Gracie v. New-York Insurance

13 Johns. 161
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMay 15, 1816
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 13 Johns. 161 (Gracie v. New-York Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gracie v. New-York Insurance, 13 Johns. 161 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1816).

Opinion

Platt, J.

The plaintiff claims as for a total loss, under a policy of insurance upon the cargó of the ship Mary, on a voyage “at and from New-Yorlc to Antwerp; if blockaded, to a port not blockaded,” “ Warranted free from seizure, for, or ' on account of, any illicit or prohibited trade.”

On her voyage the ship was captured by an English privateer, [166]*166find carried into Portsmouth, where she was liberated by a de* 'CrcC °f admiralty, and then pursued her voyage. ■

On the 21st of July, 1807, she arrived at Antwerp, and moored off the city.

About the 1st Of September, 1807, the cargo was landed at Antwerp ; and, I think, the only question is, whether, at- the. time if.was so landed, it was under, the “ arrest, restraint,, or detain-mend1 Of the French government. . .

= By the 7th article of the Ber/tn decree, (21st of November, 1806,) it was ordained, that ■“ no vessel'coming directly fi’dm England, or from the English colonies, Or having been there since'the publication of the present decree, shall-Be received into any port.’’

To go into.a French port, for the purpose of requesting a special permission to land a cargo, upon a full explanation that the vessel had come directly from an English povt, would not be a violation of the Berlin decree, whether such application were successful Or not. For, if the French government .refused permission to land the cargo, the legal consequence was, that the vessel had a right to depart with her cargo, and seek another market; arid if permission for landing the cargo was: granted, with a full knowledge that the vessel had come from art; English port, such consent '(by, the emperor himself, as in this case) would be a revocation of that decide, in.regard to that particular ship and cargo.

The 8th article of the Berlin decree provides, accordingly, that, “ every yessel'.contravening the above clause,, by means of a '.false'declaration, shall be seized j and the Vessel and cargo confiscated,'as if they were English property.”

I can, therefore, see no ground to suppose that the cargo of the J/ary was seized and condemned fora violation of the Bertin decree ; especially as the decree of cóndémnation does not allege that ás thé cause. If the assured had committed an infraction, of the Berlin decree, why was the ship permitted to depart? The penalty of that decree.was a fiprfeiture of the vessel, as well as her cargo. ¡ ' •

It is observable, that the condemnation of this cargo was not until after the Milan decreeof the 11th of November, 1807,. although the sequestration was long before that decree.

The, Milan decree declares all foreign vessels' lawful prize« [167]*167which have submitted to be searched by an English ship, or have come from an English port. '

The fair presumption is, that, in condemning this cargo, the emperor exercised a special arbitrary power, ex post facto, inasmuch as the case of the Mary was exactly within the policy of the Milan decree, although she came into the French port fifteen months before the date of that decree.

There is, therefore, no evidence of á breach of warranty,' on the part of the assured, against “ illicit .and prohibited trade.™

. But if the landing of the cargo were the voluntary and unconstrained act of the consignees, having the free election, either to send away the cargo, or to land it, then it is clear that the defendants are not liable, because their risk terminated upon the safe and unrestrained landing of the goods insured, at the port of destination. <

That the cargo was sequestered, and, afterwards, sold by order of the French government, is Undeniable ; and the only material inquiry is resolved into a question of fact, viz. Was the seizure, or sequestration, in this case, before the landing of the cargo ?

The testimony of Richards, the master, upon his direct examination, is clear and explicit, that when the,Mary arrived in Flushing roads, there were two or three ships of war there ; that an armed force was put on board the Mary; .that they inquired of him whether he had been in England; that he informed them he had been captured and carried in there; that the armed force continued on board until the arrival of the ship at Antwerp, and until the landing of the cargo ; and that he never had the control of the ship, nor the power of directing where she should go, until after the cargo was landed ; that, on the 25th 6f August, 1807, (he understood,) permission was given to land the cargo, on condition that it should be deposited in the stores of the custom house ; and it was landed and deposited accordingly. . • -

The credit, of the master is in some degree impeached by his Confused and incoherent answers to the cross interrogatories ; but it is strongly corroborated by the testimony of Jacob Ridge-way, then American consul residing at Antwerp.

He swears, that, at the time when the Mary lay at Antwerp, with her cargo on board, there' were six other American vessels, with their cargoes, also lying there, all having, like the Mary, [168]*168touched ai an English port on their voyage to Antwerp ; that four of those vessels were consigned to himself; and the other three, including' the Mary, were consigned to David Parish 8r Co. He further swears, *i that the said vessels* which came addressed to his house, and which had touched' at English ports in their passage out, were not permitted to depart with their cargoes ; that he demanded permission for the departure of their cargoes j the .first demand w.as made to the director of the customs,, and afterwards to the emperor of France, through the medium of his -minister,, all without effect.” 'He further testifies,.that,' <?.to the best'of .his "knowledge and belief, the whole of-the cargoes of those, seven vessels were put into the depot, or custom-house stores, and were, afterward's, sold by a special order at the emperor, and the funds arising from-the sales placed in his caisse d'amortissemsnt.'' ■ , ' '

With regard to the ship Mary,. he says, “ I do. not believe it was possible for her to have departed from Antwerp, with her e,argo* for any other port, without the special, permission of the emperor of France... I do not believe that any such permission could have been obtained ; and the impression on my mind is, that the consignees (of the Mary) did make efforts to obtain such, permission.”, Mr. Ridgeway further testifies, that “ the caigo of the Aíary was deposited by Order of the directors of the customs in the depot* or custom-house stores, and under the control of the custom-house officers. The consignees could not, to the best of;his knowledge and belief, either sell or deliver said cargoand “ this cargo' was sold by special order from the empeior;” that the reason assigned by the custom-house' officers}for not permitting American vessels that.had either, been boarded- by British

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Bluebook (online)
13 Johns. 161, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gracie-v-new-york-insurance-nysupct-1816.