Gosney v. Chavest, No. Cv98 0064585s (Jun. 27, 2002)

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 8119, 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 409
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJune 27, 2002
DocketNo. CV98 0064585S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 8119 (Gosney v. Chavest, No. Cv98 0064585s (Jun. 27, 2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gosney v. Chavest, No. Cv98 0064585s (Jun. 27, 2002), 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 8119, 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: COLLATERAL SOURCE REDUCTION VERDICT
In the specific and uncontested facts this case presents in the collateral source, § 52-225a context, the defendant is entitled to a reduction of plaintiff's jury verdict in the full face amount of medical bills plaintiff presented to the jury. Plaintiff urges that only the amount the doctor was contractually bound to accept from plaintiff's HMO CT Page 8120 is to be deducted.

The jury awarded the entirety of said bills to plaintiff. The involved health care provider(s) were bound by contract with an HMO to accept as full and final payment a lesser amount, dictated by the HMO, where no further potential for additional recovery by the treater against plaintiff exists.

Plaintiff's claim that the court should deduct only the smaller amount runs afoul of the legislative intent of the statutory scheme. Said scheme contains, as a linchpin, principles prohibiting double recovery. See, e.g., Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17 (1997) and Mack v.LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150 (1999).

In a certain sense, it is difficult to analogize these events to the prohibited "double recovery." Indeed, it is worse, for plaintiff's position would result in an award entirely without foundation, i.e., reimbursement for costs never-incurred.

Having so stated, it is probably still appropriate to permit a plaintiff to set before the jury the amount the treater originally billed, for it may indirectly serve as a yardstick as to measure harm endured.

This decision does not purport to embrace circumstances wherein a patient was vulnerable to a collection effort by the treater to recover the balance beyond what the HMO "allowed." Further outside the purview of this determination is a situation in which a plaintiff achieves a post-verdict compromise with his doctor, as might occur in certain "low" verdict occurrences.

Because the parties are in complete agreement as to the dollar amounts at hand on this topic, the court has deemed it sufficient to address the topic without them, and expects a stipulation as to judgment, or at least this facet.

The Court

By Nadeau, J.

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Related

Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital
699 A.2d 964 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1997)
Mack v. LaValley
738 A.2d 718 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 8119, 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 409, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gosney-v-chavest-no-cv98-0064585s-jun-27-2002-connsuperct-2002.