Goshen Sweeper Co. of Grand Rapids v. Bissell Carpet-Sweeper Co.

72 F. 67, 19 C.C.A. 13, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2646
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedDecember 9, 1895
DocketNo. 319
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 72 F. 67 (Goshen Sweeper Co. of Grand Rapids v. Bissell Carpet-Sweeper Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goshen Sweeper Co. of Grand Rapids v. Bissell Carpet-Sweeper Co., 72 F. 67, 19 C.C.A. 13, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2646 (6th Cir. 1895).

Opinions

After stating the foregoing facts, the opinion of the court was announced by

LURTON, Circuit Judge.

If, as contended by the learned counsel for appellant. Plumb’s patent is to be construed as only securing an efficient frictional contact between the driving wheels and the brush shaft, then the field for improvement in frictional devices in sweepers was an exceedingly narrow one. This is abundantly shown by numerous prior patents in evidence. That end was the purpose of so many of these earlier devices, and that result had been secured in so many ways, closely approximating the means adopted by Plumb, that his claim, if sustainable at all, is only to be upheld by limiting him to the specific friction device he has described and claimed. If his patent be thus limited, it is doubtful whether any of the sweepers made by the Goshen Company infringe his second claim. On the other hand, it has been most ably argued that the patent was rightly interpreted by Judge Brown, and that it is entitled to so broad a construction “that any carpet sweeper whose case is carried on its wheels, whether two or four, by springs of any form, or by any equivalent elastic, yielding connection, infringes his second claim.” When we come to interpret Plumb’s patent, and mark out its limits, we are at once confronted with the well-established fact that a carpet sweeper constructed according to his plans, as described in his specifications, possesses, in practical operation, advantages in usefulness which distinguish it in a most decided way from each and all of the alleged anticipatory structures. If we analyze these advantages, we find that in practical use the most obvious improvement in the utility of such machines lies, not in the mere matter of securing a more certain and reliable friction between his driving wheels and the brush roller, but in the adaptability of his mechanism for securing a varying pressure of the brush on the carpet by mere downward [71]*71pressure upon the sweeper case, whereby the brush may be made to •bear heavily or lightly on the surface to be swept, as the conditions of sweeping seem to require*. This adjustability of the brush by downward pressure resembles the action of a broom under hard or light pressure, and has been aptly described by the experts as the “broom-action” advantage of Plumb’s mechanism. This, the chief advantage of his improvement in carpet sweepers, is the very feature which it is said he has not pointed out in his specifications in such definite way as to he regarded within the perception of the inventor, or the limits of his patent. That this advantage does not exist: to so great a degree in a two-wheeled sweeper, such as shown by Plumb’s model sweeper filed with his application, may be conceded. Neither his drawings, specifications, nor claim confine him to a two-wheeled sweeper, though the model filed by him does show” that one end of his sweeper rested upon an unyielding metal shoe, so that no amount of pressure would lower that end of the case, or that end of (he brush roller carried in the case. Sweepers thus constructed were in fact made and sold by Plumb for several years after his patent. But the decided weight of the evidence is that Plumb’s two-wheeled sweepers were exhibited and advertised as sweepers callable of doing hard or light sweeping by downward pressure upon the sweeper case, and that this was called “broom action.” The evidence also clearly show's that this feature of his improved sweeper was then regarded with great favor by both the general public and by manufacturers of sweepers, who soon began efforts to obtain the same function in their several devices. The recognition of the existence and utility of this very feature may in truth be said to have, at an early day, revolutionized (.he carpet-sweeper industry. Though this varying pressure of the brush on the floor was not so beneficial as when both ends of the brush could he lowered, still it is evident, even in thai: form of sweeper, that downward pressure on the sweeper case would lower the wheel end of the case, aud with it the wheel end of the brush roller, so that hard or light sweeping might be done* by a part of the brush. The difference between the advantage of sweeping heavily or lightly with the whole of the brush, and wilh a part only, is, at last, bni: one of degree. It was a new and useful improvement to be able to vary the pressure on but a part of the brush. The interposition of wheels between the brush roller and end of the case necessarily leaves an unswept margin next a baseboard. Any limitation upon the broom-action function of Plumb’s combination in consequence of supporting his ease on wheels at one end only was somewhat offset by the fact that the shoe end of the case was better adapted to sweep close to the baseboard. At the date of Plumb’s invention this was regarded as giving two-wheeled sweepers an advantage over those carried on four wheels, and they were then much the most popular in the market. Plumb himself was the first to extend his principle to four-wheeled sweepers. If the mechanism contrived by Plumb embodied this broom adjon adaptability to a degree constituting it a new and useful improvement upon the old structures, and he has sufficiently de[72]*72scribed or pointed out his improvement to meet the requirement of the patent law, then he is aot to be deprived of the benefit of this feature because, by a duplication of his wheels, this advantage can be obtained to a greater degree. Appellant cannot escape liability as an infringer by a mere duplication of Plumb’s combination. That is a mere carrying forward of his idea, by duplicating the parts, doing the same thing in identically the same way, with better results. Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U. S. 150; Belding Manuf’g Co. v. Challenge Corn-Planter Co., 152 U. S. 107, 14 Sup. Ct. 492.

