Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Laughlin
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY : JUDGES: COMPANY : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
:
-vs- :
:
PATRICK LAUGHLIN, ET AL. : Case No. 12-CA-0089 :
Defendants-Appellees : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 11 CV 01490
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 8, 2013
APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendants-Appellees
JAMES E. FEATHERSTONE SEAN HARRIS 610 South Front Street 445 Hutchinson Avenue, Suite 100 Columbus, OH 43215 Columbus, OH 43235
GUS M. SHIHAB
65 East State Street, Suite 1550 Columbus, OH 43215
Farmer, J.
{¶1} Appellee, Patrick Laughlin, owned a business building wood furniture and cabinets. On March 19, 2010, appellee's nineteen year old nephew, William "Billy" Laughlin, was working with appellee, spraying a lacquer spray material on doors. The two were overcome by the fumes of the lacquer spray. Patrick survived and Billy passed away.
{¶2} On February 7, 2011, Billy's estate, appellee herein, filed a wrongful death action and negligence claims against appellee Patrick and his business, claiming Billy was an independent contractor as opposed to an employee. At the time of the incident, appellee Patrick was insured under three policies of insurance, a fire policy, a homeowner's policy, and a business owner's policy, issue by appellant, Grange Mutual Casualty Company.
{¶3} On November 7, 2011, appellant filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, asking the trial court to interpret and construe the insurance contracts. Appellees filed motions for summary judgment, asking the trial court to declare that Billy was an independent contractor. By judgment entry filed August 29, 2012, the trial court declared there was no coverage under the fire and homeowner's policies, but there were genuine issues regarding coverage under the business owner's policy.
{¶4} A trial on the remaining issue of coverage commenced on September 17, 2012. By judgment entry filed September 26, 2012, the trial court determined Billy was not an employee at the time of his death, and appellant's business owner's policy provided liability coverage to satisfy any potential verdict obtained in the wrongful death action. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed on November 1, 2012.
{¶5} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for consideration. Assignments of error are as follows:
I
{¶6} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY AND AGAINST ITS INSURED, PATRICK LAUGHLIN, ON CROSS-MOTIONS ASSERTING 'NO GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT.' "
II
{¶7} "AFTER A BENCH TRIAL, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW RENDERING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW."
III
{¶8} "THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT (NUMBERED 1-15) RECITE FOR THE MOST PART FINDINGS THAT ARE NOT RELEVANT TO AN ANALYSIS OF THE EMPLOYER VS. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR QUESTION UNDER BOSTIC V. CONNER OR UNDER THE CRITERIA AT R.C. 4123(A)(1)(c)(i-xx)."
I
{¶9} Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying its motion for declaratory judgment as there were no disputed questions of fact. Given the fact pattern in this case, we disagree.
{¶10} Appellant argues pursuant to Bostic v. Connor, 37 Ohio St.3d 144 (1988), when issues of fact are not in dispute, it is the duty of the trial court to rule on the existence of an employee relationship as a matter of law.
{¶11} In its judgment entry filed August 29, 2012, the trial court found genuine issues of material fact existed to warrant a trial on coverage under the business owner's policy. In its reply in support for declaratory judgment filed July 10, 2012, appellant relied on the factors set forth in R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c), the definition of "employee" under the workers' compensation statutes. Appellant claimed fifteen or sixteen factors out of twenty weighed in favor of Billy having been an employee.
{¶12} As the Supreme Court of Ohio held in Bostic at 145-146, "Whether someone is an employee or an independent contractor is ordinarily an issue to be decided by the trier of fact. The key factual determination is who had the right to control the manner or means of doing the work." The Bostic court at 146 went on to state, "The determination of who has the right to control must be made by examining the individual facts of each case."
{¶13} Per Bostic, we find appellees advanced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptions argued by appellant. The deposition of appellee Patrick raised genuine issues regarding Billy's work: appellee Patrick and his wife gave aid and assistance to their nephew Billy because they wanted to help him get started in a business, and Billy controlled when, where, and what he wanted to do for his uncle.
{¶14} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for declaratory judgment.
{¶15} Assignment of Error I is denied.
II, III
{¶16} Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding that Billy was not an employee as it met the statutory test of R.C. 4123.01, and the trial court's findings of facts were not relevant to the decision. We disagree.
{¶17} On review for manifest weight, the standard in a civil case is identical to the standard in a criminal case: a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury [or finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). See also, State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52; Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179.
{¶18} On September 17, 2012, the parties filed a stipulation regarding trial on the issue of insurance coverage. The stipulation narrowed the issue "for determination by the finder of fact whether, at the time of his death, William Laughlin, is considered an 'employee'' of Patrick Laughlin as defined under the insurance policy and Ohio law."
{¶19} In its Conclusions of Law Nos. 3 and 4 filed November 1, 2012, the trial court answered the sole issue in the negative:
3. Weighing all the factors, Patrick Laughlin did not have the right to control Billy Laughlin at Patrick's business. Billy Laughlin was, therefore, not an employee of Patrick Laughlin. At best, Billy was an independent contractor.
LIcking County, Case No. 12-CA-0089 6
4. However, under either the common law right to control test or the statutory test, Billy Laughlin was not an employee of Patrick Laughlin.
{¶20} In support of its position that Billy was an employee, appellant relies on the definition of "employee" under the workers' compensation statutes, R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c), to substantiate its position:
As used in this chapter:
(A)(1) "Employee" means:
(c) Every person who performs labor or provides services pursuant to a construction contract, as defined in section 4123.79 of the Revised Code, if at least ten of the following criteria apply:
(i) The person is required to comply with instructions from the other contracting party regarding the manner or method of performing services;
(ii) The person is required by the other contracting party to have particular training;
(iii) The person's services are integrated into the regular functioning of the other contracting party;
(iv) The person is required to perform the work personally;
(v) The person is hired, supervised, or paid by the other contracting party;
(vi) A continuing relationship exists between the person and the other contracting party that contemplates continuing or recurring work even if the work is not full time;
(vii) The person's hours of work are established by the other contracting party;
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