5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 6
7 THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, 8 Plaintiff,
9 CIVIL CASE NO. CV 1124-09 v.
10
HELENE TORRES and EVELYN O'KEEFE, DECISION AND ORDER II in their capacities as CO-
12 ADMINISTRA TRIXES OF THE ESTATE OF JOSE MARTINEZ TORRES, and THE 13 ESTATE OF JOSE MARTINEZ TORRES, 14 Defendants.
15
16
17 INTRODUCTION
18 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Sarcinas on the 30th day ofNovember, 19
20 2012, for hearing on the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third Amended
21 Complaint and the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Assistant Attorney 22 General William Bischoff represented the Government, and Attorney Joseph Razzano 23 represented the Defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part the 24 Government's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third Amended Complaint, denies in part 25
26 the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, dismisses in part the causes of action in
27 this case, and remands this controversy to the GALC for further proceedings.
Government ofGuam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV 1124-09
I. Factual and Procedural Background
2 On September 20, 2006, the Guam Ancestral Lands Commission ("GALC") held a
3 hearing on the Defendants' ancestral lands claim. During that hearing, the GALC rendered an 4 oral decision to grant a conditional deed to the Defendants. The GALC delegated to the 5 Defendants' attorneys the task of reducing its oral ruling to writing and drafting the deed. The 6 attorneys drafted a deed and the GALC executed the deed as drafted by the Defendants'
7
8 attorneys.
9 The GALC's oral decision came in the form of a motion by Commissioner Mark 10 Charfauros, as reflected in the following excerpt from the transcript of the hearing:
II MR. CHARFAUROS: I'd like to ask the family to clarifY something for the commission. What 12 is the pleasure of the - what is the request before this commission at this point in time? So I'll make sure that whatever motion that we're going to make would be clear. So can the - a 13 representative of the family state to the commission, what is its official request before us? 14 MR. MANT ANONA: In which you - if I may, for the Commissions pleasure. Your Honor, at 15 this point, we are asking that the commission award, recognize the claims of the heirs of the Jose Torres Martinez Martinez Torres, for the lots as contained in 2531 and 1540.
16 Today, recognized by Ancestral Lands Commission on their own documentation as Lots AL002, 17 Lot AL002-I, and Lot AL002-2. We believe that this will extinguish all claims that the family have to any and all properties inside the Ancestral Lands inventories.
18 MR. CHARFAUROS: Okay, all right. Madam Chair? If there's no other questions by the other 19 commission member, I'd like to make a motion and my motion would be basically to be in line with the request of the family to recognize the claim to the estate of the lots mentioned herein on 20 the record, which would also extinguish all claims to the Duarte Estate. And also that this be a 21 conditional deed that you still have to go to the courts and go through the regular court proceedings to and correct me if I'm wrong, is that going to the court proceedings to review this 22 claim and the court will make the final judgment on the claim.
23 MR. YANZA: That is correct Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the estate, neither I myself, Mr.
Mantanona or Mr. Razzano or Mrs. O'Keefe can declare that we hereby terminate all future 24 claims to ancestral lands. But, as we saw fit best for the estate, we are willing to go before the probate court and the probate estate of Mr. Torres and request the court that they, the Court, 25 approves the receipt of these ancestral lands and approve the final termination of future claims 26 within the inventory ofthe commission.
27 MR. CHARF AUROS: And understand this, this is a conditional deed and if the Court comes back that says, that you have absolutely no claim to this property, this property comes right back 28 into the inventory of the Ancestral Lands Commission and that we are not going to rehear this
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Government ofGuam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV 1124-09
case again. Unless you guys have convincing evidence that has not been reviewed by the Court to rehear the case. Do you understand exactly what this motion is?
2 MR. YANZA: Yes.
3 MR. MANTANONA: Yes, we do.
4 MR. CHARFAUROS: All right. So that's my motion.
5 MR. MANTANANE: I second.
6 MS. [sic] CHARFAUROS: Seconded by the-
7 MS. ORLINO: Okay. The motion has been second and now we're going to be voting.
8 MR. CHARFAUROUS: Yeah. It wasn't there. There's an extinguishment.
9
10 MS. ORLINO: Yeah.
II MR. CHARFAUROS: That this extinguish the Duarte claim.
