2016 IL App (1st) 152402 No. 1-15-2402 Opinion filed November 2, 2016
Third Division ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
LAURETTA GRADY, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 14 CH 20233 ) THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF ) Honorable HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES ) Mary L. Mikva, and JULIE HAMOS, Its Director, ) Judge, presiding. ) Defendants-Appellees. ) ) ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff Lauretta Grady appeals from the dismissal with prejudice of her complaint
seeking judicial review of an administrative decision nominally rendered by the Illinois
Department of Human Services (DHS) regarding her eligibility for a Medicaid program. In
her complaint, plaintiff named the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services
(DHFS) and its director, Julie Hamos, as defendants but not DHS or that agency’s head. On
appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint for failure to 1-15-2402
name required parties, arguing that DHFS has the statutory authority to determine questions
of Medicaid eligibility and consequently was the proper defendant. Alternatively, she
contends that if she failed to name the proper parties she was entitled to amend her complaint
to correct the error, pursuant to subsection 3-107(a) of the Administrative Review Law (735
ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2014)). For the reasons that follow, we find plaintiff failed to name
the proper defendant in her complaint but was entitled to amend her complaint. We reverse
and remand.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Plaintiff participates in the Home Services Plan, a program intended to prevent
unnecessary institutionalization of individuals, pursuant to the Traumatic Brain Injury
Medicaid Waiver Program. As part of the plan, participants take part in regular reassessments
to determine their continued eligibility and needs. Following a reassessment in June 2014,
plaintiff was assigned a plan that granted her 155 hours of medical services per month.
¶4 Subsequently, plaintiff filed an administrative appeal of the plan, seeking additional
hours for an assistant to aid with certain therapies prescribed by her doctor. An
administrative hearing was held before an officer of DHS, and the officer recommended a
new service plan with marginally increased hours. The caption atop the officer’s written
decision stated “STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,” and the
decision’s first paragraph indicated that the officer was a hearing officer for “the Department
of Human Services *** Bureau of Hearings.” The officer later noted that “the Department of
Human Services has jurisdiction” over the administrative appeal. The decision’s final page
was signed by Michelle R.B. Saddler, the secretary of DHS at the time, and indicated that
Saddler was adopting the findings and recommendations of the hearing officer. The decision
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was sent to plaintiff with a cover letter, signed by Saddler and indicating that the “Illinois
Department of Human Services reviewed” her appeal.
¶5 Alleging that the increased hours were still insufficient, plaintiff appealed the
administrative decision in a complaint filed in the Cook County circuit court on December
18, 2014. The complaint did not name DHS or Saddler as defendants; instead, it named
DHFS and its then-director, Hamos. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint without
leave to amend, arguing that DHS was a necessary party because it had issued the decision to
be reviewed. Plaintiff responded that DHFS was the agency responsible under the law for
rendering the decision to be reviewed and thus was the correct party. She also argued
alternatively that the court was required to grant her 35 days to serve the correct defendant
and that any mistake should be excused as a “good faith” error.
¶6 Before the trial court made its ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Appellate Court,
Fourth District, rendered its decision in Mannheim School District No. 83 v. Teachers’
Retirement System, 2015 IL App (4th) 140531, holding that subsection 3-107(a) of the
Administrative Review Law does not require leave to amend a complaint “to include the
agency that rendered the final decision as a defendant when an individual member of that
agency was not named.” Id. ¶ 28. Defendants were granted leave to cite Mannheim as
additional authority, and plaintiff responded that the case was wrongly decided. In a written
order, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, stating that plaintiff’s failure to
name DHS was fatal to her claim. The court also denied plaintiff leave to amend, explaining
that although it agreed that Mannheim was wrongly decided, it was bound by the Fourth
District’s holding.
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¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 Plaintiff first contends that defendants were properly named in her suit because the
Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2014)) requires the agency
“having power under the law to make administrative decisions” to be named as defendant.
Citing Gillmore v. Illinois Department of Human Services, 218 Ill. 2d 302 (2006), she argues
that “power under the law” refers solely to power under the relevant statute and that DHFS
has the statutory authority to determine Medicaid eligibility. Defendants respond that the
Administrative Review Law requires that the agency that actually issued a ruling be named
as defendant. They argue that it is clear from the record that DHS issued the determination in
question and thus DHS should have been named as defendant.
