Graham v. Plano Manuf'g Co.

33 F. 917, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2205
CourtUnited States Circuit Court
DecidedFebruary 20, 1888
StatusPublished

This text of 33 F. 917 (Graham v. Plano Manuf'g Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Graham v. Plano Manuf'g Co., 33 F. 917, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2205 (uscirct 1888).

Opinion

Blodgett, J.

The bill in this case charges the defendants with the infringement of letters patent No. 74,312, granted February 11, 18(58, to Alvaro B. Graham for an “'improvement in harvesters.” Infringement is charged of the first and second claims of the patent, which describe and cover the device by which the finger-bar is made to rise and fall at either end, and rock forward or backward, independently of the gearing carriage, while maintaining its connection with it. The first claim is for the device shown, whereby the finger-beam is enabled to rise and fall at either end, and rock forward or backward independently of the gearing-carriage; and the second claim covers this device, together with a lever by which the finger-beam may he rooked by the driver or operator of the machine, for the purpose of setting its guard-fingers at any desirable inclination to the horizontal line. The defenses interposed are: (1) Want of pateniable novelty. (2) Public use of the device for more than two years before the patent in question was applied for. (3) That defendants do not in fringe.

This patent has been twice before this court—First in the case of Graham v. Gammon, in July, 1877, where the controversy was as to the validity of the claims nowin question, (reported 7 Biss. 490;) and, second, in Graham v. McCormick, 10 Biss. 39, 11 Fed. Rep. 859, whore the same claims wore in controversy: and in the Eastern district of Wisconsin, in the case of Graham v. Manufacturing Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 138, decided by his honor Judge Dyer, in October, 1880, involving a controversy over the same claims. The defense in this case has made an exhaustive presentation in their proofs of the prior art covered by these two claims, and also several cases of alleged prior use of the devices for more than two years [918]*918before the patent was applied for. It seems to me, in view of the thorough and careful examination which this patent has heretofore received from this and other courts, that the only questions left open for consideration in this case are, that of infringement, and whether the defendants have "shown by the proof any substantially different state of facts upon the question of novelty than -was shown in the earlier litigation. It is true that a larger number of exhibits of formei»patents, illustrating the condition of the prior art, are introduced in this case than were introduced or considered in the former cases; but I see nothing in the additional exhibits, patents, models, and drawings offered in this case which is, or can be treated as, anything but mere cumulative evidence; and nothing which seems to me to any more nearly anticipate the devices here in question than were shown in the Dolph, Zug, Ball, Bartlett, and Bramer devices, considered in the former cases» The Bramer patent having been considered by Judge Dyer in the Manufacturing Co. Case, and it appearing in this case that while the Bramer patent is not alluded to in the opinion in Graham v. McCormick, yet it was brought to the attention of the court, on a motion for rehearing, and strenuously pressed as an anticipation of the complainant’s device, and yet, notwithstanding this exhibition of the Bramer patent, the motion for rehearing was denied, a fact of much cogency to my mind, in view of my knowledge ot the exceedingly thorough and cautious methods of the late circuit judge of this circuit, before whom Graham v. McCormick was heard. In regard to all the testimony in this case illustrating the state of the art in the field to which the complainant’s invention belongs, both that which has been passed upon in the former cases and that which is brought forward for the first time in this case, it may be said that a review of this proof, in the light of what Graham did, shows that several inventors, who preceded him in point of time, groped about, or approximated to his device, and it is now comparatively easy, with the Graham machine before us, to make a Graham machine out of several of these older efforts in that direction; but the fact seems to me to remain unshaken, by the proof in this ease, as it did in the former cases, that none of them accomplished the result obtained by his invention, or made a machine organized and intended to secure that result by the means which he adopted and described. In other words, Graham seems to me to have been the first to embody, in a practical working machine, the device covered by his patent. A mere mechanic, with a Graham machine before him, may, without invention, now so alter and improve some of the clumsy attempts at the same object in the older art as to make these machines do what Graham’s machine does; but they need the instruction of the Graham device to make these old machines a success. Graham achieved success, while his predecessors in the field had failed.

In the former litigation no attempt was made to defeat the patent by showing prior use for the term of two years before the patent ivas applied for, except use by the patentee himself, and this use was held to be only experimental; and it becomes necessary, for a moment, to consider the cases of prior use which are shown in this record. There are [919]*919three instances of snob alleged prior use presented and relied upon by the defendants: First. What is known as the Bradley machine, which is claimed to have been manufactured and sold by the firm of C. C. Bradley & Son, or the Bradley Manufacturing Company, at Syracuse, N. Y., in 1863 and 1864. In regard to this machine it is sufficient to say that the proof is not satisfactory, to my mind, that it was made and in use prior to the invention of Graham. Second. That it does not, as illustrated by the model produced in evidence, show the free rocking movement wliich is provided for and obtained in the complainant’s patent. And, thirdly, that whatever ivas contained in this Bradley machine was hut an experiment, which was abandoned after a trial of a couple of seasons, and the experiments were never carried so far as to produce an acceptable and practical device, like that covered by the complainant’s patent. The proof in this case shows that 0. 0. Bradley & Sons were manufacturers of harvesting machines at Syracuse, N. Y., under a license from Mr. M. G. Hubbard, the inventor and patentee of the main features of their machines: that in 1862 Hubbard invented tlie tilting and rocking device which the Bradleys claimed was embodied in the machine now urged as an anticipation of this patent, and yet the proof shows that neither Hubbard nor Bradley ever patented this device; and that, after using it for two seasons, it was abandoned, and none thereafter made. With the knowledge that this court has acquired, by long experience, of the characteristics of inventors and manufacturers, I can hardly deem it probable that if Hubbard had made the improvement shown in the Bradley model he would not have secured it by letters patent; as Bradley was at that time ¡laying him a royalty on all machines manufactured, and this feature was certainly a new and useful improvementworthy of a ¡latent at that time.

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Related

Graham v. McCormick
11 F. 859 (N.D. Illinois, 1880)
Graham v. Gammon
10 F. Cas. 921 (U.S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illnois, 1877)

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Bluebook (online)
33 F. 917, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2205, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/graham-v-plano-manufg-co-uscirct-1888.