Government of the Virgin Islands ex rel. K.O.

47 V.I. 77, 2004 WL 6243368, 2004 V.I. LEXIS 22
CourtSupreme Court of The Virgin Islands
DecidedOctober 25, 2004
StatusPublished

This text of 47 V.I. 77 (Government of the Virgin Islands ex rel. K.O.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of The Virgin Islands primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Government of the Virgin Islands ex rel. K.O., 47 V.I. 77, 2004 WL 6243368, 2004 V.I. LEXIS 22 (virginislands 2004).

Opinion

KENDALL, Family Court Judge

AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

(October 25, 2004)

THIS MATTER came on for Special Hearing on October 19, 2004 regarding the minor’s absence from school. The minor was present with his mother, and was represented by Assistant Territorial Public Defender, Julie Smith-Todman. The Government was represented by Assistant Attorney General Douglas Dick. The Court heard testimony from Dr. Sharon McCollum-Rogers, Principal of the Ivanna Eudora Kean High School, Mr. William Frett, Insular Superintendent of Schools for the St. Thomas and St. John District, the minor’s mother, his aunt and the minor himself.

Based upon the record and for the reasons set forth below, the Court will Order the minor back to school and Order the Principal to comply with the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Education regarding disciplinary action and Due Process procedures.

I. JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Territorial Court is vested by Congress in Section 21(a) of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, as amended, and pursuant thereto, the Family Division of the Court, by virtue of 4 V.I.C. §§ 171 and 173, has jurisdiction over “all matters within [the] Division”, including “any child ... until he becomes nineteen (19) years of age”.

The Government has contended that this Court has no jurisdiction over the minor’s exclusion from school and that school officials have unbridled power in administering the schools. There is no merit to this contention where, as here, all Due Process procedures have been denied the minor by the Principal, where all administrative remedies have been foreclosed or exhausted by the parent and the minor, and where the minor is being irreparably harmed by the continuing delay in his attendance at school this school year.

[79]*79Under such circumstances, a vacuum is created by the failure of the Executive Branch to vindicate the minor’s rights. As protectors of the Constitution, Courts at times must fill that vacuum to ensure that the rights of the powerless are protected by compelling compliance with the Rules, the Law and the Constitution. See, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954).

In this case, this Court must immediately exercise its jurisdiction under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (applicable to the Virgin Islands through Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, as amended) and the laws of the Virgin Islands in order to put an end to the continuing constitutional violation of the minor’s Due Process rights.

II. BACKGROUND

During a juvenile matter, the Court was advised that the minor was not in school. Upon further inquiry, both the minor and his mother asserted that upon returning to school for his senior year, he was asked to leave the campus because his uniform pants were too long. After fixing the pants, he returned the next day but was told that his mother had to accompany him. Since his mother was unable to leave work, she asked her sister to accompany the minor but when they arrived, the minor and his aunt were told that his pants were still too long and they were pepper-sprayed by a monitor while being escorted off campus. The minor’s mother also stated that she attempted to meet with the Principal, Insular Superintendent and the Commissioner of Education to ascertain why her son was prevented from attending school, all to no avail.

The Court could not accept what it was told about the minor’s absence from school as factual, so it immediately scheduled the Special Hearing to get the other side of the story and determine whether the minor’s exclusion was in compliance with the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Education, especially since time is of the essence during the school term.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court finds that the minor was enrolled as a student at the Ivanna Eudora Kean High School at the beginning of the current school year. He had completed the 2003-2004 school year and was never notified that he would not be admitted the following year. He was permitted to attend orientation on September 7, 2004, although he was not allowed to [80]*80participate in the ritual because “his pants were too long.” After shortening the pants, he returned the next day, but was told that he had to be accompanied by a parent. He returned that same day with his aunt because his mother was at work and unable to accompany him. At that time, the Principal said that the minor’s pants were still too long and asked the monitor to accompany them off the campus. In so doing, both the minor and his aunt were pepper-sprayed by the monitor.

It appears that they were pepper-sprayed because they delayed too long in leaving the campus. The minor’s mother testified that the Principal told her “any child who is not properly dressed will be pepper-sprayed”. This testimony was not controverted by the Principal who, at the time of the testimony, was present in the Courtroom with Counsel, but offered no rebuttal thereto. The Court rejects the Principal’s testimony that pepper-spray was used because the minor struck the monitor since she later testified that she did not see him strike the Monitor. Her testimony was therefore contradictory. Instead, the Court finds that any action by the minor came after he had been pepper-sprayed and was acting defensively, including the removal of his school shirt and undershirt which had been soaked by the pepper-spray. The use of such a dangerous weapon on an unarmed minor is not consistent with the Disciplinary Policies of the Board of Education.

The Court further finds that the minor is enrolled as a student at Eudora Kean High School and the Principal considered him a student of the school because: (1) the minor’s class schedule was prepared but was not given to him because the school’s Administration said it could not be found; (2) he received no notice that he would not be admitted for the new school year; (3) the minor’s orientation date was approved and (4) the Principal made it clear that “when he is in proper uniform, I’ll take him back”.

The Court further finds that the only reason for the minor’s exclusion from school was his alleged failure to wear the proper uniform and not because of any disruptive behavior by him at school or any other reason. The Court also finds that the other reasons posited by the Principal for his exclusion are pretextual and nothing more than belated attempts by her to find new reasons to justify her illegal exclusion of the minor from school in violation of her oath of office to obey the laws. Indeed, if those reasons were in fact valid, she would not have stated, “when he is in proper uniform, I’ll take him back”.

[81]*81The Court further finds that the minor’s initial presence in Court was directly attributable to his frustration at being denied his education for no apparent good reason. Had he not come to Court, the Territory, in all probability, would have never known of his illegal and prolonged exclusion from school.1 When he came to Court, the minor had already been excluded from school for approximately two (2) months, a blatant violation of the Board of Education’s Rules which limit suspension by a Principal to ten (10) days maximum.

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Bluebook (online)
47 V.I. 77, 2004 WL 6243368, 2004 V.I. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/government-of-the-virgin-islands-ex-rel-ko-virginislands-2004.