¶9 Where the circuit court has granted a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to section 2-619 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2014)), as occurred in this case, our
review is de novo. Rodriguez v. Sheriff’s Merit Comm’n, 218 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (2006). Plaintiff
raises matters of statutory interpretation, which are similarly reviewed de novo. Skaperdas v.
Country Casualty Insurance Co., 2015 IL 117021, ¶ 15.
¶ 10 When construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature’s intent through giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning.
People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 25. If the language is clear and unambiguous, a court
may not deviate from that language by inferring exceptions or conditions that the General
Assembly did not set forth. Wilkins v. Williams, 2013 IL 114310, ¶ 22. However, statutory
interpretation “cannot always be reduced to ‘the mechanical application of the dictionary
definitions of the individual words and phrases involved.’ ” People v. Wood, 379 Ill. App. 3d
705, 708-09 (2008) (quoting Whelan v. County Officers’ Electoral Board, 256 Ill. App. 3d
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555, 558 (1994)). A court should not read language in an excessively literal fashion such that
it produces an absurd construction. See id. at 709.
¶ 11 The Administrative Review Law governs all proceedings in which a party seeks judicial
review of an administrative eligibility decision under article V of the Illinois Public Aid Code
(305 ILCS 5/5-1 (West 2014)). Gilmore, 218 Ill. 2d at 314; see also 305 ILCS 5/11-8.7 (West
2014). Subsection 3-107(a) of the Administrative Review Law requires that “in any action to
review any final decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency and all
persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the
administrative agency shall be made defendants.” 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2014).
¶ 12 Section 3-101 of the Administrative Review Law sets forth the applicable definitions.
735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2014). “Administrative agency” is defined as “a person, body of
persons, group, officer, board, bureau, commission or department (other than a court or
judge) of the State, or of any political subdivision of the State or municipal corporation in the
State, having power under law to make administrative decisions.” Id. The Administrative
Review Law defines an “administrative decision” as “any decision, order or determination of
any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties
or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative
agency.” Id.
¶ 13 The Administrative Review Law clearly requires that when an individual seeks review of
an administrative agency decision, that agency must be named as a defendant. The only
natural reading of subsection 3-107(a) indicates that the phrase “the administrative agency”
that is the subject of the subsection’s requirement refers to the same entity as the phrase “an
administrative agency,” which occurs in the prepositional phrase immediately preceding it.
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See 305 ILCS 5/11-8.7 (West 2014). We must therefore conclude that “the administrative
agency” required by statute to be named a defendant is the agency that issued the challenged
decision. We note that a contrary conclusion could lead to the highly impractical result of an
agency being required to defend a decision which it took no part in making.
¶ 14 It is clear from the record that the decision plaintiff seeks to review was issued by DHS
and not DHFS. The proceedings were held before a DHS hearing officer, and the decision
itself clearly designated the DHS as the issuing body. The decision was sent to plaintiff along
with a letter indicating that her case had been reviewed by DHS. There is nothing in the
record that suggests that DHFS took any part in the challenged decision. Accordingly, DHS
was required to be named as defendant.
¶ 15 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Review Law defines an administrative agency as
an entity “having power under the law to make administrative decisions” and therefore the
administrative agency referred to in subsection 3-107(a) must be an agency having power
under the law to make the challenged administrative decisions. She then discusses at length
the legislative history of DHFS in arguing that the agency has the power under the law to
issue Medicaid eligibility decisions. In so arguing, plaintiff relies on our supreme court’s
opinion in Gilmore.
¶ 16 In Gilmore, the plaintiff sought review of a DHS decision finding her eligible for
Medicaid benefits but imposing a penalty based upon a rule promulgated by the Illinois
Department of Public Aid (DPA), the state Medicaid agency at the time. Gilmore, 218 Ill. 2d
at 304-06. The decision was signed by the DHS secretary and the DPA director and included
a cover letter stating that it was the decision of DHS and DPA. Id. at 310. Before addressing
the merits of plaintiff’s appeal, the supreme court briefly addressed DHS’s contention that
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the case must be dismissed because plaintiff had not served a copy of the complaint on DPA.
