Grabow v. MacOmb Township

714 N.W.2d 674, 270 Mich. App. 222
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 11, 2006
DocketDocket 256517
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 714 N.W.2d 674 (Grabow v. MacOmb Township) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grabow v. MacOmb Township, 714 N.W.2d 674, 270 Mich. App. 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

FER CURIAM.

Flaintiffs appeal by leave granted the circuit court’s denial of a motion for mandamus to compel defendant’s clerk to submit Mark Grabow’s application for a use variance to defendant’s zoning board of appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Flaintiffs Simonne L. Grabow and Mark H. Grabow are mother and son who own adjacent properties in Macomb Township along 25 Mile Road. Mark Grabow operates Brentwood Limousine, Inc., both *224 from his property and from a pole barn located on his mother’s property. In January, 2003, defendant’s ordinance enforcement officer initiated a misdemeanor complaint against Mark Grabow for operating his business and erecting a structure for a commercial use on land zoned for agricultural use. In July 2003, Mark Grabow applied for a use variance, submitting his application to defendant’s clerk. In August 2003 defendant’s clerk returned the application, stating that, after an analysis of applicable law by the township’s attorney, neither state statute nor township ordinance allowed defendant’s zoning board of appeals (ZBA) to grant a use variance.

In September, 2003, plaintiffs filed suit against defendant. Plaintiffs sought, among other things, a writ of mandamus to compel defendant’s clerk to accept Mark Grabow’s use variance application and that the township ZBA approve or reject it following a public hearing. In October, 2003, defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the case was not ripe for judicial review because plaintiffs did not apply to have the property rezoned for a commercial use. In November 2003, plaintiffs moved for defendant to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be issued to compel its clerk to accept and its ZBA to decide Mark Grabow’s application for a use variance. In December 2003, the trial court denied both motions and instructed plaintiffs to seek rezoning. In April 2004, following a public hearing on Mark Grabow’s application for rezoning, defendant’s board of trustees denied Mark Grabow’s application to have the property rezoned to a commercial use, but the property was rezoned to a residential use. In June 2004, plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for defendant to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be granted to compel its ZBA to accept and decide Mark *225 Grabow’s application for a use variance. The lowercourt — with no statutory analysis on the record —denied the motion, stating “there’s clearly an ambiguity as to whether or not there’s a clear legal right, based on the [Township Zoning Act, MCL 125.271 et seq.] and the case law” for granting mandamus:

The Township Enabling Act [sic] does not give the township authority to grant use variances. And I appreciate counsel’s argument that following Paragon [1] and Janson [2] [sic] it seems to assume that that right and authority does exist for townships.
However, to the extent that our Court of Appeals and Supreme Court [look] at every statute word by word and interprets them that way, and there is not a specific granting of use variance in the statute, I do believe that the writ of mandamus is not appropriate at this time. The [Janssen] case didn’t question, argue, brief, or even decide whether or not the use variance was appropriate. Although [it] certainly seem[s] to assume that in coming to the decision that [it] did. So it would be curious to see how the Court of Appeals is going to reconcile [its] text or elicit [sic] approach with the cases that have been decided recently, Paragon and [Janssen].
Also, — so to — to the extent that the mandamus is and should be issued if there’s a clear legal right, there’s clearly an ambiguity as to whether or not there is a clear legal right, based on the statute and the case law. So for that reason, I’m going to deny the writ of mandamus.

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting their motion for a writ of manda *226 mus, because state law and the township ordinance authorize use variances 3 and, as such, defendant’s clerk had a clear legal duty to accept and submit to defendant’s ZBA Mark Grabow’s application. We agree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s decision regarding a writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 443; 596 NW2d 164 (1999); however, “[w]here a central issue in the appeal involves statutory interpretation, which is a question of law, that is reviewed de novo.” Id. Because the central issue in this appeal is whether defendant’s ZBA has authority to grant a use variance under the Township Zoning Act, MCL 125.271 et seq., review de novo is proper.

B. MANDAMUS

It is well-settled that, for a writ of mandamus to issue, a plaintiff must prove he or she has “a ‘clear legal right to performance of the specific duty sought to be compelled’ and that the defendant has a ‘clear legal duty to perform such act....’” In re MCI, supra, at 442-443, quoting Toan v McGinn, 271 Mich 28, 34; 260 NW 108 (1935). The act must be ministerial, and the plaintiff must be without other adequate legal or equitable remedy. Lickfeldt v Dep’t of Corrections, 247 Mich App 299, 302; 636 NW2d 272 (2001).

*227 1. MARK GRABOW HAS A CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT TO FILE AN APPLICATION FOR A USE VARIANCE WITH THE TOWNSHIP ZBA AND THE TOWNSHIP ZBA IS UNDER A CLEAR LEGAL DUTY TO HEAR AND DECIDE MARK GRABOW’S APPLICATION FOR A USE VARIANCE

a. THE TOWNSHIP ZONING ACT

Michigan’s Township Zoning Act (TZA) authorizes a township board to “provide by zoning ordinance for the regulation of land development and the establishment of districts in the portions of the township outside the limits of cities and villages which regulate the use of land and structures . . . MCL 125.271. The TZA authorizes, among other things, a township zoning ordinance, MCL 125.273; a zoning board, MCL 125.274; and a board of appeals, MCL 125.288. The act is “the enabling statute that vests a township with the authority to regulate land use.” Sun Communities v Leroy Twp, 241 Mich App 665, 669; 617 NW2d 42 (2000), citing Addison Twp v Gout (On Rehearing), 435 Mich 809, 813; 460 NW2d 215 (1990).

Relevant here, MCL 125.290 of the TZA sets parameters for a township zoning board of appeals. It reads, in pertinent part:

(1) The township board of appeals shall

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Bluebook (online)
714 N.W.2d 674, 270 Mich. App. 222, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grabow-v-macomb-township-michctapp-2006.