UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GPGC LIMITED,
Petitioner, v. Civil Action No. 24-169 (JEB) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case arises out of a 2018 contractual dispute between Petitioner GPGC Limited and
Respondent The Republic of Ghana. As a prior Opinion details the full background of this suit,
see ECF No. 17 (Mem. Op.) at 4, the Court need only briefly recount the facts relevant to the
present Motion. During an energy crisis in 2015, Ghana entered into an agreement with GPGC
for the transportation, installation, and maintenance of two gas-turbine power plants in the
country. When that contract went south, the parties arbitrated the dispute in front of a three-
person arbitration tribunal in the United Kingdom, which resulted in a final award concluding
unanimously that Ghana had wrongfully repudiated the agreement. In 2024, Petitioner filed this
action to enforce the award minus some token payments Ghana had made. When the country
failed to appear, GPGC sought default judgment, which the Court granted on August 6, 2024,
and awarded $111,493,828.92 to Petitioner. Id. at 14. Now all that remains is Petitioner’s
Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses, which the Court will grant for the most part. See ECF
No. 19 (Motion for Fees).
1 I. Legal Standard
The governing law in the United States for international arbitration is found in the
Federal Arbitration Act, see 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, and the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention). See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-108.
Neither the FAA nor the New York Convention, however, expressly or impliedly
addresses whether courts may award attorney fees. See Swiss Inst. of Bioinformatics v. Glob.
Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data, 49 F. Supp. 3d 92, 98 (D.D.C. 2014) (pointing this out).
In U.S. courts “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’
fee from the loser.” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247
(1975). There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, it “may be overcome by, inter alia,
an ‘enforceable contract’ allocating such fees.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 443 (2007) (quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967)). Second, “it is well settled that the Court retains inherent power
to assess attorneys’ fees ‘when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.’” Concesionaria Dominicana de Autopistas y Carreteras, S.A. v. Dominican
State, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–
46 (1991)).
If a party is entitled to fees, the court must then determine that the amount is fair and
reasonable. “The usual method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees is to multiply the hours
reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly fee, producing the ‘lodestar’
amount.” Bd. of Trs. of Hotel & Rest. Emps. Local 25 v. JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir.
1998). “The party seeking fees has the . . . burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees
requested” for “both the number of hours and the hourly rate.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t
2 of Homeland Sec., 218 F. Supp. 3d 27, 38, 47 (D.D.C. 2016). Supporting documentation “must
be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of
certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended.” Role Models Am., Inc. v.
Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
II. Analysis
The Court first considers Petitioner’s entitlement to fees; it then examines the amount
sought.
A. Entitlement to Fees
The first issue is straightforward, as the two parties here have a contract that allows for
the prevailing party to receive attorney fees. See Mot. for Fees at 1–2. Specifically, the
agreement states that “[i]n the event of any legal proceedings between the Parties with regard to
this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the non-prevailing party,
and the non-prevailing party shall pay upon demand, all reasonable fees and expenses of counsel
for the prevailing party.” ECF No. 1-11 (Emergency Purchase Agreement), ¶ 28(g). This suit is
exactly that — a legal proceeding between the parties concerning the agreement — and therefore
falls within this provision. Given the default judgment this Court entered, GPGC is the
prevailing party. It is thus entitled to fees.
Even if the parties’ contract did not so provide, the Court would find that it is within its
authority to grant fees. It is well supported that a court can award fees if it determines that a
party has acted in bad faith. Swiss Inst. of Bioinformatics, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 98; Concesionaria
Dominicana, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 3. More specifically, courts have determined that unjustifiably
refusing to abide by an arbitral award or not participating in confirmation proceedings constitutes
such bad faith and warrants the granting of fees. Swiss Inst. of Bioinformatics, 49 F. Supp. 3d at
3 98; Concesionaria Dominicana, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 3 (granting attorney fees based on party’s
inaction in confirmation proceedings of international arbitral award); Leon Trading SA v. M.Y.
