Graff 226507 v. Shinn

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 14, 2022
• Docket: 4:19-cv-00588
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Bryan Scott Graff, No. CV-19-00588-TUC-RCC

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 David Shinn, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 On October 8, 2021, Magistrate Judge Lynette C. Kimmins issued a Report and 15 Recommendation ("R&R") recommending that this Court deny Petitioner Bryan Scott 16 Graff's Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State 17 Custody. (Doc. 27.) On October 21, 2021, Petitioner filed a written objection. (Doc. 28.) 18 Respondents filed a Response. (Doc. 29.) Upon review, the Court will deny the § 2254 19 Petition. 20 I. Standard of Review 21 The standard of review applied to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation 22 depends on whether a party files objections. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–50 23 (1985). A district court need not review "a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under 24 a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings." Id. at 150. 25 If, however, a party objects, the district court "must determine de novo any part of the 26 magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may 27 accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return 28 the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1 636(b)(1)(C). Although the district court is not required to review an issue de novo absent 2 a proper objection, the statute "does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua 3 sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard." Thomas, 474 4 U.S. at 154. 5 II. Procedural History 6 Petitioner was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and one count of 7 kidnapping in Pima County Superior Court. He received three consecutive sentences of 28 8 years, for a total of 84 years. (Doc. 27 at 1.) 9 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, and the 10 Arizona Supreme Court denied a Petition for Review. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner filed a Notice 11 for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR"). (Id.) His PCR counsel notified the court that she found 12 no colorable claim for relief, and Petitioner filed a pro se petition after the deadline. (Id.) 13 The PCR court dismissed the petition without a hearing as untimely and concluded that 14 Petitioner had not presented a colorable claim for relief because his ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit. (Id.) 15 Subsequently, the PCR court granted an extension for Petitioner to seek review of 16 its decision until September 6, 2019. (Id.) Petitioner instead filed a Petition for Review 17 with the Arizona Court of Appeals on August 16, 2019. (Id.) The Court of Appeals 18 dismissed the petition as untimely but granted leave to seek an extension in Pima County 19 Superior Court. (Id. at 2–3.) After Petitioner failed to file anything to show he had been 20 granted an extension for his appeal, the Court of Appeals issued a mandate from which the 21 Petitioner did not seek relief. (Id. at 3.) In 2019, Petitioner filed the present federal habeas 22 action and later filed an amended petition on April 23, 2020. (Id.) His amended petition 23 presented thirteen claims. (Id.) 24 III. Magistrate Judge's R&R 25 a. Claims 1–3, 5–8, and 11–13 26 The Magistrate Judge found that Claims 1–3, 5–8, and 11–13 were technically 27 exhausted and procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to fairly present the claims 28 before the state court. (Doc. 27 at 29.) These include claims that Petitioner's rights under 1 the U.S. Constitution were violated when the trial court: admitted late-disclosed DNA 2 evidence (Claim 1); admitted statements regarding Petitioner's interaction on the night of 3 the crime with a woman other than the victim (Claim 2); admitted full-body photographs 4 of Petitioner's tattoos (Claim 3); denied a competency hearing for purposes of sentencing 5 (Claim 5); and admitted the victim's identification of Petitioner (Claim 8). In addition, 6 Petitioner claimed constitutional violations when the state allegedly suppressed a doctor's 7 report that indicated the victim was intoxicated the night of the crime (Claim 11) and 8 allegedly presented perjured testimony from the victim (Claim 12); as well as claims based 9 on Petitioner's arrest (Claim 6); Petitioner's search and seizure (Claim 7); and Petitioner's 10 sentence (Claim 13). 11 Petitioner did not object to the Magistrate Judge's finding that these claims were 12 technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted. The Court finds that the Magistrate 13 Judge's conclusions are well-reasoned and agrees that Claims 1–3, 5–8, and 11–13 are 14 technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted. b. Claim 4 15 In Claim 4, Petitioner alleged that his right to a fair and impartial jury under the 5th, 16 6th, and 14th Amendments was violated after he was removed from the courtroom during 17 the aggravation phase of trial. He also alleged that two aggravating factors were not 18 supported by sufficient evidence. 19 The Magistrate Judge found that Claim 4 failed on the merits in part because there 20 is no clearly established federal law that requires the trial court to issue a warning before 21 removing a defendant from the courtroom for disruptive behavior; and, even if it were 22 constitutional error, the error was harmless because Petitioner did not identify any impact 23 his removal had on the jury's determination as to aggravation. (Doc. 27 at 17–20.) 