Grandberry v. Dallas

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 10, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00922
StatusUnknown

This text of Grandberry v. Dallas (Grandberry v. Dallas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grandberry v. Dallas, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JAMES GRANDBERRY, JR,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-922-bhl

P. DALLAS, et al.,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff James Grandberry, Jr., who is currently in custody at the Brown County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Grandberry’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Grandberry has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). Grandberry has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $52.00. The Court will grant Grandberry’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well

as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT Grandberry is an inmate at the Brown County Jail. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants are Chaplain Dallas and Lt. Sturm. Id. at 2. According to the complaint, Granberry practices a religion that requires fasting from sunrise to sunset. Id. at 5. On or around June 10, 2025, Grandberry filed a request for food to be served after sunset to accommodate his religious practice. Id. Chaplain Dallas and Lt. Sturm denied the request for religious accommodation claiming, “that is not something that happens at Brown County Jail.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. They told him to “practice vegan” for 30 days instead. Id. Grandberry alleges that a vegan diet has nothing to do with his religion. Id. Granberry notes that “after hour” bag lunches are available for inmates with medical conditions but are not available for inmates who fast as a part of their religious practice. Id. at 1- 2. For relief, Grandberry seeks monetary damages. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS

“To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). Grandberry’s allegations implicate a claim under the First Amendment.1 Under the First Amendment, “[p]risoners retain the right to exercise their religious beliefs, although that right is not unfettered.” Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009). Where prison officials “personally and unjustifiably place[ ] a substantial burden on [an inmate’s] religious practices,” they may violate an inmate’s constitutional rights. Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 379-80 (7th Cir. 2016). “A substantial burden ‘[p]uts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-718 (1981)). Denial of food puts substantial pressure on an inmate to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs. Jones v. Carter, 915 F.3d 1147, 1150–51 (7th Cir. 2019).

1 Grandberry only asks for monetary damages through this lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Therefore, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) does not apply. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(f); see also Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 288 (2011) (noting that RLUIPA “does not include suits for damages against a State.”). Grandberry alleges that he practices a religion that requires fasting from sunrise to sunset. He alleges that he requested a religious accommodation for food at sunset, but Chaplain Dallas and Lt. Strum denied the request, claiming “that is not something that happens at Brown County Jail.” Grandberry alleges that “after hour” bag lunches are available for inmates with medical conditions, however.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Ortiz v. Downey
561 F.3d 664 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Roman Lee Jones v. Robert E. Carter
915 F.3d 1147 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Thompson v. Holm
809 F.3d 376 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)

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Grandberry v. Dallas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grandberry-v-dallas-wied-2025.