Granado v. Sentry Insurance

599 N.W.2d 62, 228 Wis. 2d 794, 1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 713
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedJune 15, 1999
Docket98-3675-FT
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 599 N.W.2d 62 (Granado v. Sentry Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Granado v. Sentry Insurance, 599 N.W.2d 62, 228 Wis. 2d 794, 1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 713 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

HOOVER, J.

We are presented with the question whether Reuben Granado timely filed a summons and complaint given to the clerk of circuit court at his home at 9:30 p.m. on the last day of the limitations. 1 Granado appeals a circuit court judgment dismissing his complaint against Sentry Insurance and Younkers Inc. on the grounds that it was not timely filed. Granado contends that the clerk has the necessary power and authority to determine when and where to accept papers for filing and that the filing was proper in this instance.

We hold that the legislature intended that a pleading is filed when it is properly deposited with the clerk. *797 The legislature has set forth certain guidelines establishing the time and place for the clerk to perform his or her duties. Although clerks as elected constitutional officers have some discretion in performing their duties, that discretion is tempered by these legislative prescriptions. We look on a case-by-case basis to the circumstances surrounding the delivery of the papers in conjunction with our concern that papers not be filed in a manner that gives rise to unpredictability or the potential for abuse to determine whether a paper has been "properly deposited." We conclude that the summons and complaint have not been properly filed because they were deposited in a manner too far removed from the legislative guidelines. Because the filing was improper, we affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint.

The facts are undisputed. On June 18, 1995, Granado allegedly fell and sustained injuries at the Younkers store in Green Bay. On June 18, 1998, Granado's attorney called Paul Janquart, the Brown County clerk of court, after the clerk's office had closed and made arrangements to deliver the papers to Jan-quart at his home. Granado's attorney hand delivered the summons and complaint to Janquart at 9:30 p.m. Janquart wrote "Received: 6/18/98," and signed and dated the complaint on June 18, but it was not stamped "Filed" until June 19.

Younkers moved to dismiss on the grounds that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the statute of limitations had expired. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the summons and complaint were not filed with the clerk until June 19, after the statute of limitations had run.

The statute of limitations period for personal injury actions is three years. Section 893.54, Stats. *798 Once the limitation period expires, both the right and the remedy are extinguished. Section 893.05, STATS. Granado concedes that if the complaint was filed on June 19, it was untimely and the action should be dismissed. Conversely, Younkers agrees that if the summons and- complaint is determined to have been filed on June 18, it was filed timely for limitations purposes.

We review the trial court's decision to dismiss de novo. Town of Eagle v. Christensen, 191 Wis. 2d 301, 311-12, 529 N.W.2d 245, 249 (Ct. App. 1995). Resolution of the issues presented involves statutory interpretation, which we also review de novo. Coutts v. Wisconsin Retire. Bd., 209 Wis. 2d 655, 663, 562 N.W.2d 917, 921 (1997).

When read together, §§ 893.02, 801.02, and 801.06(1), Stats., plainly indicate that an action is commenced when the summons and complaint are filed with the clerk. Section 893.02 defines when an action is commenced for statute of limitations purposes. It states, in pertinent part: "An action is commenced, within the meaning of any provision of law which limits the time for the commencement of an action, as to each defendant, when the summons naming the defendant and the complaint are filed with the court

Section 801.02(1), STATS., governs commencement of a personal injury action. It provides:

A civil action in which a personal judgment is sought is commenced as to any defendant when a summons and a complaint naming the person as defendant are filed with the court, provided service of an authenticated copy of the summons and of the *799 complaint is made upon the defendant under this chapter within 90 days after filing.

Section 801.16(1), Stats., provides that "[t]he filing of pleadings . . . with the court as required by these statutes shall be made by filing them with the clerk of circuit court."

The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 N.W.2d 100, 103 (1997). To achieve this goal, we first resort to the statute's plain language. Id. In the absence of statutory definitions, this court construes all words according to their common and approved usage, which may be established by dictionary definitions. Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 45, 50 (1995). In addition, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that effect is to be given to a statute's every word, if possible, so that no portion is rendered superfluous. Lake City Corp., 207 Wis. 2d at 162, 558 N.W.2d at 103. When construing a statute, we examine the language in question in the context of the statute as a whole. See General Castings Corp. v. Winstead, 156 Wis. 2d 752, 758, 457 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Ct. App. 1990). It is also a fundamental rule of statutory construction that any absurd or unreasonable result must be avoided. Id. at 759, 457 N.W.2d at 561. If a statute's meaning is clear from its language, we are prohibited from looking beyond such language to ascertain its meaning. Id. The statutes we previously examined do not address what it means to file a pleading. The parties would have us resolve this case by determining the extent of the clerk's discretion as to when and where papers are accepted. Granado asserts that the clerk is a duly elected constitutional officer *800 and has unfettered discretion to decide where and when to accept papers. Younkers responds that the legislature has "specifically prescribed where and during what hours the clerk of court's record keeping duties shall take place." Given the legislature's action, Younkers asserts that the clerk has no discretion as to where and when papers may be accepted. It also contends that under St. John's Home v. Continental Cas. Co., 150 Wis. 2d 37, 441 N.W.2d 219 (1989), the pleading must be received by the end of business hours to be filed on that date. 2 To resolve this dispute, we look at the clerk's power and authority.

The clerk of circuit court is a constitutional officer.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
599 N.W.2d 62, 228 Wis. 2d 794, 1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 713, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/granado-v-sentry-insurance-wisctapp-1999.