24 Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner's claim failed as to the 25 two aggravating factors that Petitioner alleged did not have sufficient evidence: financial 26 harm to the victim and threatening to inflict serious physical injury. (Id. at 20–22.) The 27 Magistrate Judge found that, under the double deference required by AEDPA, the state 28 court's determination that there was sufficient evidence to support these two aggravating 1 factors was not objectively unreasonable. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge also concluded that 2 any error with regard to the two aggravating factors would have been harmless because the 3 trial court needed only one aggravating factor to impose the maximum sentence and the 4 jury found multiple aggravating factors apart from financial harm to the victim and 5 threatening to inflict serious physical injury. (Id. at 22.) Therefore, the Magistrate Judge 6 reasoned, the state court's denial of Petitioner's fair and impartial jury claim was not 7 objectively unreasonable. (Id.) 8 Petitioner did not object to the Magistrate Judge's findings on Claim 4.1 The Court 9 finds that the Magistrate Judge's conclusions are well-reasoned and agrees that Claim 4 10 fails on the merits. 11 c. Claim 9 12 Additionally, Petitioner alleged that his 5th Amendment right against self- 13 incrimination was violated (a) when he was arrested by police in retaliation for refusing to 14 speak with them about previous charges and (b) when he refused to testify at trial because he believed the state would use other criminal charges against him. The Magistrate Judge 15 concluded that the claim failed on the merits because Petitioner offered no factual support 16 for either subpart of Claim 9. (Doc. 27 at 22–23.) The Magistrate Judge also noted that 17 Petitioner invoked the very right he claims was violated when he chose not to speak with 18 police and chose not to testify at trial. (Id. at 22.) 19 Petitioner did not object to the Magistrate Judge's findings on Claim 9. The Court 20 finds that the Magistrate Judge's conclusions are well-reasoned and agrees that Claim 9 21 22 1 Petitioner offers a general objection to the Magistrate Judge's finding "that [his] case had 23 enough evidence to convict." (Doc. 28 at 1.) Following this statement, Petitioner describes alternate explanations for the victim's physical injuries. (Id.) The Court does not interpret 24 this as an objection to the findings on Claim 4. The Magistrate Judge did not conclude Petitioner's case had enough evidence to convict in her analysis of Claim 4. Rather, she 25 found that the state court's denial of Petitioner's claim based on two aggravating factors, including threatening to inflict serious physical injury, was not objectively unreasonable 26 based on the evidence, and that any error would have been harmless because of the other aggravating factors found by the jury. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), 27 objections must specifically indicate the findings and recommendations with which Petitioner disagrees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see also Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Wash., 350 28 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the Court will not construe Petitioner's statement as an objection to the R&R regarding Claim 4. 1 fails on the merits. 2 d. Claim 10 3 Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to (a) 4 present a doctor's report and testimony from a doctor to challenge the victim's testimony 5 as to her mental state on the night of the crime, (b) inform Petitioner of a plea offer, (c) 6 offer testimony about his prior relationship with the victim, (d) get a separate charge against 7 Petitioner dismissed, (e) keep two assault charges in one trial, (f) move for a mistrial, and 8 (g) obtain clothing evidence and video evidence. 9 The Magistrate Judge found that subparts (e) and the portion of subpart (g) that 10 relates to clothing evidence were technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted because 11 Petitioner had not fairly presented them before the state courts. (Doc. 27 at 12.) Petitioner 12 did not object to this finding. The Court finds the Magistrate Judge's conclusion is well- 13 reasoned and agrees that Claim 10(e) and 10(g), to the extent it relates to clothing evidence, 14 are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. The Magistrate Judge further concluded that subparts (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), and (g) 15 (regarding video evidence) of Claim 10 failed on the merits because Petitioner had not met 16 the standard set by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) by showing that 17 counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and caused 18 prejudice to the defendant. (Id. at 23–29.) Therefore, the Magistrate Judge found, it was 19 not objectively unreasonable for the state court to have denied Petitioner's ineffective 20 assistance of counsel claims. (Id. at 29.) 