgment for the amount of unpaid wages, liquidated damages of twice that amount, and attorney’s fees.
Because the practice in the Saco school system is to pay its teachers in bi-weekly installments through the school calendar year rather than in accord with the weekly payment provision of section 621, the plaintiffs seek the damages prescribed by section 626-A from the above-named defendants.
The defendants’ main contention on appeal and in the proceedings below is that section 621 does not, by its terms, apply to school teachers.
This position was viewed as unpersuasive by the Superior Court justice who heard and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Nevertheless, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted by another justice of the Superior Court on the ground that section 621 did not apply to public school teachers.
The plaintiffs appeal the entry of summary judgment for the defendants on two grounds. First, they contend the second Superior Court justice violated the doctrine of the law of the case when he entered summary judgment for the defendants in apparent conflict with the first justice’s ruling on the motion to dismiss. Second, the plaintiffs assert that the Superior Court erred in finding section 621 inapplicable to school teachers.
The doctrine of the “law of the case”' rests on the sound policy that in the interest of finality and intra-court comity a Superior Court justice should not, in subsequent proceedings involving the same case, overrule or reconsider the decision of another justice.
Blance v. Alley,
Me., 404 A.2d 587, 589 (1979); Warren
v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority,
Me., 259 A.2d 364, 367 (1969). Such a rule of practice promotes the orderly conduct of an action and discourages judge shopping.
Blance v. Alley,
404 A.2d at 589. While based on important policy considerations, the law of the case is not as rigidly applied as the doctrine of
res judicata. Id.
The rule does not serve as a complete bar to reconsideration of an issue when the prior ruling is provisional or lacks clarity, or the error is of such character that it should be corrected at trial. IB
Moore’s Federal Practice
¶ 0.404[4], at 454-55 (1980).
Moreover, the law of the case cannot require this Court to reverse a correct decision of a Superior Court justice simply because it is contrary to a prior ruling of another justice of the Superior Court.
See Burns v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
394 F.2d 416, 418 (1st Cir. 1968);
Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin,
292 F.2d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied,
368 U.S. 944, 82 S.Ct. 376, 7 L.Ed.2d 340,
reh. denied,
368 U.S. 972, 82 S.Ct. 437, 7 L.Ed.2d 401. While defendants would have no grounds to complain if the Superior Court had refused to consider the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs suggest that the “law of the case” prevents us from reviewing a question of law addressed in the proceedings below and squarely before
this Court on appeal. To follow such a course would not only perpetuate error but also necessitate remand for trial “even if it be apparent that any judgment for the plaintiff would have to be vacated.”
Burns v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
394 F.2d at 418.
We find that the “law of the case” does not prevent review of the merits on this appeal. We must, therefore, examine the plaintiffs’ contention that section 621 applies to the instant action. To support this point, the plaintiffs trace the origins of section 621 and a related statute which at one time directly addressed the payment of teachers’ wages, 20 M.R.S.A. § 961.
The original version of section 621 was enacted in 1887. The 1887 Act called for fortnightly payment of wages, included municipal corporations within the scope of its mandate, but expressly excluded teachers from its coverage. P.L.1887, ch. 134, §§ 1, 5.
In 1911, the exception regarding teachers was deleted as was the reference to municipal corporations. Instead, the 1911 Act made reference to counties, cities and towns and called for weekly payment of wages. P.L.1911, ch. 39.
The current version of section 621 contains no other substantive changes in the 1887 Act relevant to the instant matter.
In 1909, the forerunner to the current version of 20 M.R.S.A. § 961 was enacted by the Legislature. The 1909 Act provided that teachers could be paid at the end of each school month but only if the attendance register required to be kept by all teachers was properly completed. P.L.1909, ch. 74.
This Act which had been codified at 20 M.R.S.A. § 961 (1965) was repealed
and replaced by the passage of an errors and inconsistencies bill in 1969. The new version of section 961 contained no reference concerning the payment of wages and placed the responsibility of keeping attendance records upon the school committee. 20 M.R.S.A. § 961 (Supp.1980).
Because section 961 no longer contains any provision regarding the payment of teachers’ salaries, the plaintiffs urge that they are now within the scope of the coverage provided by section 621. We, however, cannot accept such a mechanical and literal approach to the interpretation of section 621.
See State Development Office v. State Employees Appeal Board,
Me., 363 A.2d 688, 690 (1976). The plaintiffs fail to convince us that the revision of section 961 in an errors and inconsistencies bill indicates a conscious or deliberate legislative purpose to bring teachers within the scope of 621 particularly in light of the nonappli-cability of section 621 to teachers for over fifty years and the substantial penalties involved for violations of that provision.
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ROBERTS, Justice.
The plaintiffs are sixty-seven school teachers employed in the Saco public school system. In November 1979, the plaintiffs, asserting a violation of 26 M.R.S.A. § 621 by the City of Saco, the Saco School Committee, and Howard Cushman, Superintendent of Schools, brought an action pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. § 626 — A for unpaid wages.
Under section 621, certain employers are required to pay their employees within eight days of the time when the work is performed.
Section 626-A allows an em
ployee to bring an action for violation of section 621 and if successful, receive a judgment for the amount of unpaid wages, liquidated damages of twice that amount, and attorney’s fees.
Because the practice in the Saco school system is to pay its teachers in bi-weekly installments through the school calendar year rather than in accord with the weekly payment provision of section 621, the plaintiffs seek the damages prescribed by section 626-A from the above-named defendants.
The defendants’ main contention on appeal and in the proceedings below is that section 621 does not, by its terms, apply to school teachers.
This position was viewed as unpersuasive by the Superior Court justice who heard and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Nevertheless, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted by another justice of the Superior Court on the ground that section 621 did not apply to public school teachers.