Passing from a consideration of these practical advantages of Plumb’s sweeper, as observed in its operation, let us contrast its mechanism with that found in the earlier devices, and see how far that indicates a purpose, and what that design was. Here we again find very markéd mechanical differences. This difference lies, not in the case, or brush, or wheels, but in the connection between the case and the wheels. Theretofore the connection between the case and wheels had been rigid. He made that connection elastic. He did this by spring-supporting his case on its wheels, so that both the wheels and the case hove a vertical motion relatively to each other. The combination of old elements, by which he makes the connection between the case and wheels elastic, constitutes the claim here involved. That mechanism provides for the rotation of the brush by frictional contact between the brush roller and the driving wheels, which are held in contact with the brush roller by the action of the springs, I, I. The nécessary mechanical effect of these springs, when arranged as described, is to keep the wheels pressed against the pulley wheel of the brush shaft, and, by the friction thus produced, rotate the brush when motion is given the wheels by driving it over the surface to be swept. Plumb calls attention to the fact that his wheels are allowed “free motion,” attributable in part to. the fastening of these springs to the case in one place only. This reference, looking to the whole language of his specification, and construed as one skilled in the mechanics pertaining to carpet sweepers would construe it, does not refer to the mere rotation of the '.brush roller, but to the “free motion” of the wheels vertically in ¡relation to the case.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Wagenhorst v. Hydraulic Steel Co.
27 F.2d 27 (Sixth Circuit, 1928)
Kohler v. Cline Electric Mfg. Co.
28 F.2d 405 (N.D. Illinois, 1927)
Ford Motor Co. v. Parks & Bohne, Inc.
21 F.2d 943 (Eighth Circuit, 1927)
Permutit Co. v. Wadham
13 F.2d 454 (Sixth Circuit, 1926)
Pickett v. F. B. Stearns Co.
10 F.2d 414 (Sixth Circuit, 1926)
Weir Frog Co. v. Porter
206 F. 670 (Sixth Circuit, 1913)
Warren Webster & Co. v. C. A. Dunham Co.
181 F. 836 (Eighth Circuit, 1910)
Forest City Foundry & Mfg. Co. v. Barnard
176 F. 561 (Sixth Circuit, 1910)
Morgan Engineering Co. v. Alliance Mach. Co.
176 F. 100 (Sixth Circuit, 1909)
American Bank Protection Co. v. City Nat. Bank of Johnson City
181 F. 375 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Tennessee, 1909)
Superior Drill Co. v. La Crosse Plow Co.
160 F. 504 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Wisconsin, 1908)
Dunlap v. Willbrandt Surgical Mfg. Co.
151 F. 223 (Eighth Circuit, 1906)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
72 F. 67, 19 C.C.A. 13, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2646, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goshen-sweeper-co-of-grand-rapids-v-bissell-carpet-sweeper-co-ca6-1895.