Id. at 313-15. The supreme court reviewed the Illinois Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/12-1 et
seq. (West 2002)) applicable at the time and held that DHS had the power under the law to
determine eligibility issues. Gilmore, 218 Ill. 2d at 313-15. The court explained that where
two agencies share the power to render an administrative decision, both must be made
defendants in a suit for judicial review. Id. at 314. However, noting that only DHS “had the
power to decide” plaintiff’s Medicaid eligibility, the court ruled that DPA had only endorsed
DHS’s decision pursuant to federal regulations and was therefore not a required party. Id. at
314-15.
¶ 17 We find Gilmore distinguishable from the current case. In that case, the plaintiff had
named only one of two agencies indicated on an administrative decision, and thus our
supreme court considered which of the two agencies was responsible for the decision that
both had clearly approved. In this case, there is no question of which agency rendered the
challenged decision, and therefore the analysis used by the supreme court in Gilmore is
inapposite. Accordingly we need not consider which agency ultimately had the statutory
power to address plaintiff’s eligibility. 1
¶ 18 Plaintiff also argues that her case should not have been dismissed because DHS was
acting as an agent of DHFS based upon an interagency delegation of power. See 735 ILCS
5/3-107(a) (West 2014) (“No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an *** agent ***, where the administrative
agency *** has been named as a defendant ***.”) However, this agency argument was not
raised before the trial court and is therefore forfeited. See Mabry v. Boler, 2012 IL App (1st)
1 We note, as the trial court did below, that if plaintiff truly sought to challenge defendants’ ability to render a decision as to her eligibility, she could have named DHS as defendant and challenged the decision as void. See, e.g., Crittenden v. Cook County Comm’n of Human Rights, 2013 IL 114876. -7- 1-15-2402
111464, ¶ 15 (“Generally, arguments not raised before the circuit court are forfeited and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
¶ 19 Plaintiff contends alternatively that the trial court erred in denying her request for leave to
amend her complaint and add DHS as a defendant, arguing that the language of subsection 3-
107(a) of the Administrative Review Law clearly mandates that plaintiff be allowed to
amend her complaint to add unnamed parties. Acknowledging that this argument is contrary
to the Fourth District’s recent opinion in Mannheim, plaintiff argues that this court should
reject the opinion as wrongly decided. The State responds that Mannheim was correctly
decided and that the complaint could only be amended to add an agency defendant if the head
of that agency was originally named as a defendant.
¶ 20 Subsection 3-107(a) is comprised of three paragraphs. The first, previously discussed,
sets forth the parties that must be made defendants in an action for judicial review of an
administrative decision, as well as the method of service required. 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a)
(West 2014). The second paragraph states:
“No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
based upon the failure to name an employee, agent, or member, who acted in his or
her official capacity, of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government
entity, where the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, has
been named as a defendant as provided in this Section. Naming the director or agency
head, in his or her official capacity, shall be deemed to include as defendant the
administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity that the named
defendants direct or head. No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an administrative agency, board,
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committee, or government entity, where the director or agency head, in his or her
official capacity, has been named as a defendant as provided in this Section.” Id.
Finally, the third paragraph, at issue in the case at bar, indicates:
“If, during the course of a review action, the court determines that an agency or a
party of record to the administrative proceedings was not made a defendant as
required by the preceding paragraph, then the court shall grant the plaintiff 35 days
from the date of the determination in which to name and serve the unnamed agency or
party as a defendant. The court shall permit the newly served defendant to participate
in the proceedings to the extent the interests of justice may require.” Id.
¶ 21 The Appellate Court, Fourth District, recently considered subsection 3-107(a)’s third
paragraph in Mannheim under facts similar to the case at bar. In that case, the plaintiff sought
judicial review of a decision by the Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Retirement System of
Illinois but failed to name the agency or its head as defendant. Mannheim, 2015 IL App (4th)
140531, ¶ 3. The trial court dismissed the complaint and denied the plaintiff’s motion to
amend it to include the proper defendants. Id. ¶ 7. The Fourth District held that the plaintiff
was not entitled to amend its complaint, finding that the “strict language” of subsection 3-
107(a) specifies that a plaintiff is only allowed to amend in the circumstances laid out in the
subsection’s second paragraph: “(1) the individual employee, agent, or member who acted in
his or her official capacity can be added when the plaintiff has named the administrative
agency, board, committee, or government entity ‘as provided in this section’; or (2) the
administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity can be added when the
plaintiff has named the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, ‘as provided in
this section.’ ” Id. ¶ 22 (quoting 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2012)).