12 MS. ORLINO: All future.
13 MR. CHARFAUROS: It's a conditional motion.
14 MR. ECLA VEA: That's just for the inventory we have? Or is that for everything? 15 MR. CHARFAUROS: For everything. Everything.
16 MR. ECLA VEA: So does the family understand that?
17 MR. YANZA: Yes.
18 MR. MANTANONA: For present and future. We believe that we represent about 90 percent of 19 the heirs, of course there's 10 percent so we can't speak for those 10 percent at this point. But we believe that the recommendation from the estate will be that we acknowledge the receipt and 20 term in ate all future interest. 21 MR. CHARFAUROS: Yeah. And understand, I'm not asking the family for permission for this extinguishment. My motion is not asking for permission, I'm making this motion. And this 22 motion is to extinguish this claim and basically, it's up to the Courts and if the Court see fit that 23 this motion is inappropriate then the Courts can rule against that and if the Court sees fit that this claim is invalid, this property would come back to the inventory of the Ancestral Lands 24 Commission. But basically the Court is going to be the final say so. Do you understand that motion?
25 MR. MANT ANONA: Yes.
26 MR. YANZA: Mr. Commissioner? Just to clarify.
27
28 MR. CHARFAUROS: Yeah.
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Government ofGuam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV 1124-09
MR. YANZA: This present motion on the floor, this would be a conditional transfer of the properties so long as the court approves it and once the court approves it -
2 MR. CHARFAUROS: Yes. In other words, where it's a conditional deed that we're giving you.
You still have to go to the courts and if the courts comes back and say yes 3
4 MR. YANZA: Okay. We understand that. We accept that.
5 MS. ORLINO: And then it's going to not come before this commission again?
6 MR. MANTANONA: Right. Yeah.
7 MR. YANZA: No, no. If the court approves of the transfer- 8 MS. ORLINO: Then it's a done deal.
9 MR. CHARF AUROS: Then it's your then-
10 MS. ORLINO: It's a done deal, yeah.
II MR. YANZA: And then the condition would be satisfied?
12 MR. MANTANANE: Yeah, right.
13 MR. CHARFAUROS: If the court rules against it, then it comes- that property comes back into 14
15 MR. ECLA YEA: Into our inventory.
16 MR. YANZA: And the transfer will be ineffective?
17 MR. MANTANANE: Right.
18 MR. CHARFAUROS: Yes.
19 MS. ORLINO: Yeah, that's why the extinguishment is there to let you know.
20 MR. YANZA: Yes.
21
22 MS. ORLINO: Okay?
23 MR. CHARFAUROS: So we are approving the and my motion is to approve it on the condition that it goes to the court. All right?
24 MR. ECLA YEA: Okay, we're voting.
25
26 The motion passed unanimously. The Defendants' attorneys drafted the language of the 27 deed condition, which read:
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Government ofGuam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV 1124-09
This Quitclaim Deed and the effective transfer of the Property is conditioned on the administrator/trix petitioning the probate court to approve the Jose Martinez Torres Estate's receipt of the Property and to approve the Jose Martinez Torres Estate's permanent 2 extinguishment and termination of all claims to all other properties held by the Guam Ancestral 3 Lands Commission formerly known as As Ukkudo or Estates 2531 and 1540.
4 The deed was executed by the GALC on October 17,2006.
5 The GALC issued its Final Written Decision and Order on the Defendants' claim on 6 December 22, 2006. The last paragraph of the Final Written Decision and Order reads as 7 follows:
8 The Commission also hereby directs the Chairperson and the Secretary of the Commission to 9 condition the return of the properties to the Estate that the Estate shall request the probate court of 10 the Jose M. Torres Estate to accept the return of the properties in exchange for the Estate terminating all future claims against the Commission for the return of the unsurveyed remaining II portions ofEstate 2531 and the unsurveyed remaining portions ofEstate 1540.