21 Petitioner objected to the Magistrate Judge's finding as to Claim 10(a) regarding the 22 doctor's report and doctor testimony. Accordingly, the Court will review Claim 10(a) de 23 novo. 24 However, as to subparts (b), (c), (d), (f), and (g), to which Petitioner has not raised 25 a specific objection, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge's conclusions are well- 26 reasoned and agrees that the claims fail on the merits because Petitioner has not met the 27 high burden to show that counsel's performance was deficient or that this deficient 28 performance resulted in prejudice to Petitioner. Therefore, the Court agrees that it was not 1 objectively unreasonable for the state court to deny these subclaims. 2 IV. § 2254 Habeas Standard 3 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the district court may grant relief for a claim that has been 4 adjudicated on the merits in state court if the state court’s decision "is contrary to, or 5 involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law" or an 6 "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 7 proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)–(2). A state court's application of federal law is 8 unreasonable if the Petitioner shows that the state court's decision was not merely erroneous 9 but "objectively unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). "A state 10 court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 11 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." 12 Harrington v. Richter, 526 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 13 652, 664 (2004)). Factual issues determined by the state court must be rebutted with clear 14 and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The district court's analysis is based on the last reasoned decision of the trial court. See Brown v. Palmateer, 15 379 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004). 16 V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard 17 To raise a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must 18 demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that petitioner was 19 prejudiced because of counsel’s deficient actions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686–90; Correll 20 v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir. 1998). There is “a strong presumption that 21 counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” 22 Carrera v. Ayers, 670 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 23 Moreover, ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a habeas petition are “doubly” 24 deferential. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not 25 whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable 26 argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. Under this deference, 27 prejudice requires a petitioner to demonstrate that there is “a reasonable probability that, 28 but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 1 different.” Id. at 104. “Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need 2 to consider the other.” Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002). 3 VI. Relevant Factual Summary 4 The victim in this case was examined by an emergency room doctor who created a 5 report in which he commented on the victim's psychiatric condition and noted that she 6 appeared "hyperactive and agitated." (Doc. 18-1 at 441.) The emergency room doctor also 7 noted the victim's history of "schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder." (Id.) The 8 victim was then evaluated by an attending surgeon whose report noted "a secondary 9 diagnosis of psychosis not otherwise specified." (Id. at 441–42.) The surgeon further noted 10 that the victim was displaying disordered thought and exhibiting memory issues. (Id. at 11 442–43.) There were also three inconsistent drug screens conducted on the victim including 12 a test that was negative for all substances, one that was positive for amphetamines, and 13 another that was positive for amphetamines as well as benzodiazepine, cocaine, and 14 opiates. (Id. at 442.) At trial, counsel sought to have these reports admitted to directly contradict the 15 victim's testimony that she was lucid on the night of the incident and helping the doctors 16 with her care at the hospital. (Id. at 434, 440–41.) The trial judge reviewed the reports and 17 discussed them with counsel; he ultimately concluded that he would not admit the reports 18 unless counsel called a witness from the hospital who participated in creating the records. 19 (Id. at 454.) 20 The record indicates that counsel made several unsuccessful attempts to get the 21 reports admitted, recognizing their potential importance in Petitioner's case. First, he tried 22 to have the reports introduced through a nurse who performed a sexual assault exam on the 23 victim. (Id. at 422–24.) He also sent investigators to the hospital in an effort to locate the 24 doctors or nurses who created the records. (Id. at 431–32, 504, 527–28.) Ultimately, the 25 only option left for counsel was to call the emergency room doctor as a hostile witness 26 because the doctor had declined to testify voluntarily. (Id. at 536.) It was counsel's 27 conclusion that "unwilling, involuntary testimony of a doctor [was] not going to be very 28 helpful to the defendant . . . ." (Id.) 1 VII. Petitioner's Objections 2 Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion on Claim 10(a) that trial 3 counsel was not ineffective under Strickland and, therefore, that it was not objectively 4 unreasonable for the state court to deny the claim. (Doc. 28.) 5 Petitioner first disagrees that his "case had enough evidence to convict." (Id. at 1.) 