Shipping Private Ltd., 2010 WL 2772407, at *4 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (granting petitioner’s request for
attorney fees in arbitration case where “[r]espondents failed to submit opposition papers to the
Petition”). Here, Respondent has not participated in the litigation at any point after being served.
Although Ghana has made some payments, the Court found it to be totally unresponsive and
willfully defaulting in these proceedings. Id. at 4–5. This is thus an additional basis for the
award of fees.
B. Reasonableness of Fees
The Court must also determine the appropriate amount of fees. Petitioner seeks
$147,219.50 for 145 hours of attorney and legal-assistant time, as well as $505 in reimbursable
expenses. See Mot. for Fees at 5. To determine what constitutes “reasonable attorney fees,” the
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GPGC LIMITED,
Petitioner, v. Civil Action No. 24-169 (JEB) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case arises out of a 2018 contractual dispute between Petitioner GPGC Limited and
Respondent The Republic of Ghana. As a prior Opinion details the full background of this suit,
see ECF No. 17 (Mem. Op.) at 4, the Court need only briefly recount the facts relevant to the
present Motion. During an energy crisis in 2015, Ghana entered into an agreement with GPGC
for the transportation, installation, and maintenance of two gas-turbine power plants in the
country. When that contract went south, the parties arbitrated the dispute in front of a three-
person arbitration tribunal in the United Kingdom, which resulted in a final award concluding
unanimously that Ghana had wrongfully repudiated the agreement. In 2024, Petitioner filed this
action to enforce the award minus some token payments Ghana had made. When the country
failed to appear, GPGC sought default judgment, which the Court granted on August 6, 2024,
and awarded $111,493,828.92 to Petitioner. Id. at 14. Now all that remains is Petitioner’s
Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses, which the Court will grant for the most part. See ECF
No. 19 (Motion for Fees).
1 I. Legal Standard
The governing law in the United States for international arbitration is found in the
Federal Arbitration Act, see 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, and the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention). See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-108.
Neither the FAA nor the New York Convention, however, expressly or impliedly
addresses whether courts may award attorney fees. See Swiss Inst. of Bioinformatics v. Glob.
Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data, 49 F. Supp. 3d 92, 98 (D.D.C. 2014) (pointing this out).
In U.S. courts “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’
fee from the loser.” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247
(1975). There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, it “may be overcome by, inter alia,
an ‘enforceable contract’ allocating such fees.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 443 (2007) (quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967)). Second, “it is well settled that the Court retains inherent power
to assess attorneys’ fees ‘when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.’” Concesionaria Dominicana de Autopistas y Carreteras, S.A. v. Dominican
State, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–
46 (1991)).
If a party is entitled to fees, the court must then determine that the amount is fair and
reasonable. “The usual method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees is to multiply the hours
reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly fee, producing the ‘lodestar’
amount.” Bd. of Trs. of Hotel & Rest. Emps. Local 25 v. JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir.
1998). “The party seeking fees has the . . . burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees
requested” for “both the number of hours and the hourly rate.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t
2 of Homeland Sec., 218 F. Supp. 3d 27, 38, 47 (D.D.C. 2016). Supporting documentation “must
be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of
certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended.” Role Models Am., Inc. v.
Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
II. Analysis
The Court first considers Petitioner’s entitlement to fees; it then examines the amount
sought.
A. Entitlement to Fees
The first issue is straightforward, as the two parties here have a contract that allows for
the prevailing party to receive attorney fees. See Mot. for Fees at 1–2. Specifically, the
agreement states that “[i]n the event of any legal proceedings between the Parties with regard to
this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the non-prevailing party,
and the non-prevailing party shall pay upon demand, all reasonable fees and expenses of counsel
for the prevailing party.” ECF No. 1-11 (Emergency Purchase Agreement), ¶ 28(g). This suit is
exactly that — a legal proceeding between the parties concerning the agreement — and therefore
falls within this provision. Given the default judgment this Court entered, GPGC is the
prevailing party. It is thus entitled to fees.
