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SJC-12294
GRAND MANOR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION & others 1 vs. CITY OF LOWELL.
Middlesex. October 5, 2017. - January 19, 2018.
Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.
Hazardous Materials. Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act. Real Property, Environmental damage. Limitations, Statute of. Practice, Civil, Statute of limitations. Damages, Hazardous waste contamination.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 10, 2012.
The case was tried before Kathe M. Tuttman, J.
1 Keith Parker; Paul Donoghue; Anthony Delgreco; Wilmer Gallo Solorzano; Susanna Ritson; Carol Sagro; Judith Copithorne; Frances Inglis; Susan Elimhingbe; Kathleen Harrison; Derek Soderquist; Eiddie Katende; Walter Patterson, Jr.; Michael R. Sherman; Michael Gibbs; Sakhoeurn Van; Ellsworth J. Evans, Jr.; Paul Weissbach; Amir Tabrizi; Keith L. Bennett, Jr.; Prabhaker Jani; Jyoti Jani; William R. Zink; Linda A. Zink; Daniel R. Smith, Sr.; Ashwin Thakkar; Giselia Resendes; Michelle Maher; Maureen Guerin-Porter; Theodore Leoutsakos; Susan Leoutsakos; Lawrence Kelleher; Deborah Carkin; George Barry; Nancy Barry; Brian Andriolo; Helen Bullock; Edward Bullock; Julia Paquin; Tracy Paquette; and Dolores Lemieux. 2
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.
Alan B. Rubenstein (Stacie A. Kosinski also present) for the plaintiff. C. Michael Carlson, Assistant City Solicitor (Rachel M. Brown, Assistant City Solicitor, also present) for city of Lowell.
KAFKER, J. The owners of condominium units at Grand Manor
and the Grand Manor Condominium Association (collectively,
plaintiffs) filed suit against the city of Lowell (city) on
October 10, 2012, for the release of hazardous materials at the
Grand Manor condominium site. The plaintiffs brought claims for
response costs under G. L. c. 21E, § 4A, and for damage to the
plaintiffs' property under G. L. c. 21E, § 5 (a) (iii). 2 A jury
found that the plaintiffs' claim under § 5 (a) (iii) was barred
by the applicable statute of limitations, G. L. c. 21E,
§ 11A (4). The plaintiffs appealed, and we granted their
application for direct appellate review. On appeal, the
plaintiffs argue that (1) the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until the plaintiffs knew that the property damage
was permanent; and (2) the trial judge erred in instructing the
jury that the plaintiffs had the burden of persuasion to show
that they filed suit within the statute of limitations. The
2 The plaintiffs brought a third claim under G. L. c. 93A, but the trial court granted summary judgment for the city on this claim and the plaintiffs do not appeal from that ruling. 3
city contends that the plaintiffs needed to know only that there
was environmental damage and that the defendant was the source
of the damage, not that the damage was permanent, for the
limitations period to begin to run. The city also contends that
the jury were properly instructed.
We conclude that a plaintiff must be on notice that he or
she has a claim under § 5 (a) (iii) before that claim may be
time barred, and that such notice is separate from a plaintiff's
notice that environmental contamination has occurred. A
plaintiff has notice of a claim under § 5 (a) (iii) once the
plaintiff learns whether or not remediation and response costs
will fully compensate the plaintiff for the harm he or she has
suffered, as well as the identity of the party who caused such
harm. This will not ordinarily occur until the plaintiff learns
that the damage to his or her property is not reasonably curable
by the remediation process. As we conclude as a matter of law
that the plaintiffs could not know that they had a claim under
§ 5 before June 6, 2012, when the city filed its Phase II/Phase
III report pursuant to the Massachusetts Contingency Plan, the
statute of limitations issues should not have been presented to
the jury. We therefore vacate the judgment below and remand
this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. Background. a. Overview of G. L. c. 21E. The
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act, 4
G. L. c. 21E, was enacted both "to compel the prompt and
efficient cleanup of hazardous material and to ensure that costs
and damages are borne by the appropriate responsible
parties." Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 436 Mass. 217,
223 (2002). The Department of Environmental Protection
(department) has promulgated a set of regulations known
collectively as the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP) that
detail specific requirements for complying with the G. L. c. 21E
remediation process. See id., citing G. L. c. 21E, § 3, and 310
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 40.0000 (1999).