12 On June 12, 2007, the Defendants petitioned in Superior Court Probate Case Number PR 13 0220-50 for a court order confirming the satisfaction of the deed condition. On August 30, 14 2007, Judge Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson, sitting in probate, held a hearing on the matter, and on 15 August 31, 2007, Judge Barrett-Anderson issued an order confirming the satisfaction of the 16
17 deed condition. On March 6, 2008, the Government sought to intervene in PR 0220-50 for
18 substantially the same reasons it advances in the present case, which was filed in 2009. 19 The Government claims that the Defendants' attorneys drafted the language of the deed 20 condition incorrectly, in such a way that it did not accurately reflect the GALC's oral decision.
21
22 The parties agree that the GALC intended the conditional language to require that the
23 Defendants secure some form of court approval of the deed. The central dispute in this case is 24 the question of what specific type of court approval the GALC intended the Defendants to 25 secure. The Government argues that the GALC intended to have the Superior Court adjudicate 26 the validity of the Defendants' ancestral claim. The Defendants claim that the GALC merely 27
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Government of Guam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV 1124-09
intended to have a Probate Court approve the extinguishment of the Defendants' future claims
2 against the GALC.
3 The Government brought this lawsuit requesting several forms of relief. The 4 Government asks reformation of the deed language, so that it accurately reflects the oral 5 decision rendered by the GALC at the September 20, 2006 hearing. The Government also 6 requests that the Court a judgment on the merits of the Defendants' ancestral lands claim in the 7
8 form of a declaratory judgment. Finally, in light of the sale of the underlying property by the
9 Defendants to an apparent good faith third party purchaser, the Government requests that the 10 Court impose a constructive trust in its favor on the proceeds received by the Defendants from II the sale.
12
The Government has moved for summary judgment. The Defendants oppose, and have 13
14 cross-moved for summary judgment.
15 II. Summary Judgment Standard 16 Summary judgment on an issue should be granted when no material facts are in dispute 17 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iizuka Corporation v. Kawasho 18
19 International (Guam), Inc., 1997 Guam 10 ~ 7. The initial burden is on the moving party and
20 the court must review the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at ~ 8. 21 However, if the movant can demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, the 22 non-movant cannot merely rely upon the assertions contained in the complaint, but must 23 produce significant probative evidence showing that there is a genuinely disputed issue of 24
25 material fact that must be determined at trial. Id.
26 A genuine issue exists when there is "sufficient evidence" establishing a factual dispute 27 requiring resolution by a fact-finder. Id. The factual dispute must concern a "material fact." Id.
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Government of Guam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV I 124-09
Whether a fact is material is determined by the governing substantive law; if the fact may affect
2 the outcome, it is material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
3 Under Rule 56, the moving party carries the burden of showing the court the relevant 4 information which it believes demonstrate the absence of an issue of material fact. The moving 5 party is not required to negate each element of the non-moving party's case. Rather, the moving 6 party satisfies and discharges its burden by establishing the absence of evidence to support the 7
8 non-moving party's case. Kim v. Hong, 1997 Guam 11 ~ 6 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 4 77
9 U.S. 317,325 (1986)). 10 "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after II adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 12 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which 13
14 that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
15 (1986). However, there can be no "genuine issue of material fact" if there is a complete failure 16 of proof concerning an essential element of a party's case, since such failure renders all other 17 facts immaterial. ld. at 323.
18
19 III. Defendants' Evidentiary Objections
20 The Defendants make a number of objections to the Government's submissions of
21 GALC hearing transcripts and recordings in support of its motion. For the reasons set forth 22 below, the Court overrules the Defendants' objections.
23 A. Parol Evidence
24
25 The Defendants argue that the language of the deed is unambiguous and that the parol
26 evidence rule should therefore prohibit the Court from considering evidence outside the four 27
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corners of the deed in discerning the GALC's intent. 1 Guam's parol evidence rule, 6 GCA §
2 25 I 1, expressly provides that extrinsic evidence may be considered "[w]here a mistake or
3 imperfection of the writing is put in issue by the pleadings[.]" The central allegation in this case 4 is that there was a mistake or imperfection in the language of the deed. The parol evidence rule 5 also, by its plain terms, "does not exclude other evidence of the circumstances under which the 6 agreement was made or to which it relates, as defined in § 2515 [Circumstances to be 7
8 Considered], or to explain an extrinsic ambiguity, or to establish illegality or fraud." The
9 Government's proffered evidence relates to the circumstances under which the deed was 10 executed, and the Government has alleged fraud in this case. The parol evidence rule therefore II does not bar the consideration of extrinsic evidence in this case, and the Court rejects the 12
13 Defendants' parol evidence argument.
14 B. Best Evidence, Completeness, Hearsay
15 The Defendant also make a number of objections based on the best evidence rule, the 16 rule of completeness, and the rule against hearsay.
