Glass, J.
The plaintiffs, Russell Grant (Grant) and his mother, Gail Grant, brought this action against the defendants, Charles Bassman, Inc. (CBI), and its president, Charles Bassman, seeking damages for personal injuries suffered by Grant while, as a minor, he was illegally employed by CBI. CBI moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Grant had applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries and, thus, was precluded from bringing this action by General Statutes § 31-284 (a).1 The [467] trial court granted CBI’s motion and the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiffs’ revised complaint alleged the following. Grant was born on August 25,1969. While a minor, Grant was employed as a laborer by CBI in its excavation contracting business. As part of his duties, Grant was required to operate certain equipment owned and used by CBI in its business, including a backhoe. The defendants employed Grant in an occupation determined to be hazardous by the Connecticut state labor department, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 31-23 (b), (c) and (d),* 2 and § 31-23-1 of the Regu[468] lations of Connecticut State Agencies. Bassman hired Grant with the knowledge that he was a minor and instructed him to start the backhoe by placing a screwdriver across the metal contact points on the starter motor while standing next to the engine compartment and between the wheels. The backhoe was equipped with a safety neutral switch to prevent it from starting while in gear. This switch had been disconnected, however, and was maintained in an inoperable condition. On June 17, 1987, while starting the backhoe as he had been instructed, Grant suffered serious and permanent physical injuries when the backhoe started and crushed him beneath a rear wheel.
The record reveals that Grant applied for and began receiving workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries while he was still a minor.* *3 A determination has not been made, however, concerning Grant’s entitlement to temporary total disability benefits, specific disability benefits or additional compensation benefits. As a defendant, CBI intervened in this action as a third party plaintiff and has notified the plaintiffs of its claim, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-293 (a),4 for reim[469] bursement of benefits paid to Grant. CBI filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Grant’s application for and receipt of workers’ compensation benefits precluded him, pursuant to § 31-284 (a), from bringing this action. The trial court granted CBI’s motion.* ***5 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) an illegally employed minor who exercises his right to workers’ compensation benefits is barred from pursuing his common law rights; (2) an illegally employed minor who exercises his right to workers’ compensation benefits has ratified his employment contract and thereby has elected to forego his common law rights; and (3) to show “serious and willful misconduct” by his employer, Grant had to show that CBI deliberately intended to injure him.
The plaintiffs argue that our decision in Blancato v. Feldspar Corporation, 203 Conn. 34, 522 A.2d 1235 (1987), stands for the proposition that an illegally employed minor, such as Grant, is not governed by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and, therefore, may pursue both a workers’ compensation claim and a common law tort action. CBI contends that Blancato requires an illegally employed minor either to avoid the employment contract by bringing a common law tort action or to ratify the con[470] tract by pursuing his workers’ compensation remedy. CBI argues that, by applying for and receiving workers’ compensation benefits, Grant ratified the employment contract and is thereby precluded under § 31-284 (a) from bringing a common law action. Because we conclude that CBI’s claim that the plaintiff had made an exclusive election of remedies was not properly raised by a motion to dismiss, we do not reach the substantive issues raised by the parties in this appeal.
In its motion to dismiss, CBI claimed that Grant had elected his exclusive remedy by applying for and receiving workers’ compensation benefits. CBI asserted that as a result of this election, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action. CBI argued, rather, that the workers’ compensation commission had sole jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint against CBI on that basis.
“ ‘Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.’ ” LeConche v. Elligers, 215 Conn. 701, 709, 579 A.2d 1 (1990), quoting Shea v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of New Haven, 184 Conn. 285, 288, 439 A.2d 997 (1981). We start with the premise that the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a common law negligence action. The question raised by the present case is whether Grant’s commencement of a proceeding with the workers’ compensation commission ousted the trial court of such jurisdiction. “That determination must be informed by the established principle that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of jurisdiction. . . .” LeConche v. Elligers, supra, 709-10.
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Glass, J.
The plaintiffs, Russell Grant (Grant) and his mother, Gail Grant, brought this action against the defendants, Charles Bassman, Inc. (CBI), and its president, Charles Bassman, seeking damages for personal injuries suffered by Grant while, as a minor, he was illegally employed by CBI. CBI moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Grant had applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries and, thus, was precluded from bringing this action by General Statutes § 31-284 (a).1 The [467] trial court granted CBI’s motion and the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiffs’ revised complaint alleged the following. Grant was born on August 25,1969. While a minor, Grant was employed as a laborer by CBI in its excavation contracting business. As part of his duties, Grant was required to operate certain equipment owned and used by CBI in its business, including a backhoe. The defendants employed Grant in an occupation determined to be hazardous by the Connecticut state labor department, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 31-23 (b), (c) and (d),* 2 and § 31-23-1 of the Regu[468] lations of Connecticut State Agencies. Bassman hired Grant with the knowledge that he was a minor and instructed him to start the backhoe by placing a screwdriver across the metal contact points on the starter motor while standing next to the engine compartment and between the wheels. The backhoe was equipped with a safety neutral switch to prevent it from starting while in gear. This switch had been disconnected, however, and was maintained in an inoperable condition. On June 17, 1987, while starting the backhoe as he had been instructed, Grant suffered serious and permanent physical injuries when the backhoe started and crushed him beneath a rear wheel.