As we explained in Taygeta Corp., 436 Mass. at 224, once
the department is notified of a release of hazardous materials,
"a property owner or other responsible person is subject to a
five-phase assessment and remediation process set forth in the
MCP." That assessment and remediation process defines how much
cleanup of the property will be required and who will be
responsible for the cleanup. "Phase I consists of preliminary
response actions and risk reduction measures, including a
limited investigation and evaluation of the contaminated site
and a remediation of sudden releases, imminent hazards, and
other time-critical conditions. . . . Preliminary response
actions may be sufficient for complete evaluation or remediation
of localized or uncomplicated releases and threats of release at
some sites. . . . Where that is not the case, the property 5
owner or other responsible person must proceed with the
subsequent phases of the assessment and remediation process
described in the MCP." (Citations omitted.) Id.
Phase II includes "a characterization of the sources,
nature, and vertical and horizontal extent of contamination at
the disposal site, and the identification and characterization
of all potential human and environmental receptors that could be
affected by hazardous material at or migrating from such
site." Id. at 224-225. Phase III requires the "identification
and selection of comprehensive remedial action
alternatives." Id. at 225 n.12. Phase IV implements the
selected remedial action alternative. Id. If needed, the
property owner or other responsible person will proceed to Phase
V for the continued "operation, maintenance, or monitoring of
the disposal site." Id. See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0890
(2014).
A site does not need to be remediated to its pre-
contamination state in order to complete the remediation process
specified in the MCP. Rather, there are a number of means by
which a party can finish the remediation process. See 310 Code
Mass. Regs. § 40.1000 (2014). For example, a party may be able,
or even required, to implement an Activity and Use Limitation
(AUL) to reduce contaminants to levels that pose no significant
risk to public health. See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.1012 6
(2014). An AUL limits the permissible range of future
activities and acceptable uses for the site, in order to prevent
a member of the public from being exposed to contamination that
remains onsite that could not feasibly be remediated. See id.
Thus, a site with an AUL is remediated to the point of no
significant risk to public health, but may still contain
hazardous materials. As is the case when a site utilizes an
AUL, the remediation process under G. L. c. 21E and the MCP do
not necessarily cure all property damage that resulted from the
contamination.
b. Facts. In 1906, the city acquired the land upon which
the Grand Manor condominium was later built. In the early part
of the Twentieth Century, the city operated the site as a quarry
for mining rock and gravel. During the 1940s and 1950s, the
city used the site as a landfill. Solid waste, such as tires,
leather waste products, batteries, bottles, and containers of
liquid were deposited in areas that had been excavated during
the site's prior use as a quarry. The landfill was eventually
covered and sat unused until 1983, when the city conveyed the
property to a real estate developer. The developer constructed
the Grand Manor condominium on the property, and recorded the
master deed for it in 1985. 3
3 The developer who conveyed the land is now deceased. 7
In November, 2008, the Grand Manor Condominium Association
(association) hired a contractor to excavate part of the site to
install a drainage system. During the excavation, the
contractor discovered discolored soil, as well as debris
including glass, bottles, metal, vehicle parts, and ash. Two
soil samples were collected from separate stockpiles of
excavated soil and submitted for testing. In a letter dated
December 31, 2008, the contractor was informed that one of the
two soil samples indicated that a release of hazardous materials
had occurred. The letter stated that the owner of the site was
required to notify the department of the release and hire a
licensed site professional to comply with its duties under G. L.