Even if the parties’ contract did not so provide, the Court would find that it is within its
authority to grant fees. It is well supported that a court can award fees if it determines that a
party has acted in bad faith. Swiss Inst. of Bioinformatics, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 98; Concesionaria
Dominicana, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 3. More specifically, courts have determined that unjustifiably
refusing to abide by an arbitral award or not participating in confirmation proceedings constitutes
such bad faith and warrants the granting of fees. Swiss Inst. of Bioinformatics, 49 F. Supp. 3d at
3 98; Concesionaria Dominicana, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 3 (granting attorney fees based on party’s
inaction in confirmation proceedings of international arbitral award); Leon Trading SA v. M.Y.
Shipping Private Ltd., 2010 WL 2772407, at *4 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (granting petitioner’s request for
attorney fees in arbitration case where “[r]espondents failed to submit opposition papers to the
Petition”). Here, Respondent has not participated in the litigation at any point after being served.
Although Ghana has made some payments, the Court found it to be totally unresponsive and
willfully defaulting in these proceedings. Id. at 4–5. This is thus an additional basis for the
award of fees.
B. Reasonableness of Fees
The Court must also determine the appropriate amount of fees. Petitioner seeks
$147,219.50 for 145 hours of attorney and legal-assistant time, as well as $505 in reimbursable
expenses. See Mot. for Fees at 5. To determine what constitutes “reasonable attorney fees,” the
Court first multiplies the hours reasonably spent on the case by a reasonable hourly fee. See
Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). To
substantiate its hours, Petitioner provides the law firm MoloLamken’s billing history and
invoices with itemized time entries for GPGC. See Mot. for Fees, Exhs. D–E. The Court finds
this documentation sufficient to establish that the hours worked are reasonable and fair.
For its rates, Petitioner provides the Laffey Matrix, a schedule of hourly fees based on the
number of years an attorney has practiced, which is commonly employed by courts in this
district. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 142 F. Supp.
3d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2015). GPGC also provides the biographies for Robert Kry and Sara
Tofighbakhsh, the primary partner and associate on the case. See Mot. for Fees, Exhs. A–B.
Petitioner acknowledges, however, that its requested hourly rates do not comply with the Laffey
4 Matrix. See Mot. for Fees at 6. It argues that because this case involved complicated matters,
the increase in rates is justified. Specifically, it contends that the departure is reasonable because
of the high-quality representation and the complex subject matter — i.e., sovereign-enforcement
litigation. Id. at 6–7. There are many complicated federal cases, however, and the Court does not
find this to be a compelling argument for a deviation from the Laffey Matrix. See Ashraf-Hassan
v. Embassy of France in the U.S., 189 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. 2016) (using Laffey Matrix in
complicated employment case). As a result, the chart below provides an updated hourly rate
based on the Laffey Matrix and uses that to determine the appropriate fee. Information for the
employees of MomoLamken that was not provided by Petitioner was found on its website. See
ECF 19-1 (Robert Kry Decl.), ¶ 4.
Name TitleYears of Laffey Hours Billed Fees Experience Matrix Rate Robert Kry Partner 22 $1,120 89.5 $100,240 Lucas Walker Partner 15 $930 1.4 $1,302 Lauren Dayton Partner 8 $823 4.1 $3,374.3 Sara Tofighbakhsh Associate 3 $463 29.9 $13,843.7 Jackson Myers Associate 4 $570 1.1 $627 Legal Assistants N/A N/A $253 19 $4,807 Reimbursable $550 Fees TOTAL $124,744
In sum, Petitioner sought a total of $146,714.50 in fees and costs, and it will receive
$124,744.
5 III. Conclusion
The Court will accordingly grant in part and deny in part Petitioner’s Motion for Fees. A
separate Order so stating will issue this day.
James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: September 23, 2024