17 Dispositive of these objections is the maxim that evidence need not be presented in trial-
18
19 admissible form on summary judgment. In evaluating whether evidence can be considered on
20 summary judgment, the key question for the Court is whether the underlying factual content of 21 the evidence could be presented in some admissible form at trial. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 22 F.3d 1032, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2003) (hearsay objection to personal diary overruled on summary 23 judgment because factual allegations in diary could be presented as first person testimony at 24
25 trial); Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 543 (9th Cir. 1992) (best evidence rule objection
26 overruled on summary judgment because underlying facts would be admissible). 27
28 1 Guam's parol evidence rule, 6 GCA § 2511, by its terms applies to "deeds and wills as well as contracts between
parties."
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Government ofGuam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV 1124-09
At trial on the issue of what the GALC meant by its oral decision rendered at the
2 September 20, 2006 hearing, the Court would not hesitate to admit and allow the factfinder to
3 consider transcripts and recordings of the hearing. The probative value of the underlying facts 4 would obviously vastly outweigh any potential prejudice. Accordingly, on summary judgment, 5 the Court overrules the Defendants' technical objections to the form in which the underlying 6 facts have been presented to the Court.
7
8 In light of the Defendants' best evidence and completeness objections to the hearing
9 transcript, the Court must also note that it is distressed by the Defendants' strenuous objections 10 to the Government's admittedly tardy submission of the transcript recording during the II pendency of summary judgment, and the Defendants' concomitant demands that the 12 Government's counsel be sanctioned. The traditional remedy for evidentiary incompleteness is 13
14 introduction of complete evidence; the rule intends to broaden, not to narrow, the scope of
15 admissibility. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1988). Yet, 16 rather than assenting to the introduction of the audio recording, which would presumably 17 convey accurately the "flavor" that the Defendants argued was missing from the transcripts, the 18
19 Defendants pursued the obscurantist strategy of objecting to the recording as well. This
20 troubling approach and the fervor with which the Defendants have pursued it have done little 21 for their cause.
22 IV. Administrative Reconsideration 23 The Defendants argue that this lawsuit is a de facto effort by the GALC to revisit its 24
25 decision. This is a mischaracterization of the nature of this case. The GALC does not seek to
26 reconsider its decision; it merely seeks to amend the language of the deed to reflect accurately 27 its previously rendered decision, which still stands. The administrative reconsideration analysis 28
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Government ofGuam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV 1124-09
established by Dep 't of Agriculture v. Civil Service Commission, 2007 Guam 21, therefore is
2 not applicable, and Defendant's arguments that the GALC did not comply with it are inapposite.
3 V. Estoppel 4 The Defendants argue that the doctrine of estoppel should bar the Government from 5 pursuing this case. However, this case is sharply distinct from United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 6 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973), relied upon by the Defendants. In Lazy, id at 987, a federal 7
8 employee gave advice to a business as to how to reorganize itself to take best advantage of
9 available federal funds. The business acted on the federal employee's advice and successfully 10 secured payments of federal funds. Subsequently, an administrative decision found that, the II federal employee's advice ad been erroneous and the payments of federal funds had been 12 improper. The federal government was nonetheless estopped from recovering the funds on the 13
14 basis of the federal employee's representations to the business.
15 The situation in Lazy, id., was quite different than what we have in this case, which 16 involves an allegation of an affirmative act of deception by the Defendants, not the mere passive 17 reliance on advice from a government employee. A party that stands accused of inducing 18
19 another to assent via deception cannot use the other's fraudulently procured assent as a shield;
20 to allow so would be to allow estoppel to act as an absolute bar against any recovery by any 21 fraud victim. Because of the allegation of fraud in this case, the Court rejects the analogy to 22 Lazy, id, and rejects the Defendants' estoppel argument.