c. 21E. 4 See 310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 40.0169, 40.0315. The
association learned of the soil test results in early 2009. The
site's prior use as a landfill was the source of the hazardous
materials. 5
4 A licensed site professional is an individual licensed by the State to provide opinions on safely cleaning hazardous waste sites. See G. L. c. 21A, § 19; 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0006 (2014). 5 The city of Lowell (city) did not concede that the landfill was the cause of the release prior to trial. However, in a joint pretrial memorandum containing an agreed statement of facts, the parties stated that the "source of the hazardous materials discovered at the Grand Manor site and released into the environment is the former use of the site as a solid waste landfill." 8
In January, 2009, the association hired Joseph Jammallo as
its licensed site professional. In March, 2009, Jammallo
attempted a limited removal action to remediate the
contamination, which would allow the association to avoid the
much lengthier five-phase cleanup process mandated by the MCP. 6
310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0318 (2014). Jammallo issued a report
on April 24, 2009, informing the association that the limited
removal action had failed. The association notified its
residents and unit owners of the contamination in a letter dated
the same day. Both the report and the letter indicated that
members of the association had learned through personal research
that the site was once operated as a landfill by the city. The
report stated that the contamination "may likely be associated
with the wastes that were deposited on the [s]ite over the years
of the [c]ity's ownership [and operation of the dump]," but
recommended further investigation to assess the "nature and
approximate extent of the release." The letter similarly stated
that "[t]he extent and nature of materials disposed of is not
yet known."
6 A limited removal action consists of removing up to twenty cubic yards of contaminated soil from the site. 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0318(4)(b) (2014). Afterward, if the remaining concentrations of hazardous material in the soil are below the contamination levels that require notifying the Department of Environmental Protection (department), the limited removal action has been successful. 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0318(9) (2014). 9
Four days later, the association notified the department of
the release of hazardous materials, and requested that the
department issue a notice of responsibility to the city. 7 In May
2009, the department sent a notice to both the city and the
association informing them that they were potentially
responsible parties under G. L. c. 21E, § 5, and ordering them
to undertake all response actions necessary to achieve a level
of no significant risk to public safety, in compliance with the
MCP.
On July 16, 2009, the city hired its own licensed site
professional, Christopher McDermott, and Jammallo's work for the
association ceased. 8 On October 13, 2009, the association sent a
letter to the city demanding reimbursement for costs the
association incurred responding to the contamination, pursuant
to G. L. c. 21E, § 4. In April, 2010, McDermott filed a Phase I
Initial Site Investigation report with the department. The
Phase I report stated that the release of hazardous materials
"is likely related to the former use of the [s]ite as a solid
waste landfill." The report indicated that interpreting aerial
7 The department sends notices of responsibility to parties that may be liable for the release of hazardous materials under G. L. c. 21E, § 5. See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0160(1) (2014). 8 Christopher McDermott was the city's licensed site professional until January, 2012. 10
photographs from 1957 "suggest[ed]" where the outer boundaries
of the contamination were located.
On July 7, 2010, the city sent Grand Manor residents and
unit owners a letter assuring them that it was working to
"develop and implement a more permanent solution to protect"
their health and safety. However, the city noted that
"significant additional testing and monitoring in multiple
seasons (to determine if seasonal factors impact contamination
levels, as is often the case) is required by the [department] to
establish and implement a definitive long term remediation
strategy."
In June, 2011, a subcontractor completed a geophysical
report on the extent of the site contamination for the city.
The report calculated that there were over 1.5 million cubic
feet of hazardous material at the site, and that the hazardous
material extended down to the bedrock. The findings from this
report were included in the city's Phase II Comprehensive Site
Assessment, which was filed in June, 2012, along with the city's
Phase III Remedial Action Plan. The Phase II report stated that
the source of the hazardous material was "fill containing soil
and solid waste from the landfill disposal operations in the
[city's former landfill] in the 1940s and 1950s." The Phase III
report indicated that returning the site to its original
condition would cost approximately $11.7 million, and was not 11
feasible. The report concluded that installing an asphalt or
concrete pavement cap over the hazardous material and
implementing an AUL would be the most practical remedy, and laid
out a tentative schedule for implementing that solution.
