Gran Teejai D. Bumagat v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 13-24-00376-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00376-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

GRAN TEEJAI D. BUMAGAT, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT OF SAN PATRICIO COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron

Appellant Gran Teejai D. Bumagat filed a pro se motion to dismiss this appeal on

December 12, 2024. On October 23, 2024, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, and a motion to withdraw with this Court.

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The voluntary dismissal of a criminal appeal is governed by Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 42.2. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2. Under this rule, the appellate court

may dismiss an appeal if the appellant and his or her attorney files and signs a motion to

dismiss. See id. R. 42.2(a). Rule 42.2 does not provide for the voluntary dismissal of a

criminal appeal in the absence of such a motion. See id. However, on our own initiative,

if we find good cause, we may suspend the requirements of Rule 42.2 in a particular case

to order a different procedure. See id. R. 2; Conners v. State, 966 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d).

Appellant’s pro se motion to dismiss contains his signature but it is not signed by

his attorney. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2(a) (requiring a motion to dismiss to contain both

the appellant’s and his or her attorney’s signature). However, Rule 42.2 is designed to

protect an appellant from having their attorney dismiss the appeal without their consent.

See Conners, 966 S.W.2d at 110. Appellant states in his motion that he understands the

ramifications of dismissing his appeal, he discussed with his counsel “that there are no

arguable grounds . . . to support an appeal of [his] cause,” and after his careful

consideration, he desires to dismiss this appeal. We therefore conclude that good cause

exists to suspend the requirements of Rule 42.2. See Hendrix v. State, 86 S.W.3d 762,

763 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (per curiam) (suspending the requirements of Rule

42.2 to dismiss an appeal); Conners, 966 S.W.2d at 110–11 (same); see also Smith v.

State, No. 13-24-00517-CR, 2025 WL 1189163, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Apr. 24, 2025, no pet.) (same).

2 Upon receiving an Anders brief, we typically must conduct a full examination of all

the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75, 80 (1988). In light of appellant’s pro se motion to dismiss, we decline to perform

a review of the record. Accordingly, without passing on the merits of the case, we grant

appellant’s pro se motion to dismiss, grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and dismiss the

appeal. Having dismissed the appeal at the appellant’s request, no motion for rehearing

will be entertained.

JENNY CRON Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 26th day of June, 2025.