Gotwals v. Miller

District of Columbia

Gotwals v. Miller

59 F.2d 1051, 61 App. D.C. 402, 1932 U.S. App. LEXIS 3537

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia

DecidedJune 6, 1932

DocketNo. 5496

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 59 F.2d 1051 (Gotwals v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gotwals v. Miller, 59 F.2d 1051, 61 App. D.C. 402, 1932 U.S. App. LEXIS 3537 (D.D.C. 1932).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is by the commissioners of the District of Columbia from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District, directing the cancellation of certain assessments for street paving levied against the properties in question, under the front foot rule, authorized by what is known as the Borland Amendments (38 Stat. 517, 524; 39 Stat. 676, 716).

We have ruled upon the validity of front foot assessments under those acts in a number of eases, holding that the assessments were void because of inequality and discrimination. Johnson v. Rudolph et al., 57 App. D. C. 29, 16 F.(2d) 525; Dougherty et al. v. American Security & Trust Co., 59 App. D. C. 301, 40 F.(2d) 813; Taliaferro et al. v. Railway Terminal Warehouse Company, 59 App. D. C. 376, 43 F.(2d) 271; Crosby et al. v. Dodge, 60 App. D. C. 36, 46 F.(2d) 727.

We are unable to discover any distinction in the present ease that would justify a departure from our interpretation of the law as announced in the decisions in the above eases.

The decree is affirmed, with costs.

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