The plaintiffs filed suit on October 10, 2012, for response
costs, under G. L. c. 21E, § 4A, and damage to the plaintiffs'
property, under G. L. c. 21E, § 5 (a) (iii). The statute of
limitations period for the claim under § 5 is three years.
G. L. c. 21E, § 11A. Thus, the plaintiffs' claim under § 5
would only be timely if the limitations period began to run on
or after October 10, 2009.
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing in
relevant part that a claim under § 5 (a) (iii) requires
permanent damage, and that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until they learned the damage was permanent. The
trial court rejected the latter argument. Instead, the court
ruled that the city was a liable party as defined in G. L.
c. 21E, § 5 (a) (iii), but that there was a "genuine issue of
material fact as to which date commenced the running of the
three-year limitations period" for the claim under
§ 5 (a) (iii). The court listed several potential dates that
could have triggered the limitations period: (1) March, 2009,
the date Jammallo conducted the limited removal action; (2)
April 24, 2009, the date Jammallo issued a report indicating the 12
limited removal action had failed; (3) May 21, 2009, the date
the department notified the city it was a potentially
responsible party; or (4) October 13, 2009, the date the
plaintiffs sent a letter to the city demanding reimbursement for
response costs under § 4A.
At trial, the jury were instructed that the plaintiffs
"must first persuade you by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that their claim did not arise until on or after October 10,
2009." The jury awarded the plaintiffs response costs pursuant
to G. L. c. 21E, § 4, but found that the plaintiffs had failed
to prove that their claim under § 5 (a) (iii) was brought within
the statute of limitations. 9
2. Discussion. The statute of limitations for claims
under § 5 (a) (iii) provides as follows:
"Actions by persons other than the [C]ommonwealth to recover for damage to real or personal property shall be commenced within three years after the date that the person seeking recovery first suffers the damage or within three years after the date the person seeking recovery of such damage discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the person against whom the action is being brought is a person liable pursuant to this chapter for the release or threat of release that caused the damage, whichever is later."
G. L. c. 21E, § 11A (4). See Taygeta Corp., 436 Mass. at 226
(individual who brings claim under § 5 [a] [iii] must do so
9 The city has not appealed from the judgment awarding response costs to the plaintiffs under § 4. 13
within three years of when plaintiff "discovers or reasonably
should have discovered [1] the damage, and [2] the cause of the
damage"). 10 The plaintiffs argue that the word "damage" in
§ 11A (4) refers specifically to damage under § 5 (a) (iii),
which the plaintiffs contend is limited to damage not reasonably
curable by repair. Accordingly, they argue that the limitations
period should not begin to run until a plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should have discovered that the damage is not
reasonably curable by repair. 11 The city disagrees, arguing that
10 By contrast, claims for response costs pursuant to G. L. c. 21E, § 4 or 4A, have a statute of limitations that provides:
"Actions brought by persons other than the [C]ommonwealth pursuant to [§§ 4 or 4A] to recover reimbursement, contribution or equitable share shall be commenced within three years after the date the person seeking such recovery discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the person against whom the action is being brought is a person liable pursuant to the provisions of this chapter for the release or threat of release for which such costs or liability were incurred, or within three years of the time when the person bringing the action first learns of a material violation of an agreement entered into pursuant to [§ 4A], or within three years after the person bringing the action incurs all response costs, or within three years after payment by the person seeking contribution, reimbursement, or an equitable share for liability pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, or within three years after sending notice pursuant to the [§ 4A, first par.], whichever is later."
G. L. c. 21E, § 11A (2). 11 The plaintiffs rely on this court's holding in Hill v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 439 Mass. 266 (2003), for their contention that damages under § 5 (a) (iii) are those that are not reasonably curable by repair. In Hill, the trial court 14
notice of environmental contamination and the identity of the
responsible party is sufficient to trigger the limitations
period.