The record reveals that Grant applied for and began receiving workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries while he was still a minor.* *3 A determination has not been made, however, concerning Grant’s entitlement to temporary total disability benefits, specific disability benefits or additional compensation benefits. As a defendant, CBI intervened in this action as a third party plaintiff and has notified the plaintiffs of its claim, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-293 (a),4 for reim[469] bursement of benefits paid to Grant. CBI filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Grant’s application for and receipt of workers’ compensation benefits precluded him, pursuant to § 31-284 (a), from bringing this action. The trial court granted CBI’s motion.* ***5 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) an illegally employed minor who exercises his right to workers’ compensation benefits is barred from pursuing his common law rights; (2) an illegally employed minor who exercises his right to workers’ compensation benefits has ratified his employment contract and thereby has elected to forego his common law rights; and (3) to show “serious and willful misconduct” by his employer, Grant had to show that CBI deliberately intended to injure him.
The plaintiffs argue that our decision in Blancato v. Feldspar Corporation, 203 Conn. 34, 522 A.2d 1235 (1987), stands for the proposition that an illegally employed minor, such as Grant, is not governed by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and, therefore, may pursue both a workers’ compensation claim and a common law tort action. CBI contends that Blancato requires an illegally employed minor either to avoid the employment contract by bringing a common law tort action or to ratify the con[470] tract by pursuing his workers’ compensation remedy. CBI argues that, by applying for and receiving workers’ compensation benefits, Grant ratified the employment contract and is thereby precluded under § 31-284 (a) from bringing a common law action. Because we conclude that CBI’s claim that the plaintiff had made an exclusive election of remedies was not properly raised by a motion to dismiss, we do not reach the substantive issues raised by the parties in this appeal.
In its motion to dismiss, CBI claimed that Grant had elected his exclusive remedy by applying for and receiving workers’ compensation benefits. CBI asserted that as a result of this election, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action. CBI argued, rather, that the workers’ compensation commission had sole jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint against CBI on that basis.
“ ‘Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.’ ” LeConche v. Elligers, 215 Conn. 701, 709, 579 A.2d 1 (1990), quoting Shea v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of New Haven, 184 Conn. 285, 288, 439 A.2d 997 (1981). We start with the premise that the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a common law negligence action. The question raised by the present case is whether Grant’s commencement of a proceeding with the workers’ compensation commission ousted the trial court of such jurisdiction. “That determination must be informed by the established principle that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of jurisdiction. . . .” LeConche v. Elligers, supra, 709-10.
[471] This court has not squarely addressed the question of whether a claim that an injured plaintiff has elected workers’ compensation as his exclusive remedy deprives the Superior Court of subject matter jurisdiction over a tort action for personal injury. In the past, parties have raised and we have reviewed claims that an injured plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is under the Workers’ Compensation Act both by way of a motion to dismiss and by way of a special defense. Compare Pallanck v. Donovan, 105 Conn. 591, 136 A. 471 (1927) (plea in abatement), with Mancini v. Bureau of Public Works, 167 Conn. 189, 355 A.2d 32 (1974) (special defense), and Bates v. Connecticut Power Co., 130 Conn. 256, 33 A.2d 342 (1943) (special defense). Because these cases did not address the propriety of the procedural posture, however, “[w]e do not read our case law ... as conclusively deciding that such a claim is subject matter jurisdictional.” Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 543, 590 A.2d 914 (1991).
In Fusaro v. Chase Brass & Copper Co., 21 Conn. Sup. 240, 154 A.2d 138 (1956), the trial court discussed the appropriate procedural mechanism for raising a claim that an injured plaintiff has made an exclusive election of workers’ compensation. In that case, the defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction and in abatement on the ground that workers’ compensation was the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy.6 The court sustained the plaintiff’s demurrer to the plea, concluding that the matter raised by the plea should properly have been raised by a special defense in the answer. Id., 244. In referring to the predecessor to § 31-284 (a), the court [472] stated: “It is true that our compensation act provides (Rev. 1949, § 7419) that as to an employee covered by it, ‘the employer shall not be liable to any action for damages on account of personal injury.’ This provision, however, is not at all a denial of jurisdiction in the Superior Court, as such, but is basically a destruction of an otherwise existent common-law right of action. The facts alleged in the plea to the jurisdiction would, if proven, establish such a destruction. Consequently, they constitute matter in bar. The confusion, if there be any, arises from the fact that the compensation procedure which is substituted for the common-law right of action involves a special tribunal, rather than the Superior Court. However, this is a mere incident of the destruction of the common-law right of action. In other words, there is not a lack of jurisdiction in the court but a want of a cause of action in the plaintiff. ” (Emphasis added.) Id., 243; see also Gurliacci v. Mayer, supra, 541-45 (suit against fellow employee not subject to motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
We agree with the reasoning of the court in Fusaro that a claim that an injured plaintiff has made an exclusive election of workers’ compensation is properly raised by a special defense.7 The purpose of a special [473] defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action. Practice Book § 164. The claim that a plaintiff has elected an exclusive remedy relies on facts outside those alleged in the complaint that operate to negate what may once have been a valid cause of action. 1 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (2d Ed.) § 127, p. 519. It is therefore both rational and fair to place the burden of pleading and proving an election of remedies on the party asserting the claim, usually the defendant. “It is sufficient to require the plaintiff to allege facts showing that at one time, at least, he had a cause of action. It would be an undue burden to require him to negate the occurrence of any and all subsequent events that could operate to destroy his cause of action.” Id. In the present case, CBI asserted in a motion to dismiss that regardless of the truth of the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint, they could not maintain a common law action because Grant had elected workers’ compensation as his exclusive remedy. We conclude, however, that a special defense, and not a motion to dismiss, was the proper procedural vehicle for CBI’s challenge to the plaintiffs’ complaint.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to deny the motion to dismiss and for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.