23 VI. Reformation
24
25 The Court now proceeds to examine the sufficiency of the evidence to support summary
26 judgment on the central issue of this case - whether there was fraud or unilateral mistake 27 tainting the execution of the conditional deed such that reformation of the deed is justified.
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Government of Guam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV 1124-09
A. Unilateral Mistake
2 The Defendants emphasize the testimony of Mark Charfauros, the GALC commissioner
3 who made the motion embodying the GALC's oral decision at the September 20, 2006 GALC 4 hearing. Mr. Charfauros testifies via declaration that his intent in making the motion was to 5 require Probate Court approval of the extinguishment of the Estate's future claims, and not to 6 require a Superior Court adjudication of the merits of the ancestral lands claim. It is worth 7
8 noting that the Government has introduced evidence suggesting that at least three of the other
9 commissioners, Maria Cruz, Ronald Laguana, and Anita Orlino, had different understandings of IO the meaning of Mr. Charfauros' s motion.
II However, this is beside the point. Mr. Charfauros's subjective intent on making the 12 motion is irrelevant, as is the subjective intent of any individual commissioner. The question is 13
I4 not what thoughts were in Mr. Charfauros's head when he made the motion; the question is the
15 objective meaning of the words of the GALC's oral decision. The fundamental legal principle 16 that an individual's intent should be inferred objectively rather than subjectively is applicable I7 here. The law is not concerned with an individual's private, unexpressed intent, which is I8
19 undeterminable except through that individual's own inherently unreliable testimony. The
20 objectively determinable outward indicia of intention are the legally relevant points. 21 Here, what controls here is the plain meaning of the language of Mr. Charfauros's oral 22 pronouncement. Mr. Charfauros's words were that the Defendants would be "going to the court 23 proceedings to review this claim." Mr. Charfauros explicitly stated that "the court will make the 24
25 final judgment on the claim." He further stated that "if the Court comes back that says, that you
26 have absolutely no claim to this property, this property comes right back into the inventory of 27
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Government ofGuam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV 1124-09
the Ancestral Lands Commission," and again that "if the Court sees fit that this claim is invalid,
2 this property would come back to the inventory ofthe Ancestral Lands Commission."
3 Regardless of what thoughts might have been in Mr. Charfauros' s mind when he spoke 4 these words, the meaning of the words themselves is clear. Those words directed the Defendants 5 to obtain a Court ruling on the validity of their ancestral claim. Those words were voted on by 6 the GALC. The Court therefore concludes that the GALC intended the deeded transfer of 7
8 property to the Defendants to be conditioned upon a Court ruling affirming the validity of the
9 Defendants' ancestral claim. Mr. Charfauros's affidavit is not sufficient to create a genuine 10 dispute as to the GALC' s intent.
II The language of the deed condition, drafted by the Defendants' attorneys, provided for a 12 probate court to "approve" the Defendants' "receipt" of the property. The distinction between a 13
14 "probate court" and a court of general jurisdiction, competent to adjudicate the validity of the
15 Defendants' ancestral claim- see Zahnen v. Limtiaco, 2008 Guam 5 ~ 17 -was clear to the 16 Defendants' attorneys, or should have been so in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Thus, the 17 Defendants' attorneys knew that the language of the deed condition, as drafted, did not 18
19 accurately reflect the GALC's decision.
20 The Defendants point to their attorney Louie Yanza's contacts with Joey Leon Guerrero, 21 a land agent employed by the GALC, during which Mr. Leon Guerrero did not object to 22 language of the condition as drafted by Mr. Yanza. The Court rejects the Defendants'
23 characterization of Mr. Yanza's contacts with Mr. Leon Guerrero as "extensive correspondence 24
25 and discussion ... to make sure that the Deed provision was crafted exactly as the GALC
26 intended." See Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 17. From 27 Mr. Yanza's declaration, it appears that these contacts consisted of three phone calls over the 28
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·dovernment ofGuam v. Torres, Civil Case No. CV 1124-09
course of two weeks, with no indication that the language of the condition was discussed.