We must consider the statute of limitations for claims
under § 5 (a) (iii) "in the context of the over-all statutory
scheme and the regulations set forth in the MCP." Taygeta
Corp., 436 Mass. at 226. As we have explained, "G. L. c. 21E
was drafted in a comprehensive fashion to compel the prompt and
efficient cleanup of hazardous material and to ensure that costs
parties." Id. at 223. Its statutory and regulatory scheme sets
out separate phases of assessment and remediation, which
eventually lead to a decision about the appropriate level of
remediation, beyond which further cleanup would be cost
prohibitive. See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0860 (2014). More
specifically, in Phase III of this process, the responsible
parties determine whether the contamination can be feasibly
remediated to precontamination levels, and select a feasible
remediation plan. See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0852 (2014).
Recognizing the different phases of assessment and remediation
instructed the jury that the plaintiff is entitled only to remediation costs, not damages, unless he or she demonstrates that there was damage that was not reasonably curable by repair. Id. at 273. We note, however, that our decision in Hill did not address the accuracy of the jury instructions, because the unobjected-to jury instructions became the law of the case. Id. at 275. 15
and the different possible levels of cleanup required, G. L.
c. 21E provides for separate and distinct recovery for response
costs under § 4 and property damages under § 5, and sets out two
different statutes of limitations depending on whether the cause
of action arises under § 4 or § 5. See G. L. c. 21E,
§ 11A; Guaranty-First Trust Co. v. Textron, Inc., 416 Mass. 332,
338 (1993). We examine these causes of action, and their
particular purposes, to inform our understanding of the statute
of limitations under § 11A.
a. Private causes of action under G. L. c. 21E. The
primary purpose of G. L. c. 21E is to clean up environmental
contamination, and to pay for the costs associated with that
cleanup. See Taygeta Corp., 436 Mass. at 223. Accordingly, the
statutory and regulatory scheme prioritizes the performance and
financing of cleanup efforts, and then considers the calculation
of property damage that cannot be cured by remediation and
remediation cost recovery. See id. (remediating environmental
contamination is primary purpose of G. L. c. 21E, while
compensating owners for property damage is secondary purpose).
Sections 4 and 4A and their corresponding statutes of
limitations address the former objective; statutes of
limitations under § 5 address the latter.
In order to perform and pay for effective and efficient
remediation, G. L. c. 21E not only mandates that responsible 16
parties engage in the MCP remediation process, but also provides
for private causes of action pursuant to §§ 4 and 4A to recover
cleanup costs from other responsible parties. See Taygeta
Corp., 436 Mass. at 223. Section 4 allows private individuals
to sue for reimbursement of response costs they have already
incurred. Section 4A allows private individuals to sue for
contribution or equitable share of response costs they have not
yet incurred. Thus, whenever a plaintiff's property is
contaminated, G. L. c. 21E not only prioritizes environmental
cleanup, but also empowers the plaintiff to pursue
reimbursement, contribution, or equitable share of the response
costs necessary to perform that remediation. Sections 4 and 4A,
and not § 5, govern cost recovery for these remediation efforts.
Full remediation of the environmental contamination is a
desirable outcome. See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.1020 (2014).
If the cleanup and cost recovery process fully remediates the
plaintiff's property damage, the plaintiff has suffered
environmental contamination without incurring damages under § 5.
However, cleanup in accordance with G. L. c. 21E and the MCP may
not remediate all of the physical damage to a site, particularly
in cases of significant environmental contamination, as full
remediation may be cost prohibitive. See 310 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 40.0860(7)(a) (2014). See also Department of Environmental
Protection, Conducting Feasibility Assessments under the MCP, 17
Policy No. WSC-04-160, at 17 (July 16, 2004) (remediation
necessary to reach background levels not feasible if it costs
more than twenty per cent of cost of remediation necessary to
reach level of "No Significant Risk"). Cf. Guaranty-First Trust
Co., 416 Mass. at 338. In those instances, remediation and the
recovery of response costs pursuant to §§ 4 and 4A may not fully
compensate plaintiffs for the harm they have suffered.
