Government of the Virgin Islands v. Carela

44 V.I. 11, 2001 WL 1825823, 2001 V.I. LEXIS 44
CourtSupreme Court of The Virgin Islands
DecidedApril 6, 2001
DocketCrim. No. 104/2000, Crim. No. 40/2000
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 44 V.I. 11 (Government of the Virgin Islands v. Carela) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of The Virgin Islands primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Carela, 44 V.I. 11, 2001 WL 1825823, 2001 V.I. LEXIS 44 (virginislands 2001).

Opinion

C ABRET, Presiding Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(April 6, 2001)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. These combined cases involve two arrests for driving under the influence, in which the defendants separately challenge the methods used in finding they were intoxicated. The defendants argue that the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”) and the Intoxilyzer 5000 (“Intoxilyzer”) tests have not been scientifically validated in the Virgin Islands and, therefore, are not valid bases for their arrests. For the reasons which follow, the defendants’ motion will be denied.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Both defendants, Frank Carela (“Carela”) and Delroy Henry (“Henry”), were arrested in separate incidents and charged with driving under the influence (“DUI”), in violation of Title 20, Section 493 of the Virgin Islands Code.

Carela was driving without headlights on King Street, Frederiksted, on the night of April 12, 2000. During a traffic stop, police detected a strong odor of alcohol and noted that the defendant was unable to keep his balance after he left his vehicle. Police administered three field sobriety tests — the HGN, the one leg stand and the walk and turn tests — all of [13]*13which Carela reportedly failed. Carela was subsequently arrested at 10:20 p.m. and, at 1:04 a.m., was administered the Intoxilyzer breath test, which showed a .24 blood alcohol content.1

Police stopped Henry on Lagoon Street, Frederiksted, on January 25, 2000, after noting erratic driving. During the traffic stop, police noted that the defendant had a strong odor of alcohol and staggered when asked to leave the vehicle. Heniy was also arrested after failing three field sobriety tests, including the HGN, and was subsequently tested with the Intoxilyzer breath test, which established his blood alcohol content at .21 percent.

Both defendants filed motions to dismiss, in which they challenge the HGN and Intoxilyzer tests as scientifically unreliable methods for a finding of intoxication. These cases were consolidated for the purpose of this motion. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, during which the Government presented expert testimony on both the HGN and the Intoxilyzer tests.

Dr. Karl Citek (“Dr. Citek”) — an optometrist, professor of optometry at Pacific University College of Optomology and researcher in the field — was qualified as an expert to testify regarding the reliability of the HGN, based on his professional training, education, and experience, and substantial peer review publications in the area of vision science and the effects of alcohol and drugs on vision and perception.

Randall Beaty (“Beaty”), an assistant manager of Texas’ Breath Alcohol Testing Program and consultant in the field of forensic alcohol testing in the private sector, testified as an expert on the Intoxilyzer 5000. Beaty’s curriculum vitae evidences a broad range of education, experience, knowledge, training and peer review publication in forensic alcohol testing and in the technical functioning of the Intoxilyzer, as well as formal education in chemistry and physics.

DISCUSSION

The admission of scientific or expert evidence is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides:

[14]*14If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Under this standard, the Court may exercise broad discretion in excluding or admitting scientific evidence. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1175, 143 L.Ed. 2d 238 (1999). However, before admitting expert testimony or scientific evidence, the Court must exercise its gatekeeping role in determining what evidence would help the jury to resolve the issues presented. See Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Byers, 35 V.I. 240, 941 F. Supp. 513 (D.V.I. 1996); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2789, 2796-97, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). In Daubert, the Supreme Court set a two-prong test for determining the validity and admissibility of scientific evidence: 1) relevance and 2) reliability. Relevance goes to the helpfulness standard set forth in Rule 702, as determined by the trial court. The reliability prong requires inquiry into the methodology used as a basis for the expert’s conclusions, to ensure that it is grounded in good science and based on more than mere “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Belofsky v. General Electric Co., 980 F. Supp. 818, 821 (D.V.I. 1997); 29 Charles A. Wright & Victor J. Gold, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6262, at 183 (1997). In making its reliability determination under Daubert, however, this Court must consider several factors on the record:

1) whether the theory or technique can be tested or verified;
2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;
3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique;
4) the existence of standards controlling the technique’s operation; and
5) the general acceptance of the technique in the relevant scientific community.

[15]*15Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-95. In setting these standards, the Court eliminated or, better, elasticized the earlier Frye2 standard which required strict adherence to the “general acceptance” standard. Unlike the earlier general acceptance standard, the above factors are considered as part of a total, flexible inquiry, and no one factor is dispositive. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95; 29 Wright and Gold §6266 (2000 Supplement). Moreover, the court’s inquiry must focus “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.

The Third Circuit has added several other factors which a Court must consider as part of its reliability analysis:

1) the relationship of the technique to other methods which have been established as reliable;
2) whether the witness is qualified to testify based on the methodology; and
3) whether the method has been put to non-judicial use.

In re Paoli R.R. Yard P.C.B. Litig., 35 F.3d 111, 742 (3d Cir. 1994). The Government bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged methods meet the standards for admission of scientific evidence, as outlined above. See Belofsky, 980 F. Supp. at 822.

The HGN Test

The HGN test measures the effect of alcohol on the ability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they are turned. See 60 ALR 4th 1129, 1130 (1988).

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Bluebook (online)
44 V.I. 11, 2001 WL 1825823, 2001 V.I. LEXIS 44, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/government-of-the-virgin-islands-v-carela-virginislands-2001.