Graham v. State of Nevada

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided September 5, 2024·No. 2:24-cv-00790·Unknown

Opinion

SANKONA GRAHAM, Case No. 2:24-cv-00790-ART-DJA

Plaintiff, ORDER v. STATE OF NEVADA, et al., Defendants. Pro se plaintiff Sankona Graham brings this civil-rights action to redress constitutional violations that he allegedly suffered while he was incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”). Graham has applied to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 6). Based on the financial information provided, the Court finds that Graham is unable to prepay the full filing fee in this action. On June 18, 2024, this Court screened Graham’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), allowing certain specified claims to proceed, dismissing other claims without prejudice, and dismissing the remaining claims with prejudice. (ECF No. 25). The Court stayed this action for 90 days and referred it to the Court’s Inmate Early Mediation Program. (Id.) The parties did not reach a settlement at the mediation conference. (ECF No. 43). The Court thus grants Graham’s in forma pauperis application, orders service upon the defendants, lifts the stay, and addresses many of Graham’s pending motions for relief.1

1 This order does not address Graham’s motions seeking injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 35, 38), reconsideration of the screening order (ECF No. 27), or relief regarding the mediation conference (ECF No. 44). A. Motion to seal (ECF No. 22) Graham moves to seal “information of declarants[,]” vaguely arguing that “declarants are now being targeted for providing testimony and threatened to fix it by hurting or discrediting plaintiff.” (ECF No. 22). The only declarant’s information that Graham clearly identifies in his motion is the declaration of Jimmy Burgos. (See id.) Graham filed the declaration of fellow inmate Jimmy Burgos in support of his first amended complaint and motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 19). The Court has reviewed Burgos’s declaration, which states that certain corrections officers have retaliated against him and failed to protect him and other inmates while he was incarcerated at Ely State Prison (“ESP”). (Id.) The Court has disregarded the first amended complaint and denied the motions associated with non-party Burgos’s declaration. (See ECF No. 25). And it finds that Burgos’s privacy interest in reports of officer misconduct is a compelling reason to currently seal his declaration from the public’s view. See Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining the good-cause and compelling-reason standards for sealing judicial records and documents); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying the compelling-reasons standard to exhibits to an injunctive-relief motion that is “more than tangentially related to the merits of [the] case”); accord Nev. LR IA 1-5 (c), (d) (explaining that documents filed under seal must be served on opposing attorneys or pro se parties unless the moving party provides an affidavit showing good cause why that should not happen). Accordingly, the motion to seal is granted in part as to sealing Burgos’s declaration from the public’s view and denied in all other respects. Shortly before the Court screened the SAC, Graham filed a motion asking for a screening order, and he filed a separate motion supporting his earlier-but unsuccessful motions seeking the same relief. (ECF Nos. 23, 24). These motions are moot and procedurally improper. This Court’s general order governing pro se inmate non-habeas civil-rights filings instructs that “[n]o party may file a motion if he or she has another motion on the same subject matter already pending before the Court.” General Order No. 2021-05 at 5. “Motions submitted in violation of this General Order may be struck or may be summarily denied.” (Id.) “When a motion is filed, the opposing party may file one response, usually an opposition.” Id. at 4. “After a response to a motion is filed, the party who filed the motion may file a reply in support of the motion.” Id. But “[n]o other documents, such as supplements or responses to the reply, may be filed unless the Court grants permission to do so.” Id. “Parties must not use notices or letters to ask the Court to rule on a motion.” Id. And “[t]he parties may not file evidence with the Court until the course of litigation brings the evidence into question. (ECF No. 2 at 3). Graham is advised that his habit of filing new motions that are, in substance, identical to motions he has already filed; filing motions seeking updates or immediate action on matters that are already pending before the Court; and filing notices and exhibits that are really just unauthorized supplements to existing motions, will not increase the speed with which the Court is able to proceed in this case. The Court has a heavy docket. And Graham’s repetitive and borderline frivolous filings only slow the pace of this litigation by requiring the Court’s attention and consideration of small and secondary matters instead of the central issues in this case. Graham is warned that neither his status as a pro se nor an indigent litigant will dissuade the Court from Accordingly, the motions for a screening order are denied. C. Motion for a free copy (ECF No. 28) Graham moves the Court to provide him a free file-stamped copy of the emergency motion for a preliminary injunction and/or protective order that was filed at ECF No. 21. (ECF No. 28). Graham argues that he needs a free copy of ECF No. 21 because he’s not sure if the documents filed at ECF Nos. 18 and 19 were correctly scanned by the prison’s law library, so he mailed a duplicate injunctive-relief motion and exhibits to the Court as a protective measure. The duplicate motion and exhibits were filed at ECF No. 21. This motion is moot, and Graham is not entitled to the relief he seeks. The Court has already explained that it received two complete copies of the injunctive-relief motion and exhibits, and it denied both motions on their identical merits. (See ECF No. 25 at 34–35). If Graham wishes to receive copies of documents or files from the Court, the cost is $0.50 per page. 28 U.S.C. § 1914; Nev. LR IC 1-1(i)(5) (e-filing institutions); Nev. LR 10-1 (mail institutions). Although Graham should not mail documents to the Court for filing because he is housed at an e-filing institution, if he wishes to receive a file-stamped copy of such documents, then he must include an “additional copy for that purpose in [his] mail filing.” (See ECF No. 2 at 2). Accordingly, the motion for a free file- stamped copy of ECF No. 21 is denied. D. Motion for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 31) A litigant does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights actions. Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” But the court will appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants only in “exceptional circumstances.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). “When determining whether on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (cleaned up). “Neither of these considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together.” Id. Graham moves the Court to find and appoint him a

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