Section 5 provides for recovery of this type of residual
damage that cannot be cured or compensated by remediation or the
recovery of response costs. Damage may be residual, in that the
property, even after undergoing the cleanup mandated by the MCP
process, may still contain pollutants diminishing the fair
market value of the property. Bisson v. Eck, 40 Mass. App. Ct.
942, 942 (1996) (jury could find "residual levels of hazardous
materials persisted on the property despite the plaintiff's
cleanup efforts" for purposes of claim under § 5). The
plaintiff may have also suffered temporary loss of use and
resulting economic damage, such as lost rent, that again cannot
be cured or compensated by remediation and response
costs. Guaranty-First Trust Co., 416 Mass. at 336-337. 12 In
12 Although the phrase "not reasonably curable by repair" is often synonymous with "permanent" at common law, see Belkus v. Brockton, 282 Mass. 285, 287-288 (1933) (measure of damages at common law depends on whether injury is permanent or reasonably curable by repairs), the terms are not interchangeable to describe damages under G. L. c. 21E, § 5. In Guaranty-First 18
both instances, the plaintiff's recovery under § 5 is limited to
those residual damages that are not cured by the remediation
process and cleanup cost recovery available under §§ 4 and 4A.
Prior cases have highlighted the importance of the residual
nature of the relationship between damages under § 5 and
response costs under §§ 4 and 4A. Hill v. Metropolitan Dist.
Comm'n, 439 Mass. 266, 273 (2003) (jury instruction that "if the
damage to the plaintiff's property can reasonably be cured, can
reasonably be repaired, remediated, then the plaintiff, instead
[of getting damages under § 5], gets the expense of doing those
repairs, of doing that remediation"); Black v. Coastal Oil New
England, Inc., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 461, 466 (1998) ("to the extent
that the expense of cleanup was recoverable at the time of this
action [because contamination was reasonably curable and there
were no loss of use damages], that recovery could be pursued
only under § 4"); Bisson, 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 943 ("if remedial
measures did not completely cure the problem and the fair market
value of the property was less or diminished due to this prior
Trust Co. v. Textron, Inc., 416 Mass. 332, 337 (1993), we held that § 5 provides for recovery of damages due to loss of rent during the period reasonably needed to repair the property. Thus, the environmental damage to the property was not permanent, but recovery was still permissible under § 5 because the damages were not curable or compensable through remediation and repair costs alone. The Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP) also uses the terms "permanent" and "temporary" to classify response action outcomes, and those terms have specific meanings in the MCP entirely separate from our discussion here. See 310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 40.1000 (2014). 19
existing contamination, then the plaintiff would be entitled [to
recover for the property's] diminution in value" [quotation
omitted]). The statute thus prioritizes cleanup and response
costs while still ensuring full recovery. This approach also
guards against double recovery for environmental contamination.
See Guaranty-First Trust Co., 416 Mass. at 338. See
also Mailman's Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp. v. Lizotte, 415 Mass.
865, 870 (1993) ("Recovery of duplicative damages under multiple
counts of a complaint is not allowed"). 13
b. The statutes of limitations of §§ 4, 4A, and 5. The
statute of limitations for a private cause of action under G. L.
c. 21E is governed by G. L. c. 21E, § 11A. Prior to 1992, G. L.
c. 21E did not include a statute of limitations, and
Massachusetts courts were left to determine which existing
statutes of limitations applied to G. L. c. 21E claims.
