Goss v. Board of Education, City of Knoxville, Tenn.

340 F. Supp. 711, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14769
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Tennessee
DecidedMarch 8, 1972
DocketCiv. A. 3984
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 340 F. Supp. 711 (Goss v. Board of Education, City of Knoxville, Tenn.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goss v. Board of Education, City of Knoxville, Tenn., 340 F. Supp. 711, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14769 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge.

This lawsuit commenced December 11, 1959, over twelve years ago. While a detailed account of its early history is set out at D.C., 270 F.Supp. 903, 904-912 (1967), a brief recitation of that history will place the issues in proper perspective.

Judicial History

On April 8, 1960, the defendant submitted a grade-a-year desegregation plan effective September, 1960. This plan was approved after an extended evidentiary hearing. D.C., 186 F.Supp. 559. That decision was modified by the Court of Appeals to require acceleration of the grade-a-year schedule. However, the Court of Appeals expressly approved the neighborhood 'pupil assignment system. 6th Cir., 301 F.2d 164, 168-169. The defendant amended the plan on June 25, 1962, and March 14, 1963, to accelerate the schedule.

On May 11, 1964, defendant adopted a plan for complete desegregation effective September, 1964. Each child was to be assigned to the school “designated for the district in which he or she legally resides,” and that “districting [was to be] based on the location and capacity (size) of school buildings and the latest enroll *712 ment studies.” In order to preserve continuity of education, children whose assignment was altered by the plan were permitted to complete the grade sequence where they were before transferring to a new school. This was called the “grade-requirement” transfer.

On May 8, 1967, plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the defendant to provide an equitable distribution of all racial and socio-economic elements in the population within each school in the system. After a full evidentiary hearing, the Knoxville school system was found to be fully desegregated under the plan in effect since the school year 1963-64. D.C., 270 F.Supp. 903, 918. In that opinion, we expressed the view that:

“ . . . there is no constitutional duty on the part of the school board to bus Negro or white children out of their neighborhoods or to transfer classes for the sole purpose of alleviating racial imbalance which it did not causé, nor is there a duty to select new school sites solely in furtherance of such purpose ...” 270 F.Supp. 903, at 916-917.

Believing our responsibility to be discharged, we struck the case from the docket. This decision was affirmed in all respects except that we were instructed to keep the case on the docket to insure future compliance with Brown I. 6th Cir., 406 F.2d 1183, 1191 (1969).

On November 17, 1969, plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate relief based on Alexander v. Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 90 S.Ct. 29, 24 L.Ed.2d 19 (1969) . At the pretrial conference, proof was limited to alleged discriminatory developments since the decision of June 7, 1967. After the evidentiary hearing, we found that the building program was consistent with the neighborhood school system approved in 1967, and that the defendant was operating a unitary system within the meaning of Alexander. D.C., 320 F.Supp. 549, 561-562 (1970).

This decision was on appeal when Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971), and its companion cases were filed. Without reviewing our decision, the Court of Appeals remanded the case on June 22, 1971 “for further proceedings consistent with Swann . . . and the other relevant Supreme Court opinions announced on April 20, 1971.” (Emphasis added) 6th Cir., 444 F.2d 632, 640.

Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs presented to Mr. Justice Stewart a motion for immediate relief. He denied the motion because we had not had an opportunity since the remand order “to inquire whether respondents have failed to maintain a unitary school system as defined in Swann . . . and prior cases.” (Emphasis added) His order states that if it is found that defendant has not “maintained a unitary school system, [it] must ‘terminate dual school systems at once,’ ” citing Alexander, supra. (Emphasis added)

On August 16, 1971, a pre-trial conference was held and an order entered defining the issue as whether defendant had maintained a unitary system within the meaning of Swann. Defendant agreed to construct a pupil locator map as suggested by the Court of Appeals. 444 F.2d 632, at 639, n. 1. The evidentiary hearing was set for September 7, 1971.

Difficulties in completing the pupil locator map caused a continuance to October 21, 1971. Plaintiffs’ expert witness’ inability to complete his preparation caused a continuance to December 1, 1971. Then, after three full days of testimony, plaintiffs moved for the joinder of the Mayor and City Council of Knoxville as co-defendants. The motion was granted and the hearing was recessed to permit service on the proposed new defendants. On December 15, 1971, these parties appeared by attorney, agreed to their joinder, but requested a continuance to study the record already accumulated and otherwise prepare their case. Their request was granted and the hearing resumed January 31,1972. Com *713 pletion of the hearing was delayed until February 3, because of the inability of plaintiffs’ chief witness to be present before that date.

The history of this case, unlike that in Swann, reveals that the Court has had the full cooperation of the defendant Board of Education in the effort to satisfy the constitutional mandate of Brown I and subsequent Supreme Court cases.

Pupil Locator System

The pupil locator system has the capability of locating the residence of each pupil within 1000 feet of the address on his enrollment card and identifying him by race and grade level. The data used came from the initial enrollment in September, 1971. It contains the normal mistakes made in initial enrollments and does not show 2700 to 2800 pupils who live in Knox County but attend school in the City. Consequently, it is 3000 to 4000 pupils below actual enrollment. The computer print-outs used in making the maps show the number of pupils of each race, at each grade level, living within each 1000 foot square. It also shows totals and percentages for each square.

Two pupil locator maps were created from the information contained in the print-outs. For both maps a grid was superimposed on a map of Knoxville and each square given a number corresponding to one on the print-out. One map shows the total number of white pupils and the total number of black pupils living in each square and attending a City school. The other is a color schematic map that reveals the degree of racial concentration by residence within each square.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
340 F. Supp. 711, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14769, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goss-v-board-of-education-city-of-knoxville-tenn-tned-1972.