Gould v. Christianson

10 F. Cas. 857
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided February 15, 1836·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

BETTS, District Judge.

Both parties have gone into very extended proofs in support of their respective pleadings and to repel the allegations brought against them. One commission was executed at Valparaiso and one at Canton; ten other depositions were taken out of court, and six witnesses were examined orally on the hearing. It is not important to analyze, in this opinion, this mass of testimony. Its general bearing throughout is in contradiction of the inflamed charges of the libel, and goes to prove the conduct of the respondent, in the treatment of the libellant, to-have been, ordinarily, mild and unobjectionable. This is the tenor of the evidence given by the libellant’s own witnesses, who were in the ship with him — not merely the crew, but passengers in reputable walks of life, who may be supposed to appreciate personal rights more justly; whilst the rest of the crew, and- all the passengers, including a supercargo and the American consul at Valparaiso, speak in unqualified terms of approval of the general deportment of the respondent in his command, and in regard to-the libellant, so far as his situation came under their notice or they heard him speak of it. But, abating the exaggerations in the statement of the libellant’s case, and making [862]*862l)road subtractions from the evidently prejudiced representations of two of his witnesses, the boy Childs and the carpenter, I think there is direct and unimpeached evidence, that on two or three occasions the respondent assaulted the libellant and committed violence upon his person, in a manner not justified by the proofs — first, in pushing the libellant forcibly across the deck, and accompanying the act with a blow or slap on the side of his head, for a breach of etiquette in walking on the weather side of the quarter-deck; again, in cuffing him for awkwardness or lack of activity in setting the pump to work; also, in twitching his head backwards and slapping him for failing to know and find a particular rope he was ordered to haul upon; also, in pulling off the libellant’s belt, striking him over the shoulders with it, and throwing it overboard, in presence of the passengers, and taunting and deriding him for his clumsy and ungainly dress and appearance; and again, for striking him across the small of his back with a rope’s-end, when he was stooping down in the effort to raise from the deck one end of a yard with a wet sail on it. The court is very careful not to be carried away by the picture given in the libel of this last-named transaction, or by the dubious colorings applied to it by the testimony of the boy Childs, and of another sailor, because their testimony is inconsistent with the after conduct and representations of the libellant himself, and because their credibility as witnesses, if not legally impeached, is much impaired by the testimony, of the passengers and of others of the crew. Yet, I cannot deny my belief of the fact that a blow with a rope was given at the time by the respondent. This is the substance of the credible proof in support of the charges in the libel. It may embrace another instance or two of like character; but no punishment or a more aggravated kind appears to have been inflicted on the libellant by the master.

The argument for the defence is, that If the master has not succeeded in wholly discrediting the evidence against him on this subject, he was justified in law for his acts, under the circumstances and in the relation of the parties to each other; and that, in respect to this minor, the master stood emphatically in loco parentis, and was empowered to correct him under the same immunity that a father may correct a child. The rightful authority of a master to correct a mariner at sea, for malconduct or culpable negligence on shipboard, is not now in debate. The libellant’s action is put on the footing, that he was entitled to a privilege or exemption in this service, which distinguished his liability to the authority of the master from that of a common sailor; and, if not, that the punishment he received was excessive and cruel. It is in proof that the libellant was about eighteen years of age, and of a delicate constitution, and was desirous of making a long sea voyage to benefit his health and learn navigation with a view to that profession. He was of highly respectable connections, and had been brought up in a distinguished family and with cultivated and refined tastes. He had never been accustomed to hard labor, and was entirely without experience of the exactions and hardships of seafaring life. Prom these considerations, his father and friends were opposed to his undertaking the voyage; but, yielding to his persistency, they obtained a berth for him on board the ship Commerce, commanded by the respondent The libel-lant’s father explained the young man’s situation to the respondent, and besought for him treatment on board which might render the service useful and encouraging to him, and contribute to strengthen his constitution and health. The master was reluctant to receive him and another young man, his companion, of about the same age and position in society, alleging that sons of gentlemen were troublesome in merchant ships and proved to be poor sailors, and that the libel-lant, if he engaged in the voyage, would find the service more severe than he anticipated, and become dissatisfied with his position. He was, however, accepted as one of the crew, and signed shipping articles for the voyage as a boy. He was stationed in the steerage with the carpenter and another boy, and was not put in the forecastle with the common sailors.

The old distribution of titles and rank amongst the ship’s company 2 has, in respect to boys at least, gone into disuse in modern times. In American ships, cabin-boys, apprentices or pupils, and raw or green hands, are all rated as boys, without regard to their ages. The full-grown man, if not an ordinary seaman, ranks as a boy. Cabin-boys are usually attendants upon the master or steward, are regarded rather as servants than as mariners, and are rarely put to gen-[863]*863«ral ship’s duty. It is otherwise with apprentices or pupils; but, as they serve under special articles or hiring, their cases come less under the supervision of the law maritime than those of other members of the crew. In this case, the libellant was a boy, in a general and nautical sense. He was a raw hand, and, having signed the shipping articles, was subject to the rules and authority of the ship, in every respect, according to his capacity and experience, the same as an ordinary seaman. The master might rightfully punish him for delinquencies, in the same manner as a common sailor, and, when the misfeasance was of a hind to call for personal chastisement, there was nothing in his position which exempted him from its infliction. Nevertheless, the effect of the infliction of unjustifiable punishment upon a delicate, educated and sensitive youth, and upon a hardy seaman, inured to rough usage from officers and from his messmates, would be widely different, and the consequences to the master for the wrongful act ought not to be the same. In my judgment, it is proved in this ease, that personal chastisement was applied to the libellant in several instances, where no necessity is shown for its infliction. It was administered for' very trivial delinquencies, if the acts or omissions of the libellant could be so termed, and abruptly, without calling the libellant to explain his conduct, or giving him an opportunity to offer apologies or amends for it Nor did the master pronounce it faulty, so as to afford a caution to the libellant or the crew against its repetition.

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Gould v. Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1836).

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