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¶ 22 Plaintiff did not name DHS or its secretary as defendant in her complaint; thus under the
reasoning of Mannheim, she would not be entitled to add either entity as a defendant.
However, we decline to follow Mannheim for the following reasons.
¶ 23 First, it is clear that the Fourth District found that the reference to “the preceding
paragraph” in subsection 3-107(a)’s third paragraph was intended to direct the reader to the
subsection’s second paragraph because the court limited the subsection’s mandate to allow
amendment to the circumstances described in that paragraph. Although we acknowledge that
the court’s understanding of the phrase is a plausible reading of the statute, we do not agree
that it is the best or most natural reading. In statutory interpretation, a reviewing court must
view each phrase or part of the legislation in the context of the statute as a whole. Ultsch v.
Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 184 (2007). The phrase “the preceding
paragraph” by itself could be read to mean the immediately preceding paragraph; however,
the statute indicates that the preceding paragraph in question requires that “an agency or a
party of record to the administrative proceedings” be made a defendant. 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a)
(West 2014). Of the two paragraphs that precede this language, only the subsection’s first
paragraph details which parties are required to be named defendant. Id. By contrast, the
second paragraph sets forth no requirements but indicates two situations in which unnamed
parties cannot be the basis for a dismissal and therefore are not required to be named. See id.
Thus, we find that the legislature intended “the preceding paragraph” to refer to the
subsection’s initial paragraph, despite it not being immediately prior. Consequently, the third
paragraph’s mandate to allow amendments is not limited to the circumstances described in
the second paragraph, as the Fourth District held.
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¶ 24 This reading of “the preceding paragraph” is supported by an examination of the
legislative history of the statute. In 1995, subsection 3-107(a) consisted of only two
paragraphs, with the first paragraph being substantially similar to the current first paragraph’s
description of required parties and the second paragraph being substantially similar to the
current third paragraph. 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 1996). In 1996, the legislature amended
the subsection’s first paragraph, adding the language that currently constitutes the
subsection’s second paragraph; however, the subsection remained as two paragraphs. See
735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 1998). Thus, prior to 2008, the phrase “the preceding paragraph”
clearly referred to the statute’s first paragraph explaining the required parties. However, in
2008, the legislature amended the statute again, adding two sentences regarding service to the
first paragraph and reformatting the subsection into its current three paragraphs. See 735
ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2010). This reformatting resulted in the phrase “the preceding
paragraph” being distanced from its original referent, but there is no indication that this
stylistic restructuring was intended to substantively alter the phrase’s meaning.
¶ 25 Moreover, we note that appellate courts are not permitted to interpret statutory language
in a manner that renders any part of the statute “redundant” or “superfluous.” Citizens
Opposing Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 29. If the phrase “the
preceding paragraph” is read to limit the ability to amend to the situations found in the
second paragraph, then the third paragraph is rendered superfluous. The second paragraph of
the subsection states that naming the head of an administrative agency as a defendant “shall
be deemed to include as defendant the administrative agency.” 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West
2014). Additionally the second paragraph states that a case cannot be dismissed under either
of the circumstances listed. Id. Accordingly, it would be unnecessary to add a party already
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“deemed” to be included or to amend the complaint in circumstances that cannot lead to a
dismissal. If the third paragraph is limited by the second paragraph, as the Mannheim court
found, then a plaintiff is only permitted to amend the complaint in situations where
amendment would be unnecessary. Such a reading would impermissibly render the paragraph
superfluous.
¶ 26 Subsection 3-107(a) mandates that if a court determines that a plaintiff has failed to name
an agency or party of record as a defendant “then the court shall grant the plaintiff 35 days
from the date of the determination in which to name and serve the unnamed agency or party
as a defendant.” Id. As we find this mandate is not limited to the circumstances included in
the subsection’s second paragraph, plaintiff was entitled to amend her complaint within 35
days from the date the trial court determined that DHS was a required party. We therefore
reverse the judgment of the circuit court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice and
remand the case to the circuit court to allow plaintiff 35 days to amend her complaint to
name the required defendants and serve them.
¶ 27 CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, we find that plaintiff failed to name the correct parties as
defendants in her complaint under the Administrative Review Law but was entitled to the
opportunity to amend her complaint to name the proper parties pursuant to subsection 3-
107(a). 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2014). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
circuit court of Cook County and remand the case to allow plaintiff to amend her complaint.
¶ 29 Reversed and remanded with directions.
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