See Oliveira v. Pereira, 414 Mass. 66, 72-73 (1992) (pre-1992
action brought under G. L. c. 21E, § 4, fell under statute of
limitations for torts, G. L. c. 260, § 2A). In 1992, G. L.
c. 21E underwent significant reform, including the enactment of
13 As explained above, the statute prioritizes cleanup over calculating the property damage that will remain after such cleanup has been completed. The statute therefore disallows the conversion of future cost recovery expenses under §§ 4 and 4A into claims for present property damages under § 5. Black v. Coastal Oil New England, Inc., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 461, 465-466 (1998) ("diminution in value analysis generally has no place in assessing the cost of remediation for temporary injury" [footnote omitted]). 20
§ 11A. See St. 1992, c. 133, §§ 271-313. According to the
department, § 11A was added as part of this reform to "more
comprehensively establish statutes of limitations for actions
filed under [G. L. c.] 21E." See Department of Environmental
Protection, The Massachusetts Oil & Hazardous Materials Release,
Prevention & Response Act, 1992 Amendments to Chapter 21E (July
22, 1992).
As discussed, § 11A must be analyzed within the context of
G. L. c. 21E and the MCP. Taygeta Corp., 436 Mass. at 226.
Chapter 21E provides multiple causes of action, and § 11A sets
out different statutes of limitations for each one. Because
G. L. c. 21E prioritizes cleanup, and cleanup under the MCP can
take many years, the statute of limitations for causes of action
that support such cleanup is generous. Specifically, for claims
brought under § 4 or 4A, the suit need only be filed within
three years of the latest of four events, one of which is the
date when the plaintiff has "incur[red] all response costs."
G. L. c. 21E, § 11A (2). Thus, a plaintiff who has conducted
remediation activities can bring suit up to three years after he
or she finishes remediating the property.
Individuals who intend to bring a claim under § 5 (a) (iii)
must do so within three years of when they discover or
reasonably should have discovered the damage and the party
liable under G. L. c. 21E for such damage. Taygeta Corp., 436 21
Mass. at 226. Here, the relevant question is whether the word
"damage" in § 11A (4) refers specifically to damage under § 5,
that is, damages that cannot be cured and compensated by the
cleanup and cleanup cost recovery processes defined by the MCP
and §§ 4 and 4A, such that the limitations period does not begin
to run until the plaintiff knows there is residual damage not
subject to such remediation and compensation. We conclude that
the reference to damages in both provisions refers to the same
residual claim. 14
As discussed, a plaintiff suffers damage within the meaning
of § 5 (a) (iii) if there is damage that is not curable through
the cleanup and cleanup cost recovery process defined by the MCP
and §§ 4 and 4A. Thus, if a plaintiff is to have notice of a
claim under § 5 for statute of limitations purposes, the
plaintiff must have knowledge that he or she suffered damage
that is not curable by the MCP remediation process. See Olsen
v. Bell Tel. Labs., Inc., 388 Mass. 171, 175 (1983) ("[T]he
court has been guided by the principle that a plaintiff should
be put on notice before his or her claim is barred by the
passage of time"). Such notice is generally not provided until
14 We note that the MCP provides no express guidance on the meaning of § 11A (4), as the MCP does not address suits initiated by private individuals. 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.1201(3) (2014). Nor does the MCP address suits initiated by the Commonwealth for damage to property. See 310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 40.0002(5), 40.1201(1) (2014). 22
the MCP process is sufficiently advanced to identify residual
property damage.
This understanding of the statute also comports with the
over-all statutory scheme, which imposes deadlines for assessing
the extent of a site's damage. See Taygeta Corp., 436 Mass. at
227 ("An interpretation of the statute of limitations that
imposes on plaintiffs an obligation to investigate their
property in advance of a defendant's completion of the requisite
assessment would be contrary to the statutory and regulatory
scheme"). The liable party is required to determine the full
extent of the damage in its Phase II report, and analyze and
choose from among the available remedies in its Phase III
report. 310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 40.0835(4)(b), 40.0853 (2014).