2 Further, Mr. Leon Guerrero is a land agent whose professional expertise could not have been
3 expected to include the vagaries of probate court jurisdiction. Mr. Yanza's declaration reflects 4 that the subject matter of his discussions with Mr. Leon Guerrero was the property description.
5 Mr. Leon Guerrero's job, as a land agent, was ensuring that the deed clearly and accurately 6 described the lots to be transferred. He is not a lawyer. In light of his professional role, his 7
8 approval of the deed cannot reasonably be understood as assent to the operative legal language
9 of the deed condition relevant to the issue here. 10 It appears to the Court that the GALC's Final Written Decision and Order was also II drafted by the Defendants' attorneys, and that its language was taken from that of the already-
I2 finalized deed condition, rather than vice versa. The D&O fails to reflect fully the GALC's 13
I4 decision as enunciated in open hearing. In light of these considerations, the Court does not find
I5 the D&O to be evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute as to the GALC' s intent. I6 Indeed, none of the evidence before the Court supports any genuine dispute of the fact I7 that the conditional deed did not express the true intentions of the GALC, that this deficiency I8
I9 was due to the unilateral mistake of the GALC in approving and executing deed language not
20 accurately reflecting its oral decision, and that the Defendants knew or should have known at 2I the time of the execution ofthe deed that its language did not accurately reflect the GALC's oral 22 decision. The GALC's execution of the deed as drafted by the Defendants' attorneys thus 23 constitutes a unilateral mistake ofwhich the Defendants availed themselves with knowledge and 24
25 for their own benefit. Accordingly, the Government is entitled, as a matter of law, to
26 reformation of the deed language. 27
II
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VII. Disposition
2 The Government has proposed no language to replace the defective terms of the deed,
3 and the Court has come to understand the difficulty of encapsulating the GALC's intent in a 4 deed condition. The GALC essentially was attempting to certify the question of the validity of 5 the Defendants' ancestral claim to the Superior Court, and to condition the deed on a Superior 6 Court ruling favorable to the Defendants. The remaining counts ofthe Government's complaint 7
8 - declaratory judgment, quiet title, and constructive trust - all hinge on a determination of the
9 validity of the Defendants' ancestral claim. The Government asks this Court to proceed to make 10 this determination, but offers no statutory authority for the Court's jurisdiction over this II question, which it appears to the Court is actually within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 12 GALC. The Court has searched in vain for any statutory provision, in the GALC's enabling 13
14 legislation or elsewhere, authorizing certification of a question in the manner the GALC
15 intended. Accordingly, the Court must conclude that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this 16 question, and dismiss the remaining claims. See GRCP 12(h)(3).
17 It appears to the Court that the proper path toward resolving this question is for the 18
19 GALC itself to hold further proceedings and to make an explicit ruling on the validity of the
20 Defendants' ancestral claim. The Court acknowledges the GALC's strong and explicitly 21 expressed preference not to have to reopen hearing on the merits of this difficult claim, but, as 22 the GALC has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, it appears to the Court 23 that this is the only way. Without intending any intrusion on the GALC's authority to conduct 24
25 its proceedings on this question in whatever manner it sees fit, the Court respectfully suggests
26 that the GALC develop a record of its proceedings in a manner that will streamline review on 27 appeal. In particular, a substantial written decision with detailed findings and discussion and 28
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analysis of the evidence would seem to be appropriate in this vigorously contested case, which
2 appears destined to come again before a Court in some form or another before it is finally put to
3 rest. 4 CONCLUSION
5 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that summary judgment in favor of the 6 Government is appropriate on the issue of reformation. Accordingly, the Government's Motion 7
8 for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part, and the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary
9 Judgment is DENIED in part. 10 The remaining counts of the complaint are DISMISSED for lack of subject matter II jurisdiction, and the question of the validity of the Defendants' ancestral claim is REMANDED 12
13 to the GALC for further proceedings.
14
15 SEP
IT IS SO ORDERED this __ day of September, 2013.
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18 HONORABLE ARTHUR R. BARCINAS 19 Judge, Superior Court of Guam
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