Goss v. MAN Roland, et al.

2008 DNH 063
District Court, D. New Hampshire·Decided March 28, 2008·No. Civil No. 03-cv-513-SM. Opinion No. 2006 DNH 088·Published

Opinion

Goss v . MAN Roland, et a l . 03-CV-513-SM 03/28/08 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Goss International Americas, Inc., Plaintiff

v.

MAN Roland, Inc. and MAN Roland Druckmaschinen AG, Defendants Civil No.03-cv-513-SM Opinion N o . 2008 DNH 063 MAN Roland, Inc. and MAN Roland Druckmaschinen AG, Counterclaim Plaintiffs

Goss International Americas, Inc., Counterclaim Defendant

O R D E R

In document n o . 496, plaintiff moves for summary judgment

that defendants infringed dependent claims 2 , 3 , 1 0 , 1 1 , and 12

of the ’734 patent and dependent claims 2 , 3 , 4 , 6, 7 , and 8 of

the ’251 patent.1 Defendants object. For the reasons given,

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

The disputed dependent claims from the ’734 patent include

the following:

1 In document n o . 5 2 8 , the parties stipulated that defendants have infringed dependent claims 4 , 5 , 7 , 8 , and 9 of the ’734 patent and dependent claim 5 of the ’251 patent. 2 . The tubular printing blanket of claim 1 , further comprising an inextendable layer between said inner and outer layers.

3 . The tubular printing blanket of claim 1 , wherein said intermediate layer includes an inextendable material.

1 0 . The tubular printing blanket of claim 1 , further comprising an inextendable layer of material.

1 1 . The tubular printing blanket of claim 1 0 , wherein the inextendable layer of material is located between the outer layer and the intermediate layer.

1 2 . The tubular printing blanket of claim 1 0 , wherein the inextendable layer of material is located between the inner layer and the intermediate layer.

’734 patent, col. 1 2 , l l . 39-43, 57-64. The disputed dependent

claims from the ’251 patent include the following:

2 . The offset lithographic printing press as recited in claim 1 further comprising a layer of inextendable material in the printing blanket.

3 . The offset lithographic printing press as recited in claim 1 further comprising an inextendable material disposed between the intermediate layer and outer layer of the printing blanket.

4 . The offset lithographic printing press as recited in claim 1 further comprising an inextendable material disposed in the intermediate layer of the printing blanket.

6 . The offset lithographic printing press as recited in claim 5 further comprising a layer of inextendable material in the printing blanket.

2 7 . The offset lithographic printing press as recited in claim 5 further comprising an inextendable material disposed between the intermediate layer and outer layer of the printing blanket.

8 . The offset lithographic printing press as recited in claim 5 further comprising an inextendable material disposed in the intermediate layer of the printing blanket.

’251 patent, col. 1 3 , l l . 4-13, col. 1 4 , l l . 3-12.

Plaintiff argues that all the limitations stated in the

disputed claims are present in the accused devices, which renders

them infringing. For their part, defendants accept plaintiff’s

construction of the terms “inextendable layer” and “inextendable

material” as being “one that gives substantial tensile strength,

for example, a fabric,” and “admit[ ] that the Reeves blankets

include fabric layers and [that] the MacDermid blankets have

Kevlar fibers therein, whose purpose is to give strength to the

blankets.” However, they argue that the accused devices do not

infringe the claims at issue because: (1) during the prosecution

of ’668 application, the applicants “distinguished the

inextendable fabric layers of the prior art from their invention

on the basis that they were not gapless and seamless”; (2) based

upon that prosecution history, the disputed claims should be

construed to require that the claimed inextendable layer or

material is both seamless and continuous; and (3) the

3 inextendable layers and inextendable materials in the Reeves and

MacDermid blankets are not seamless or continuous. More

specifically, defendants argue that if the disputed claims are

construed to include the limitations they advocate, the accused

devices do not infringe – an argument that appears to concede

infringement if the claims are not construed in their favor.

Plaintiff counters that: (1) the court has already rejected

defendants’ attempt to insert the limitations “seamless” and

“continuous” into the three independent claims and should, on the

same grounds, reject defendants’ current attempt to insert those

limitations into the dependent claims; and (2) the prosecution

history upon which defendants rely is not relevant because the

claims in the ’668 application were narrower than the claims in

the patents-in-suit, and the prosecution history of narrower

claims does not limit the subsequent broader claims.

In document n o . 403, the court construed the term “outer

printing layer” to include a limitation that the outer printing

layer claimed in the patents-in-suit is gapless, but not to

include a limitation of the claimed invention to an outer

printing layer that is devoid of any seam or splice. That

determination alone is not dispositive of the question before the

court, which is whether the terms “inextendable layer” and

4 “inextendable material” in the claims at issue – which pertain to

layers other than the outer printing layer – are properly

construed to include the further limitations “seamless” or

“continuous.” However, defendants’ arguments for including those

limitations are not persuasive.

First of all, it is far from clear that the prosecution

history of the ’668 application has any bearing on the proper

construction of the claims of the patents-in-suit. The ’668

application initially claimed an “inextensible layer comprising a

second seamless tubular body,” and was rewritten to claim “a

gapless and seamless cylindrical inextensible layer.” The

relevant claims of the patents-in-suit do not limit the claimed

invention to a seamless or continuous printing blanket. Thus,

the claims recited in the ’668 application are narrower than

those recited in the patents-in-suit. In Middleton, Inc. v .

Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., the Federal Circuit

explained that the prosecution history of a narrower claim in a

parent application did not limit the broader claims in a child

application. 311 F.3d 1384, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2002); c f . Advanced

Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v . Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1305

(Fed. Cir. 2001). Based upon the reasoning of Middleton, it

would appear that the prosecution history upon which defendants

5 rely is inapplicable to construing the claims of the patents-in-

suit.

Moreover, even if the prosecution history did,

theoretically, have a bearing upon the claims of the patents-in-

suit, defendants’ substantive argument would be unavailing.

Defendants correctly report that during the prosecution of the

’668 application, the applicants explained to the PTO, in a

written amendment to the rejection of claim 1 , that “no prior art

reference discloses a cylindrical inextensible layer that is

gapless and seamless.” The rejected claim recited, in relevant

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