Goulette v. Service Credit Union

2015 DNH 180

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: September 16, 2015
• Docket: 15-cv-379-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

William-Joseph:Goulette, Plaintiff

v. Case No. 15-cv-379-SM Opinion No. 2015 DNH 180 Service Credit Union, Defendant

O R D E R

Pro se plaintiff, William-Joseph:Goulette has filed a motion

for a temporary restraining order (document no. 2), entitled

“Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief,” seeking to enjoin a

hearing scheduled for September 17, 2015, in the New Hampshire

Superior Court sitting at Hillsborough County. That state court

action was instituted by the defendant in this case, Service

Credit Union, to obtain a writ of replevin for personal property

in plaintiff’s possession. For reasons set forth below, the

motion for a temporary restraining order (document no. 2) is

denied.

Plaintiff asserts that this court should enjoin the state

court writ of replevin proceeding to prevent a violation of

plaintiff’s right to due process. Plaintiff argues that: Service

Credit Union is a corporation that plaintiff believes cannot

institute a civil case; Service Credit Union has not provided plaintiff with the “instrument” upon which it bases its claim in

the state courts; plaintiff has not had sufficient time to

respond to the state court claims, as he received notice of the

hearing only six days before the hearing; and the hearing,

scheduled for September 17, 2015, is likely to affect the

plaintiff’s interests as to the same property, which he expected

to litigate in a small claims court hearing in Hillsborough

County, scheduled for a later date.

Discussion

I. Standard – Preliminary Injunctive Relief

To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must

establish “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that

an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The movant bears the

burden of proof on a motion for preliminary injunction. See Esso

Std. Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006).

II. Anti-Injunction Act

The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, precludes this

court from granting the relief plaintiff seeks. The Anti-

Injunction Act provides, as follows:

2 A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.

28 U.S.C. § 2283. “The Act thus constitutes ‘an absolute

prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the

injunction falls within one of [the] three specifically defined

exceptions.’” Garcia v. Bauza-Salas, 862 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.

1988).

To the extent plaintiff relies on the exception for actions

filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in arguing that his right to due

process will be violated if this court does not enjoin the state

court hearing, plaintiff has not established that a due process

violation has occurred or will occur, as the state courts provide

an adequate forum for protecting his right to due process. The

claims asserted here can be raised in the Superior Court

proceeding, and the Superior Court can issue orders, as necessary

and appropriate, to prevent the unwarranted impairment of the

parties’ rights and interests at issue in the small claims court

proceeding. To the extent orders are issued that are adverse to

plaintiff’s interests, plaintiff can seek review in the New

Hampshire Supreme Court. Accordingly, § 2283, precludes

3 plaintiff from obtaining the relief he seeks, and for that

reason, the motion for a temporary restraining order is denied.

III. Younger Abstention

Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),

federal courts are required to abstain from enjoining ongoing state court proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. . . . Under Younger, a federal court must abstain “if (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding involving the federal plaintiff that (2) implicates [certain] important state interests and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to assert his federal claims.”

Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 26 (1st

Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v.

Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013) (Younger may apply in cases

“that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and

judgments of its courts”). When Younger applies, abstention is

mandatory, and the federal court is deprived of any discretion to

grant injunctive relief. See Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v.

United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22 (1976).

The Younger abstention doctrine applies here, insofar as the

requested injunction would target, and substantially interfere

with, a pending action in state court, implicating important

state interests in the issuance of a writ of replevin. Moreover,

the state court proceeding provides an adequate opportunity for

4 plaintiff to assert his federal claims. Plaintiff has not

alleged any facts providing grounds for this court to find any

applicable exception to the Younger abstention doctrine.

Accordingly, abstention under Younger is mandatory. To that end,

plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits,

and his motion for a temporary restraining order (document no. 2)

is therefore denied.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the motion for a

temporary restraining order (document no. 2).

SO ORDERED.

____________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

September 16, 2015

cc: William-Joseph:Goulette, pro se