It would make little sense to require a plaintiff to
independently determine whether residual property damage exists
prior to the completion of those reports. See Taygeta Corp.,
436 Mass. at 227 ("There is nothing unreasonable in a
plaintiff's decision not to go forward with an assessment
duplicating the work that the defendant is already obligated to
perform"). 15
15 As claims of loss of use are tied to the "period of time reasonably necessary to repair the damage," these claims are also dependent on the remediation process. Guaranty-First Trust Co., 416 Mass. at 333, 339. The Phase II and Phase III reports required pursuant to the MCP therefore lend necessary clarity to such claims as well. For this reason, and to avoid splitting 23
Adopting this understanding of the statute of limitations
for claims under § 5 (a) (iii) also provides a "prescribed and
predictable period of time" within which such claims would be
time barred. Olsen, 388 Mass. at 175. A Phase III report must
be submitted within four years of the site's tier
classification. 16 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0560(2)(c) (2014).
Accordingly, a plaintiff will typically know whether he or she
has a cognizable claim under § 5 (a) (iii) within five years of
notifying the department of the contamination.
Requiring claims under § 5 to be filed before it is clear
whether there is any residual damage not curable pursuant to the
MCP cleanup process would also make little sense. If the
limitations period for § 5 begins as soon as a plaintiff learns
of contamination, he or she could be forced to bring suit before
knowing whether there is a cognizable claim under § 5 (a) (iii).
Plaintiffs would be put in the difficult position of choosing
between whether to sue immediately, and potentially recover
nothing, or to wait for more information, and potentially find
their claim under § 5 time barred. This makes even less sense
claims under § 5, the statute of limitations for claims under § 5 should be uniformly defined. 16 A site must undergo a tier classification within one year of notifying the department of the release of hazardous materials or one year of the department issuing a notice of responsibility, whichever is earlier. 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.0404(3) (2014). 24
when plaintiffs may also have a claim under § 4 or 4A that could
be brought years later, including after the remediation process
is completed. Requiring plaintiffs to bring a claim under § 5
(a) (iii) early in the assessment and remediation process,
before clarification of whether there is residual property
damage, and certainly any realistic understanding of the extent
of that damage, would therefore be wasteful for both the parties
and the court system.
The city contends that this case is "functionally
identical" to the facts in Taygeta Corp., and that Taygeta Corp.
subverts this interpretation of § 11A (4). We disagree. In
that case, hazardous materials migrated from the defendant's
property to the plaintiff's property by way of subsurface
groundwater contamination. Taygeta Corp., 436 Mass. at 219-220,
228. We held that the statute of limitations did not begin to
run until the plaintiff had received test results indicating
that its groundwater was contaminated and resembled groundwater
samples taken from the defendant's property. Id. at 228.
However, the record in Taygeta Corp. indicates that both parties
stipulated prior to trial that the plaintiff's property suffered
permanent damage. Thus, the central issue was not whether the
damage was not reasonably curable by repair, but whether a
plaintiff's suspicions about possible contamination created a
duty to investigate that could trigger the limitations period. 25
Additionally, our decision in Taygeta Corp. stressed the
importance of the MCP process for identifying the appropriate
trigger for the statute of limitations, a principle we reaffirm
today. See id. at 225-227.
In the instant case, no one had knowledge of whether the
damage was reasonably curable more than three years before the
plaintiffs filed suit. The initial soil test results that
notified the plaintiffs of the contamination found hazardous
materials only in one of the two soil samples, indicating the
contamination may have been limited to that stockpile location.
Even after attempting a limited removal action, the
association's licensed site professional indicated that the
extent of the contamination was unknown. At best, the city
learned of the scope of the contamination, and that such
contamination could not be fully remediated, when the
geophysical report was completed, sixteen months before the
plaintiffs filed suit. That information was not available to
the plaintiffs until the city submitted its Phase II and Phase
III reports, four months before the plaintiffs filed suit.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' suit was timely as a matter of
law. 17
17 Because we conclude that the plaintiffs' § 5 (a) (iii) claim was timely as a matter of law, we need not address the plaintiffs' argument that the jury instructions on the burden of persuasion were in error. 26
3. Conclusion. For the reasons discussed, we hold that as
a matter of law the plaintiffs' claim under § 5 (a) (iii) was
not time barred. The judgment is vacated, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.