Govan v. Owens

• Court: District Court, D. Idaho
• Decided: March 24, 2025
• Docket: 4:24-cv-00541
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

HERMAN GOVAN, Case No. 4:24-cv-00541-BLW Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE

HOLLY C. OWENS and SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT for Bannock County, State of Idaho,

Defendants.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Herman Govan’s Complaint because of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning

that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable

legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, even if a complaint meets the pleading requirements, dismissal under

§§ 1915 and 1915A is still appropriate if an affirmative defense is an “obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is an inmate in the Bannock County Detention Center. Plaintiff claims that, in May 2024, private citizen Holly C. Owens presented false evidence,

including committing perjury, during an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2. Owens also allegedly converted Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff received notice of the unlawful detainer action, but he was incarcerated the entire time the suit was pending. Id. at 4.

The Bannock County District Court entered a final judgment against Plaintiff in the unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment, which remains pending. Plaintiff contends that the court was

“complicit” in Owens’s actions, which included prohibiting Plaintiff from accessing the rental property to retrieve his property. Id. at 3–5. Plaintiff asserts that the actions of Owens and the Bannock County Court deprived him of his rights under the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth

Amendment. 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended

complaint should take into consideration the following. A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights

protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A defendant causes a constitutional deprivation within

the meaning of § 1983 “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Personal liability under § 1983 cannot be based on events “beyond the control of a

defendant.” Pinto v. Nettleship, 737 F.2d 130, 133 (1st Cir. 1984). The Due Process Clause prohibits state action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A person cannot obtain relief on a due process claim unless he demonstrates that he was deprived of one of these protected interests.

If a plaintiff shows he had a protected liberty or property interest, the factfinder must then determine what process was due. This determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974)

(“Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted). The “essence of due process” is notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). Due process is a flexible concept and calls for such procedural protections as

the particular situation demands. Id. Three factors inform whether an inmate has received the process to which he was due: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional

or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 335 (1976). i. Claims Against Owens The Complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim against Defendant Owens.

Plaintiff’s allegations do not plausibly suggest that Owens was acting under the color of state law. Instead, she is a private citizen who filed an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff. Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for purely private conduct, “no

matter how unfair that conduct may be.” NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988). A private party can be subject to suit under § 1983 for violating a plaintiff’s civil rights only in narrow circumstances—“state action may be found if,

though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has identified several contexts in which a private party can be considered a state actor for purposes of a civil rights action. Id. at 296. These include the following situations: (1) the private party’s action results from

the state’s “exercise of coercive power” or “significant encouragement”; (2) the private party participates in “joint activity” with the state; (3) the private party is “controlled by an agency of the State”; (4) the private party “has been delegated a public function by the State”; and (5) the private party is “entwined with governmental policies,” or “the government is entwined in [the private party’s] management or control.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A private party

“may be designated a state actor for some purposes but still function as a private actor in other respects.” Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2010).

If Plaintiff includes § 1983 claims against Defendant Owens in an amended complaint, he must present facts plausibly suggesting that Owens was acting under color of state law. ii. Claims Against Bannock County Court

Plaintiff’s claims against the Bannock County Court are also implausible. Though Plaintiff contends that the court was complicit in Owens’s alleged perjury, presentation of false evidence, and conversion of Plaintiff’s property, there are no specific facts in the Complaint to support such a conclusion. Rather, the Complaint

alleges, at most, that the court “was used by Defendant Owens” in her alleged scheme, Compl. at 3, not that the court itself acted unlawfully. A bare assertion that one party conspired with another is insufficient to meet the pleading standards of

Rule 8. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556–57 (“[A] conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.”) (discussing pleading standards in context of a conspiracy claim under the Sherman Act). The claims against the Bannock County Court are implausible for the additional reason that Plaintiff received all the process which he was due. Plaintiff

was notified of the unlawful detainer action against him and had the opportunity to appear and contest Owens’s allegations. Whether or not Plaintiff did so was not within the control of the Bannock County Court. See Pinto, 737 F.2d at 133.

Plaintiff may attempt to remedy these deficiencies in an amended complaint. B. State Law Claim In addition to § 1983 claims, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim of conversion. Because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim upon which relief may be

granted, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, and if the amended complaint states a plausible claim under Idaho law, the Court will reconsider the issue of supplemental jurisdiction.

4. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other

grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive

screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a

state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is

unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant.

Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a

pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v.

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, (9th

Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint).

Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.”

Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within 28 days, or if

the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”).

ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Plaintiff has 28 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if

Plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this case.1 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

1 A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). DATED: March 24, 2025 we, } OFT Wand B. Lynn Winmill IGE US. District Court Judge

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 12