Grace Anderson v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJanuary 19, 2023
DocketAT-0752-17-0172-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Grace Anderson v. Department of the Army (Grace Anderson v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grace Anderson v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GRACE E. ANDERSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-17-0172-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: January 19, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Grace E. Anderson, Evans, Georgia, pro se.

Mary Rae Dudley, Fort Gordon, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 By letter dated August 15, 2016, the agency notified the appellant that she would be separated from her nonappropriated fund (NAF) position as a Child Youth Program Assistant with the agency’s Child Youth School Services (CYSS), effective August 24, 2016. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 24-25. The letter stated the reason for the appellant’s separation was that she had issued false statements and submitted false documents to the agency. Id. ¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging her separation. IAF, Tab 1. She alleged that she was treated unfairly, subjected to a hostile work environment, terminated on the basis of her race, retaliated against for being a whistleblower, and denied due process. Id. at 1-8, 10-11, 13-14, 17-18, 20, 27. Documents in the appellant’s initial appeal reference or explicitly state that she was an NAF employee. Id. at 6-8, 24, 33-36, 40-41. ¶4 The administrative judge issued an order informing the appellant of her burden of proof on jurisdiction and directing her to provide evidence and argument establishing the Board’s jurisdiction over her appeal. IAF, Tabs 5-6. After providing the parties with the opportunity to respond to the order, the 3

administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-3. The administrative judge found that the appellant was an NAF employee, and as such, she was not an “employee” with Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. Id. Because the administrative judge found that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, she declined to address the apparent untimeliness of the appellant’s appeal. Id. at 2, n.1. ¶5 The appellant filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency responded to the appellant’s petition, arguing that she did not establish Board jurisdiction over her appeal and that both the appeal and petition for review were untimely filed. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶6 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The appellant has the burden of establishing Board jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). ¶7 Under section 2105 of Title 5, the provision defining “employee” for purposes of that title, an employee paid from nonappropriated funds is, with certain exceptions not relevant here, not an “employee” for the purposes of laws administered by the Office of Personnel Management. 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c). The Board previously has found that 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c) excludes NAF employees from those employees with rights to appeal adverse actions to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). Clark v. Army & Air Force Exchange Service, 57 M.S.P.R. 43, 44-45 (1993). It is undisputed that the appellant was an NAF employee. IAF, Tabs 1, 4. Thus, the administrative judge correctly found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s removal appeal. 4

¶8 For the first time on review, the appellant suggests that the agency is not complying with three executive orders that discuss u sing plain language in Government documents. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3; Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (2011); Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,729 (1996); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993). Yet, she does not provide any argument of how these executive orders could establish Board jurisdiction over her appeal, and we find that nothing in these executive orders provides any basis for establishing Board jurisdiction over her removal. ¶9 The appellant also alludes to NAF collective bargaining agreements (CBA) without stating whether she is subject to a CBA, and without providing any argument for how any such CBA might establish Board jurisdiction. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. We find that the mere presence or lack of an NAF CBA does not provide any basis for Board jurisdiction. ¶10 In addition, the appellant renews her whistleblower retaliation and discrimination claims, asserting that her supervisors terminated her because she reported them to the union and that they also had made racial slurs against her. Id. at 9, 11-12. However, allegations of prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b), such as racial discrimination, are not an independ ent source of Board jurisdiction. Wren v. Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

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Grace Anderson v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grace-anderson-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2023.