Gottschalk Co. v. Samuelson

97 A. 1003, 128 Md. 541, 1916 Md. LEXIS 98
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedMay 17, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 97 A. 1003 (Gottschalk Co. v. Samuelson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gottschalk Co. v. Samuelson, 97 A. 1003, 128 Md. 541, 1916 Md. LEXIS 98 (Md. 1916).

Opinion

Pattison, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

J. Harry Thomas was appointed Trustee under a petition filed by The Gottschalk Company of Baltimore City to sell certain leasehold property, situated at the corner of Exeter and Lexington streets in said city, mentioned and described in a mortgage held by The Gottschalk Company.

The trustee sold the property unto Meyer Samuelson, the appellee, and reported the sale to the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, upon which report a nisi order was passed and published, and no exceptions having been filed, to the report of sales within the time named in the order, it was finally ratified and confirmed on the day following the last day in which exceptions were to be filed. Later on the same day, the appellee Samuelson filed exceptions to the ratification of the sale so made by the trustee. The ground of the exception was that the trustee could not convey unto him a marketable title to said property because, as alleged in the exceptions, “parts of the improvements on said property are situated on (the bed of) Exeter street,” in and to which the trustee could not convey unto the purchaser a marketable title. ’ ■

*543 The trustee answered, denying the appellee’s right to have his exceptions considered by the Court, inasmuch as they were not filed within the time limited for the filing of exceptions by the nisi order and before the final ratification of the sale; and also1 denying that any part of said improvements were upon the bed of Exeter street, but if so, that said fact .did not create such a defect in the title as to warrant the rescission of final order and the setting aside of the sale.

The Court, however, held otherwise, and passed an order rescinding the final order and setting aside the sale. From this order of the Court both the trustee and the mortgagee appealed. The two appeals, however, were hoard together -and both of them will be passed upon in this opinion.

We will first consider the question as to the right of the appellee to have considered his exceptions filed after the final ratification of the sale.

In Brown v. Gilmor, 8 Md. 326, our predecessors said that “public policy and justice to parties interested reqxiire that the ratification of judicial sales by courts having jurisdiction over the same should be final and conclusive, unless irregularly made by the court, or unless the purchaser was ■prevented by misrepresentation, surprise or fraud, from making his objection to the ratification in due time; and it must-further appear that such misrepresentation, surprise or fraud resulted from some act or conduct upon the part of the trustee or on the part of those interested in the proceedings.”

This Court, in the recent case of Forest Lake Cemetery v. Baker, 113 Md. 536, after quoting from Brown v. Gilmor, supra, said, speaking through Judge Thomas, that “this rule, as applicable to a case where the proceeds of the sale are still within the control of the Court, is more accurately stated by Judge Boyd in the later case of Connaughton v. Bernard, 84 Md. 590, where it is said: ‘where a sale has been ratified, after publication of the order nisi in accordance with the established practice of Courts of Equity, the facts relied on by one seeking to have the sale set aside must be very clearly established and must be of such character as -strongly appeal to the conscience of the Court. But when *544 the Court can see that injustice will he done a purchaser by compelling him to- take the property, it has the power to rescind the order of ratification, if the proceeds of sale are still within its control, provided the purchaser has not by his conduct or neglect deprived himself of the right to relief.’ ”

After making this statement of the law, Judge Boyd in that case said: “we will therefore inquire into the circumstances surrounding this case to ascertain whether the appellant should be relieved of the purchase made by his intestate.” .

Therefore, following the decision in Connaughton v. Bernard, supra, it will be necessary for us to consider the facts and circumstances of this case in determining whether the exceptant is entitled to the relief sought, although the exceptions were filed after the final ratification of the sale. It is claimed by the exceptant that the aforesaid improvements consisting of a two-story brick storehouse and dwelling extend beyond the west line of Exeter street the distance of two feet and five inches.

The facts upon which the exceptant relies for such relief must be proven and the burden is on him to establish them. Forest Lake Cemetery v. Baker, supra; Miller's Eq. Proc. section 509; In re Roberts v. Loyola Perp. Build. Assn., 74 Md. 1; Haskie v. James, 75 Md. 569.

The facts as disclosed by the record and upon which the .decision in this case depend are substantially as follows: The property involved is in one of the oldest sections of Baltimore City. It at one time formed a part of “Jones-town,” an addition to Baltimore Town. Exeter street was laid out and o-pened. in 1782 by the owners of the lot through which it was opened. The land for the bed of the street was never condemned and there is no record of its location. There is, however, some evidence in the record that its original width was 53 feet 9 inches, although as now used it does not exceed 51 feet % of an inch, at any point between Fayette and Lexington streets. The houses on the west side of the street between Lexington and Fayette streets are built upon no fixed and established line. Some of the *545 houses are so much as two or three feet further out than others, hut without an established line of the street, it can not he said that such houses extend over the line of the street, or that they encroach upon said street, for it may be that the other houses aré back from tbe line of the street. The line of the street must he first determined before it can he said with certainty that the improvements upon the lot mentioned in these proceedings encroach upon the street. Mr. Coonan, the present City Surveyor, in his testimony, says: “'He does not think it possible to ascertain the true lines of the street either on the East or West Side,” and gives his reasons therefor. He also stated “he was familiar with the old surveys of the old parts of Baltimore and that in such sections of the city encroachments are usual, and it was not unusual to find houses setting hack from the line.” He was then asked, “Are you familiar witli the usage and practice of the city authorities in regard to the supposed encroachments? Yes, sir; in a way. What is it? Generally they let them alone; the city authorities do not bother them; if they do' anything at all it is more to help the persons who encroach than to disturb them. Do yon know of any case that has come to' your knowledge in the old parts of Baltimore where they have compelled property owners to move back ? I know of no case ; hut I do know of cases where they have compelled them to set back after the houses were torn down.”

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Bluebook (online)
97 A. 1003, 128 Md. 541, 1916 Md. LEXIS 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gottschalk-co-v-samuelson-md-1916.