6 He emphasizes that his conviction was based on victim testimony that he asserts was 7 unreliable due to the victim's altered mental state and drug use, which could have been 8 corroborated best by the medical reports that were never introduced at trial. (Id.) Thus, 9 Petitioner "object[s] to the doctor not being called" and the Magistrate Judge "saying [the 10 doctor's testimony] might not weigh enough." (Id. at 1–2.) He states that the doctor's 11 testimony would have been "such a big peice [sic] of evidence that it would change the 12 outcome of the trail [sic]." (Id. at 1–2.) Furthermore, Petitioner argues that the doctor would 13 not have been a hostile witness because his "lawyer needed the doctor; [sic] to show [his] 14 salvation piece of evidence." (Id. at 2.) Upon de novo review, this Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his 15 ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the medical reports and doctor testimony. 16 He has not explained how the state court's determination that he failed to meet either prong 17 of Strickland was contrary to law or an unreasonable application of law to fact. 18 First, Petitioner has not established that trial counsel's performance was deficient. 19 As outlined above, counsel tried several avenues to introduce the medical records. He also 20 attempted to elicit the information contained in the medical records from the victim on 21 cross examination. (Doc. 18-1 at 295–300.) Under these facts, Petitioner has not overcome 22 the strong presumption that counsel's strategic decision not to call an involuntary witness 23 to introduce the records fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 24 His only argument to the contrary is Petitioner's assertion that the doctor would not have 25 been a hostile witness because the reports were instrumental to his case. This speculation 26 is insufficient to overcome the presumption that this Court must apply. 27 The Court need not address prejudice because Petitioner did not establish the first 28 prong of Strickland. Rios, 299 F.3d at 805. Nonetheless, the Court finds that Petitioner has 1 not established that counsel's failure to introduce the medical reports caused him to suffer 2 prejudice. In other words, Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that there was a 3 reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial had the jury learned of the medical 4 reports. The other evidence presented against Petitioner corroborated the victim's 5 testimony. This includes her description of the location of the crime (Doc. 18-1 at 226–31), 6 her identification of Petitioner (Id. at 231–32), her detailing of the crime and her resulting 7 injuries (Id. at 232–49), and her description of what happened afterwards as she fled the 8 scene and ran to the Circle K (Id. at 251–52). These details were all corroborated by other 9 evidence, including law enforcement who investigated the crime and found Petitioner near 10 the scene, witnesses who saw the victim running to the Circle K in the manner she 11 described, photographs and medical reports of the victim's injuries, and DNA evidence that 12 verified the presence of Petitioner's semen on the victim and the victim's blood on 13 Petitioner. 14 Moreover, the victim testified to some of the information contained in the medical reports that counsel sought to admit. Specifically, the jury heard her admit that she 15 struggled with mental health issues including bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and 16 post-traumatic stress disorder, and that she had been previously diagnosed with 17 schizophrenia. (Id. at 289–90.) They also heard her discuss her previous drug use and the 18 fact that she used heroin a few days prior to the crime and methamphetamine the day of 19 the crime. (Id. at 226, 277–78, 282, 294–95, 298–99.) Finally, the jury heard the victim 20 exhibit some difficulty recollecting the night in the hospital. (Id. at 298–99, 301.) 21 Therefore, given the weight of the other evidence and the victim's testimony on 22 cross examination regarding her mental health and drug abuse, there is a reasonable 23 probability that the jury would have convicted Petitioner even with the medical records 24 that counsel sought to introduce. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate both prongs of 25 Strickland and has thus failed to show that the state court's denial of his ineffective 26 assistance of counsel claim with regard to the doctor reports and doctor testimony was 27 unreasonable. 28 /// 1 VIII. Conclusion 2 Upon de novo review of the issues raised in Petitioner's objection to the R&R, the □□ Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's determinations and adopts the R&R. Petitioner is 4|| not entitled to relief in habeas. 5 IX. Certificate of Appealability 6 Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because 8 || reasonable persons could not “debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition || should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate 10 || to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 11 |} (2000) Ginternal quotations omitted). 12 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 13 1. Magistrate Judge Kimmins' Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED. (Doc. 14 27.) 15 2. Petitioner's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a 16 Person in State Custody is DENIED. (Doc. 1.) 17 3. The Clerk of Court shall docket accordingly and close the case file in this matter. 18 Dated this 13th day of April, 2022. 19 20 4A)

73 senior United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28

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