Graham v. Spivey

133 S.W.2d 460, 175 Tenn. 145, 11 Beeler 145, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 24
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 25, 1939
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 133 S.W.2d 460 (Graham v. Spivey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Graham v. Spivey, 133 S.W.2d 460, 175 Tenn. 145, 11 Beeler 145, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. 1939).

Opinion

Mr. Justice McKinney

delivered the opinion of the Court.

By his original bill complainant seeks specific performance of a contract for the sale of his farm in Marion 'County to defendant.

It is averred in the bill that defendant owns and operates a hosiery mill at Dayton, Tennessee, and that he was desirous of moving same to South Pittsburg, Tennessee; that he also owns farms along the Tennessee River near Dayton, Tennessee, which will be inundated by the waters of Chickamauga Dam under construction by the Tennessee Valley Authority, and that defendant has negotiated the sale of said farms to the Tennessee Valley Authority. The bill then alleges the following:

“In this situation said Warren R. Spivey negotiated with PI. A. Griffith, of South Pittsburg, Tennessee, for the removal of his hosiery mill from Dayton, Tennessee, to South Pittsburg, Tennessee. Pie also desired to buy a farm near South Pittsburg, Tennessee.
“H. A. Griffith, on behalf of himself and other business *147 interests at South. Pittsburg desired to secure the removal of the hosiery mill to South Pittsburg. To this end he undertook to find for defendant Spivey a farm near South Pittsburg.
“Your complainant owns a large farm along the Tennessee River opposite South Pittsburg, in Marion County, Tennessee, and learning of the fact that defendant Spivey was in the market for a farm, authorized H. A. Griffith, as his agent, to offer his farm for sale to defendant Spivey.”

It is then averred that after inspecting the properties defendant entered into a written contract with Griffith, same being in the form of a letter, which was accepted, and is as follows:

“South Pittsburg, Tennessee, Feby. 14th, 1938.
“Mr. W, R. Spivey,
“Dayton, Tennessee.
“Dear Mr. Spivey:
“Acting for myself and those I represent, with which situation you are familiar, I make you the following offer :
“To sell that portion of the J. H. Graham farm lying south and west of the Ferry Road and the Long Island Road for the sum of $34,000.00 cash, you to assume the payment of the 1938' taxes on the same, but immediate possession of the premises to be delivered to you, Graham to reserve to himself the benefit of such damages to the same as the T. Y. A. has now determined to take as shown by the present plans and surveys, but any additional taking, to go to you.
“You are to remove you hosiery mill from Dayton to South Pittsburg on the following terms and conditions :
“You are to have the use of the property known as the *148 Ingersoll Building, situated on the East side of Cedar Avenue for two years free of rent, but you are to pay the taxes assessed against said real estate for the two years and to pay fire insurance premiums for this period, hut you are to have an option to buy the same premises within or at the expiration of said period for a price of $5,000.00. If not purchased, you agree to surrender the building at the expiration of this period in as good condition as it now is.
“The City of South Pittsburg and the County are to free your hosiery mill of tax assesssment for five years for ad valorem taxes.
“You are to have the option to purchase the home known as the R. F. M. Kirkpatrick place at the price of $4,000.00 if you wish, but this option must be immediately exercised or within such time as it is possible for you to inspect it.
“We are to pay the cost of removing your hosiery machinery from Dayton to South Pittsburg, this to cover transportation only.
“Yours very truly,
“IT. A. Griffith.
“Accepted: Warren R. Spivey”

Complainant tendered a deed to defendant which he declined to accept; whereupon the bill herein was filed.

It is not claimed that Griffith and his undisclosed associates offered to comply with the other provisions of the contract, and it is conceded that the city and the county cannot release taxes on a hosiery mill operated in South Pittsburg for a period of five years. But counsel for complainant contend that this is a divisible contract which may be enforced as to the farm, regardless of the other provisions thereof.

The bill was demurred to upon numerous grounds, *149 the fourth and seventh of which were sustained by the chancellor and the hill dismissed. These grounds of the demurrer are as follows:

“IV. There is no offer to perform, or showing of performance, of the various provisions contained in the alleged contract by the parties, other than this defendant, purported to be bound thereby.”
“VII. The section in the alleged contract providing for the exemption from tax assessment for a period of five years of the hosiery mill by the City of South Pitts-burg and the County of Marion, is illegal, void and un-enforcible. This provision of the contract is an integral and non-severable part thereof and the illegality of this portion of said contract results in rendering the entire contract null, void and unenforcible.”

In Barnes Bros. v. Coal Co., 101 Tenn., 354, 357, 47 S. W., 498, 499, the court quoted approvingly from 1 Ency. Pl. & Pr., 150, 152, note 1, as follows: “Whether a contract is entire or separable into several independent contracts depends upon the intention of the parties, to be ascertained from the language employed and the subject-matter of the contract.”

We have found no better statement as to when a contract is entire and when severable than that contained in the opinion in Coleman v. Hudson, 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed), 463, 466, which is as follows:

“An entire contract in its legal interpretation, is an unconditional agreement for the whole of the several articles, or number, or quantity of goods contracted for; and precludes by its terms, and equally by the plain intention of the parties, all idea of divisibility: a severable contract on the other hand, in its terms, implies an apportionment. ’ ’

*150 In New River Lbr. Co. v. Tennessee Ry. Co., 145 Tenn., 266, 293, 238 S. W., 867, 875, it is said:

“. . . Specific performance of illegal contracts will not fie decreed fiy a conrt of equity. 36 Cyc., 546, and cases cited. Nor does an action for damages lie for redress of tlie breach of such contracts.
“In this state, if donfit is thrown upon the existence of a legal contract, specific performance thereof will not fie enforced. Morrison v. Searight, 63 Tenn. (4 Baxt.), 476.”

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Hamilton National Bank v. Richardson
304 S.W.2d 504 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1957)

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Bluebook (online)
133 S.W.2d 460, 175 Tenn. 145, 11 Beeler 145, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/graham-v-spivey-tenn-1939.