Gowrie v. Eevelle, LLC
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Opinion
22-1831-cv Gowrie v. Eevelle, LLC
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 3 City of New York, on the 29th day of June, two thousand twenty-three. 4 5 PRESENT: GERARD E. LYNCH, 6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 7 JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 8 Circuit Judges. 9 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 SAMUEL GOWRIE, HEATHER GOWRIE, 11 12 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 13 14 v. No. 22-1831-cv 15 16 EEVELLE, LLC, MTA NEW YORK CITY 17 TRANSIT, 18 19 Defendants-Cross Claimants, 20 21 22 MTA NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT,
1 1 Defendant-Cross Defendant, 2 3 HYSTER-YALE GROUP, INC, DBA 4 HYSTER COMPANY, CROWN 5 EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, XYZ 6 ENTITY #1 THROUGH XYZ ENTITY #10, 7 THE LAST 10 NAMES BEING FICTICIOUS 8 AND UNKNOWN TO PLAINTIFFS, 9 10 Defendants- Cross Defendants, 11 12 HYSTER YALE MATERIALS HANDLING, 13 INC., DBA HYSTER COMPANY, 14 15 Defendant. * 16 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 17 18 FOR PLAINITFFS-APELLANTS: David E. Gordon, Steven R. 19 Haffner, Gordon & Haffner, 20 LLP, Harrison, New York
21 Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern
22 District of New York (Victor Marrero, Judge).
23 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
24 AND DECREED that the order of the District Court is VACATED and the case is
25 REMANDED for further proceedings.
26 Plaintiffs-Appellants Samuel and Heather Gowrie (“Plaintiffs”) appeal
27 from a June 1, 2022 order of the United States District Court for the Southern
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above. 2 1 District of New York (Marrero, J.) dismissing their case, without prejudice, for
2 failure to prosecute. We assume familiarity with the underlying facts and the
3 record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our
4 decision to vacate and remand.
5 I. Background
6 When Samuel Gowrie lost sight in one eye after a work-related forklift
7 accident in January 2016, the Plaintiffs asserted defective design and failure to
8 warn claims against various entities they believed had manufactured the weather
9 shield that caused Gowrie’s injury, as well as a failure to train and supervise
10 claim against Gowrie’s employer, the New York City Transit Authority
11 (“NYCTA”).
12 After voluntarily dismissing their claims against NYCTA in December
13 2019, conducting discovery, and then dismissing their claims against Crown
14 Equipment Corporation, on December 7, 2020 the Plaintiffs requested a 60-day
15 stay of discovery to decide how to proceed, which the Court granted. The
16 Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed their claims against Eevelle on June 9, 2021,
17 and, on August 16, 2021, dismissed its claims against Hyster as well.
3 1 When expert discovery ended on November 1, 2021, no non-fictitious
2 defendants remained in the case. On December 2, 2021, the District Court
3 requested a status update. On December 21, the Plaintiffs responded that they
4 needed an additional 45 days to file a motion to substitute the correct
5 manufacturer of the weather shield, but noted that the motion might be delayed
6 if NYCTA did not timely cooperate with their efforts to determine the identity of
7 the manufacturer. On March 2, 2022, having heard nothing from the Plaintiffs
8 for more than two months, the District Court requested another status update.
9 On March 7, 2022, the Plaintiffs responded that the documents they had finally
10 received from NYCTA identified the manufacturer of the shield as a New York
11 entity, whose substitution would destroy diversity and require a remand to state
12 court. The Plaintiffs requested 45 more days to file any motions. App’x 182. On
13 June 1, 2022 (86 days later), the District Court, sua sponte and without notice to
14 the parties, dismissed the complaint without prejudice and closed the case for
15 failure to prosecute.
16 II. Discussion
17 We review a dismissal for failure to prosecute for abuse of discretion. U.S.
18 ex rel. Drake v. Norden Systems, Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 2004). To
4 1 determine whether such an abuse of discretion has occurred, we consider five
2 factors:
3 (1) the duration of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with 4 the court order, (2) whether plaintiff was on notice that 5 failure to comply would result in dismissal, (3) whether 6 the defendants are likely to be prejudiced by further 7 delay in the proceedings, (4) a balancing of the court’s 8 interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff’s 9 interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard, and (5) 10 whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction 11 less drastic than dismissal.
12 Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Baptiste v. Sommers, 768
13 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 2014). “No one factor is dispositive, and ultimately we
14 must review the dismissal in light of the record as a whole.” Drake, 375 F.3d at
15 254. We conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing this case for failure
16 to prosecute.
17 First, the Plaintiffs’ inaction for nearly 90 days was relatively brief
18 compared to prior cases in which we have found a period of inaction significant.
19 And the District Court technically never responded to the Plaintiffs’ request for a
20 45-day extension or imposed a deadline. Second, the District Court provided no
21 notice at all to the Plaintiffs that failure to file a timely status update or to file the
22 motion to substitute would result in a dismissal of their case, even though the
23 Plaintiffs had responded to each prior request for an update. Third, the only
5 1 defendant subject to prejudice by the delay is the actual manufacturer of the
2 wind shield, which has yet to be identified. Any prejudice to that defendant
3 caused by the 90-day period of inaction is not, in our view, especially significant.
4 Fourth, while we recognize the able and experienced District Judge’s inherent
5 interest in managing his docket, here all that remains in the federal case is to
6 amend the complaint to substitute the correct defendant and remand to state
7 court. App’x 182. This process will not congest or “strain[] [the District Court’s]
8 docket.” Baptiste, 768 F.3d at 218. Finally, there is no record that the District
9 Court considered any alternative, less severe, sanctions. A dismissal without
10 prejudice is often a less severe sanction than a dismissal with prejudice. United
11 States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 70, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2016). But where, as here, the statute of
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