The plaintiffs appeal the entry of summary judgment for the defendants on two grounds. First, they contend the second Superior Court justice violated the doctrine of the law of the case when he entered summary judgment for the defendants in apparent conflict with the first justice’s ruling on the motion to dismiss. Second, the plaintiffs assert that the Superior Court erred in finding section 621 inapplicable to school teachers.
The doctrine of the “law of the case”' rests on the sound policy that in the interest of finality and intra-court comity a Superior Court justice should not, in subsequent proceedings involving the same case, overrule or reconsider the decision of another justice.
Blance v. Alley,
Me., 404 A.2d 587, 589 (1979); Warren
v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority,
Me., 259 A.2d 364, 367 (1969). Such a rule of practice promotes the orderly conduct of an action and discourages judge shopping.
Blance v. Alley,
404 A.2d at 589. While based on important policy considerations, the law of the case is not as rigidly applied as the doctrine of
res judicata. Id.
The rule does not serve as a complete bar to reconsideration of an issue when the prior ruling is provisional or lacks clarity, or the error is of such character that it should be corrected at trial. IB
Moore’s Federal Practice
¶ 0.404[4], at 454-55 (1980).
Moreover, the law of the case cannot require this Court to reverse a correct decision of a Superior Court justice simply because it is contrary to a prior ruling of another justice of the Superior Court.
See Burns v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
394 F.2d 416, 418 (1st Cir. 1968);
Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin,
292 F.2d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied,
368 U.S. 944, 82 S.Ct. 376, 7 L.Ed.2d 340,
reh. denied,
368 U.S. 972, 82 S.Ct. 437, 7 L.Ed.2d 401. While defendants would have no grounds to complain if the Superior Court had refused to consider the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs suggest that the “law of the case” prevents us from reviewing a question of law addressed in the proceedings below and squarely before
this Court on appeal. To follow such a course would not only perpetuate error but also necessitate remand for trial “even if it be apparent that any judgment for the plaintiff would have to be vacated.”
Burns v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
394 F.2d at 418.
We find that the “law of the case” does not prevent review of the merits on this appeal. We must, therefore, examine the plaintiffs’ contention that section 621 applies to the instant action. To support this point, the plaintiffs trace the origins of section 621 and a related statute which at one time directly addressed the payment of teachers’ wages, 20 M.R.S.A. § 961.
The original version of section 621 was enacted in 1887. The 1887 Act called for fortnightly payment of wages, included municipal corporations within the scope of its mandate, but expressly excluded teachers from its coverage. P.L.1887, ch. 134, §§ 1, 5.
In 1911, the exception regarding teachers was deleted as was the reference to municipal corporations. Instead, the 1911 Act made reference to counties, cities and towns and called for weekly payment of wages. P.L.1911, ch. 39.
The current version of section 621 contains no other substantive changes in the 1887 Act relevant to the instant matter.
In 1909, the forerunner to the current version of 20 M.R.S.A. § 961 was enacted by the Legislature. The 1909 Act provided that teachers could be paid at the end of each school month but only if the attendance register required to be kept by all teachers was properly completed. P.L.1909, ch. 74.
This Act which had been codified at 20 M.R.S.A. § 961 (1965) was repealed
and replaced by the passage of an errors and inconsistencies bill in 1969. The new version of section 961 contained no reference concerning the payment of wages and placed the responsibility of keeping attendance records upon the school committee. 20 M.R.S.A. § 961 (Supp.1980).
Because section 961 no longer contains any provision regarding the payment of teachers’ salaries, the plaintiffs urge that they are now within the scope of the coverage provided by section 621. We, however, cannot accept such a mechanical and literal approach to the interpretation of section 621.
See State Development Office v. State Employees Appeal Board,
Me., 363 A.2d 688, 690 (1976). The plaintiffs fail to convince us that the revision of section 961 in an errors and inconsistencies bill indicates a conscious or deliberate legislative purpose to bring teachers within the scope of 621 particularly in light of the nonappli-cability of section 621 to teachers for over fifty years and the substantial penalties involved for violations of that provision.
Moreover, the language of section 621, standing apart from the statutory history of section 961, does not indicate that teachers are within the purview of its provisions. Teachers possess a unique status as employees of a school system.
See Board of Directors of Maine School Administrative District No. 36 v. School Administrative District No. 36 Teachers Association,
Me., 428 A.2d 419, 422 (1981). They serve as professionals.
Cf.
26 M.R.S.A. § 962(5). Their duties and responsibilities are not of the same kind as the class of employees specifically mentioned in section 621, namely, mechanics, workmen and laborers.
Cf. People v. City of Buffalo,
11 N.Y.S. 314 (Sup.Ct.1890). The terms of their employment are to a great extent mandated by statute.
See, e. g.,
20 M.R.S.A. §§ 161(5) (contracts of employment shall not be less than two years, automatic extension of contract unless notice to contrary six months prior to terminal date of contract), 473(9) (leave of absence at half pay), 1901 (minimum salaries based on education and experience), 1902 (reimbursement for professional credits), 1951 (minimum sick leave);
Winship v. Brewer School Committee,
Me., 390 A.2d 1089 (1978) (review of school committee’s dismissal of teacher pursuant to 20 M.R.S.A. § 473(4) on grounds that teacher was unfit to teach and his services unprofitable to school system);
Wright v. Superintending School Committee, City of Portland,
Me., 331 A.2d 640 (1975) (school board does not have power to dismiss a tenured teacher in order to calm fear of constituency absent evidence that character or notoriety of teacher’s conduct adversely affects his services to school). Because the special nature of a teacher’s employee-employer relationship is clearly distinguishable and far different from that of others typically employed by cities, counties and towns, we find no reason to conclude that the Legislature intended the inclusion of the plaintiffs within the scope of section 621.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
All concurring.